Turkish-Speaking Young People in North London:

A Case of Diversity and Disadvantage

by

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Abstract

This thesis examines the situation of Turkish-speaking boys and girls, mostly aged 14-16, in two London boroughs, Hackney and Haringey. It seeks to deconstruct the notion of a single Turkish identity. It is also informed by the view that it is necessary to situate ethnic differences within a broader socio-economic context. It systematically identifies the lives, aspirations and values of these young people with specific reference to ethnic, religious, family, education and economic concerns. First of all, the thesis concentrates on the construction of the young people's ethnic and religious identities. Secondly, it discusses their attitudes towards family issues. Thirdly, the academic performances of the Turkish-speaking young people are addressed, and their economic aspirations and future perceptions are studied in relation to their parents' economic status. Finally, the young people's contacts with their relatives both in London, Turkey, Cyprus and other countries are analysed, together with their access to Turkish-speaking television and newspapers.

Ogrencileri icin hep en iyiyi hedefleyen babam

Ertekin Enneli'nin anisina

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Memorandum

The study presented here is based entirely on my own work, except where other authors have been referred to or acknowledged in the text. It has not been previously submitted for a degree at this or any other university.

PINAR ENNELI



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Introduction:

There has been growing academic interest in ethnic minorities in the West. In this process, quite a substantial amount of research has been produced concerning ethnic communities in developed countries. The study of the younger generation has become particularly important. As Portes (1996:2) argues:

> the adaptation of the second generation will be decisive in establishing the long-term outlook for contemporary immigration. It is indeed among the second generation, not the first, where such issues as the continuing dominance of English, the growth of a welfare-dependent population, the resilience of culturally distinct urban enclaves, and the decline or growth of ethnic intermarriages will be decided permanently.

On the other hand, research to date does not seem to have a full understanding of the second generation's lives and aspirations. As Rumbault (1996:122) points out:

> less is known about the subjective aspects of the children's experience... including their modes of ethnic or national self-identification, perceptions of discrimination, aspirations for their adult futures, cultural preferences, forms of intergenerational cohesion or conflict within their families, self-esteem and psychological well-being, and how all these may be related to more objective indices of their experience, such as their school and work performance and language shifts from the mother tongue to English, in given social context.

In line with these arguments, this thesis is particularly aimed at the study of Turkish-speaking young people[1] . Throughout, the term 'Turkish-speaking' will be used instead of 'Turkish'. Since the 1990s the schools and the education authorities have used the term 'Turkish-speaking' in order to identify their pupils whose home language is Turkish. The term has certain advantages, since it is able to cover various ethnic and religious sub-groups.

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[1]When I use the term 'young people', I am referring to both women and men in general. I prefer not to differentiate between the two each time I use the term in order to avoid disrupting the readability of the sentences.

In the Turkish-speaking 'community' in the UK, there are three basic sub-communities - Kurds, Turks and Turkish Cypriots[2]. The oldest established community is Turkish Cypriot. Turkish Cypriot males began to migrate to the UK between 1945 and 1955 (Sonyel, 1988:11). Most of the Turkish Cypriot young people in my research were second generation, and quite a number were third generation. The Turks came to England to find a job after the 1960s, when Europe, and in particular Germany, began to accept Turkish workers. Kurds have been in the United Kingdom since the early 1980s. Their political status is different from Turkish Cypriots and Turks. They are here as political refugees escaping from a dispute in the Eastern part of Turkey. 98 per cent of Kurdish young people in the sample had been in the UK for less than ten years, while 88 per cent of the Cypriots were born in the UK.

The Turkish-speaking 'community' makes up the largest immigrant community in the European Union. Although the majority live in Germany, there are a substantial number living in Great Britain. Estimates of the size of this community in Britain are not accurate, and there are different calculations. Problems are caused by the structure of the 1991 census data (Dale and Holdsworth 1997). As Fenton (1996:152) has discussed, there are several ways to determine the size of the ethnic minority population. For the purposes of this research, the census question on ethnicity is not useful, because most of the Turkish-speaking people were classified as 'white'. The number of people who called themselves 'Turkish, not white' was 18,876, including Turkish Cypriots (OPCS 1993a). However, the number of those born in Turkey was 26,597. Moreover, 78,031 people were born in Cyprus (OPCS 1993a). 31,189 people lived in households headed by someone born in Turkey. Additionally, 118,347 people lived in households headed by someone born in Cyprus (OPCS 1993a). A further delineation of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Kurds from this data is not possible.

Given these restrictions, the census data were used to find the places where the Turkish-speaking population was concentrated, rather than to obtain an accurate

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[2] I use the word 'community' in quotation marks each time I refer to Turkish-speaking people, since there are three sub-communities and the thesis seeks to analyse their differences. Nevertheless, the Turkish-speaking community is a generic term to describe people who share a common language.

number. It appears that 10,996 of the 18,876 Turkish population in the UK live in the inner London area and 53 per cent of the 10,996 live in Hackney and Haringey (OPCS 1993c). For this reason, the fieldwork was concentrated in these two boroughs. In fact, the latest language survey, of 896,743 schoolchildren in London, found that Turkish is the sixth mostly spoken language. There are 15,659 Turkish-speaking schoolchildren in London (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000:5). Turkish-speaking schoolchildren make up 1.74 per cent of all children in London, while they are 9.9 per cent in Haringey and 10.61 per cent in Hackney (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000:56). Storkey (2000:65) estimated from these figures that the total number of Turkish-speaking people living in London would be between 67,600 and 73,900.

These two areas in which the Turkish-speaking 'community' is concentrated, also include various other ethnic minorities. The schools which Turkish-speaking students attend have highly concentrated numbers of ethnic minority pupils but, most importantly, the Turkish-speaking students are one of the main groups in the schools. A total of over a hundred languages are spoken in Hackney and Haringey (OFSTED 1997:7 and Haringey Education Authority). In general, these boroughs are economically very disadvantaged. According to the Deprivation Index, which was prepared by the Department of the Environment in 1994 (DfE 1994), Hackney and Haringey are two of the most deprived areas. Hackney was the third most deprived local authority out of 366, and Haringey was tenth. Additionally, the Turkish-speaking students come from disadvantaged families in terms of economic prosperity. Most of the Turkish-speaking families live in council houses. The unemployment rate of the Kurdish fathers is especially high, compared to that of other Turkish-speaking fathers and that of the national average. The main economic activity among the community members is small shop keeping and working in garment factories. Economic participation is very low among the Kurdish mothers, compared to others.

In recent years, 'Turkish' communities have begun to be investigated, most notably in some continental countries, such as Germany and Holland. In the case of the UK, there are several studies on Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish community.

Ladbury (1977) carried out field research in London and in northern Cyprus in the mid 1970s in order to analyse the inter-ethnic relationships between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. However, she did not give detailed information about her research regarding

the number of cases and methodology. The study concluded that although the relationships between the two communities in Cyprus suffered as a result of the 1974 war, they had reasonably good relationships in London due to individuals' economic goals (Ladbury 1977:327). This research was limited to the Turkish Cypriot community and did not reveal any particular information about young people.

Other research, does however, specifically focus on young people. Ulug (1981), for instance, conducted in-depth interviews with five Turkish Cypriot girls and their families on a variety of cultural issues and carried out observations in the schools. Ulug (1981:1-2, 64) argued that Turkish Cypriot girls felt a considerable amount of alienation, confusion and conflict between their own culture (Eastern-Turkish) and English (Western) culture. Turkish families, as she observed, were scared of children having their moral values loosened by integrating with mainstream culture (1981:33).

Sonyel (1988) studied the education problems of Turkish pupils, by surveying 200 Turkish children aged between fourteen and seventeen years, and 100 parents and 100 teachers or other educationalists working with these children. Sonyel (1988) found that there was a lack of recognition of the Turkish children's own culture and religion and that they had difficulties because of this. He commented that:

> Many of them [the children] are ignorant of their own culture: language, religion and traditions; and many more are becoming strangers to their own ethnicity. Under the influence of British culture, a number of them question, and even reject, their own values and traditions. In the confusion created by the conflict of two cultures, they have become the victims of the dual-role dilemma (Sonyel 1988:45).

He added that unless serious and effective measures were taken at the family, community and governmental levels, these children might completely lose their ethnic and religious identity in 'the melting pot of Anglo-conformism' (Sonyel 1988:73).

Dedezade (1994) studied Turkish-speaking pupils' problems in the schools of north London, by interviewing twenty pupils (fourteen boys and six girls) aged between 15 and 16 years and seventy parents. The research concluded that the parents and the pupils were not satisfied with the education system due to the teachers' attitudes towards Turkish-speaking pupils, the lack of discipline, the language problems and the lack of respect given to their culture (Dedezade 1994:50).

Finally, Kucukcan (1998) conducted research on 93 Turkish and Turkish Cypriot young people (42 boys and 51 girls aged 12-18) in London, and found that Turkish young people's values under the influence of the socio-cultural values of British society, were in conflict with the values of their community presented by their parents (Kucukcan 1998:128).

It might be argued that these studies are either overly concentrated on Turkish Cypriot and Turkish young people, or overlook the internal dynamics of the community. The studies have a tendency to define a 'Turkish' culture in contrast to a British one, defining the young people's situation as caught between two different cultures. By doing this, the studies have restricted the understanding of Turkish-speaking young people's lives and aspirations within the assimilation and integration debates. Moreover, they usually studied young people in an educational context and mention other issues such as family and employment only when relevant to the young people's school performance. Consequently, these studies have very little to offer in terms of the sectoral and religious differentiation and change within the community arising from these internal dynamics.

This thesis aims to contribute to filling this gap. The thesis consists of five chapters. I review the relevant literature in relation to particular topics that form the substance of the separate chapters, rather than provide a single overview followed by my own investigation. The first chapter considers identity formation among Turkish-speaking young people. Initially, it is argued that the studies of ethnic and religious identities in general and of Muslim and Turkish identity in particular, usually claim that religious (Muslim) identity, as cultural, overrides ethnic identity (Turkish) as social. They then impose a distinction between the mainstream social values as secular, western and/or Christian and ethnic minority values as religious, traditional and/or Muslim. As against this, the chapter concentrates on the evidence regarding the fragmented nature of the Turkish-speaking 'community' which creates fractions based on religious and ethnic identities.

These fractions are not held to be creations of a process of interaction with the mainstream society, but rather a product of internal processes of interaction between various Turkish religious and ethnic groups. In other words, when Turkish-speaking young people identify themselves in religious and ethnic terms, their reference point is

not British society, nor even other Muslim communities in Britain, but the ethnic and religious sectoral differences in the Turkish-speaking 'community'.

Additionally, the first chapter argues that many current approaches ignore the practical implications of religious and ethnic identities due to the fact that they tend to focus on the importance of public representation of Muslim identities and the role of community-based associations in the public sphere. They pay little attention to the meaning of religious and ethnic identities for individuals in the private sphere.

The second chapter deals with Muslim family stereotypes. Whilst associating Muslim family structure with extended family size, a high level of solidarity and patriarchalism, earlier studies sometimes ignore changes in Muslim family structure, or explain these changes as the assimilationist effects of mainstream societies. In this chapter, it is argued that whilst there is a considerable attachment to traditional values, and that attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages are generally conservative, this is not the whole of the story.

Empirical evidence suggests that young people have attitudes that differ considerably from a traditional Muslim family understanding, with regards to: the number of children they want to have in the future; arranged marriages; extended families and women working outside their homes. It will be argued that these kinds of attitudes cannot simply be portrayed as the assimilationist effects of the mainstream society. Rather their attitudes are not different from those of their own parents. Turkish-speaking families also differ in many respects compared to other Muslim families. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account the changing family structure in Turkey.

The third chapter discusses multi-culturalist education policies. In recent years, in order to explain the underachievement of ethnic minority students, a growing number of multi-culturalist scholars have claimed that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is due to the lack of recognition of their cultural assets. Yet the evidence suggests that, although the schools of two boroughs, Haringey and Hackney, adopted a considerable set of multi-culturalist policies, the Turkish-speaking students do not show a uniform pattern in terms of academic achievement. Besides, there is a wide-spread scepticism amongst the Turkish-speaking students and teachers concerning some multi-culturalist incentives.

The third chapter argues that the Turkish-speaking young people's educational problems cannot be encapsulated into the space of cultural debates. It is necessary to take into account the effects of their families' economic exclusion[3] on their school-life in order to understand their problems. To substantiate such an argument, consideration is given to the case of the 'work experience scheme'. It is shown that, Turkish-speaking pupils are 'placed' in the small shops of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in which they are already working on a part-time basis and this is likely reinforce their disadvantage. Then, I will refer to the educational ambitions of students, and their feelings that education will not bring an end to exclusion in their future life.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a general analysis of the position of Turkish-speaking communities in the labour market. The young people's position in the labour market is analysed in the context of transition from school to work and their current engagement with the labour market through part-time jobs. The evidence shows that the current structural changes in the British market economy are bringing about severe disadvantages for Turkish-speaking immigrant communities in terms of their employment opportunities. Most are pushed into self-employment, or other forms of informal community employment, in the ethnic enclave labour markets.

Turkish-speaking adolescents' perceptions of their economic prospects and their chance of having a part-time job are clearly related to their parents' economic situations and the existing labour market conditions. In fact, the parents' economic positions are not uniform and vary in terms of their place of origin. Although they are located in the same deprived labour market and are dependent on the ethnic network to find employment,

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[3] There are various meanings of exclusion. Levitas (1998) puts all existing discussions into three categories: a redistributionist discourse primarily concerned with poverty, the moral underclass discourse centred on the moral and behavioural delinquency of the excluded themselves and, finally, a social integrationist discourse focused on paid work. To advance a specific discussion about all three categories is beyond the scope of this thesis, yet throughout this thesis, exclusion is used in the context of a redistributionist discourse. For a detailed discussion on the exclusion issue, see Levitas (1998). Additionally I should add here that I am also using the term exclusion descriptively to refer to the facts of economic disadvantage - economic marginalisation etc.

the Kurdish families are in the most disadvantaged circumstances, in comparison with the Turkish and Cypriot families.

The fifth chapter shows that the economic disadvantages of ethnic minorities are often referred to alongside the concerns over cultural assimilation within transnationalisation studies. In recent years, there has been increasing academic attention given to the transnationalisation of migrant communities. In this process, the advances in transportation systems, credit transactions between ethnic minorities and their relatives in different countries, and the globalisation of ethnic-minority media are amongst the most frequently cited changes. The chapter considers the association between transnationalisation and Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes on several issues in relation to the globalisation of ethnic-minority media. Their attitudes are analysed in terms of their access to Turkish/Kurdish newspapers and television.

Finally, the thesis will conclude that the existing identity, understandings and attitudes of Turkish-speaking young people cannot simply be regarded as the assimilationist effects of the dominant society on young people and that it is also necessary to take into account the impacts of changes in social life in Turkey and Cyprus. Nor can their problems be understood only within the limits of cultural debates, it is necessary to refer to the problems of economic exclusion as well. Likewise, describing certain effects of transnationalisation as a way of saving ethnic minorities from the assimilationist effects of the dominant society cannot be unreservedly accepted in the case of Turkish-speaking young people.

Epistemology and Methodology:

The aim of this chapter is to discuss this thesis in relation to current epistemological debates and describe the research method in detail. First of all, I begin with the epistemological debate. Then move into a more detailed account of the research method I used and a rationale for the strategy I adopted. This will include discussion of my role as a researcher vis-à-vis the Turkish-speaking 'community', my overall approach to data collection, the sampling, conduct of the interviews and issues around the use of language.

In recent years, the question of the social context of knowledge has been a central concern. As Delanty (2000:111) puts it, the central issue lies in clarifying the extent to which social reality is constructed by social sciences. There seem to be two sides to this discussion: constructivist and realist. The constructivist concentrates on the question of whether reality can be objectively observed or how the scientist constructs the reality. As a constructionist, Bourdieu (1995:10) argues that sociologists occupy a position in various struggles, not only class struggles, but also scientific ones. Their position in these struggles is first as the possessors of a certain economic and cultural capital, and then as researchers endowed with a certain specific capital in the field of cultural production. Referring to the sociologist, Bourdieu (1995:10) states that:

> He [a sociologist] always has to bear this in mind, ... to try to allow for everything that his practice, what he sees and does not see, what he does and does not do (for example, the objects he chooses to study), owes to his social position.'

From a similar position, Millman and Kanter (1987:31) introduce a feminist model which takes into account the researcher's subjective experiences as well as the respondents' experiences. They argue that male researchers have difficulties achieving the same empathy with female subjects as female researchers and, in this sense, female researchers might have an advantage (Millman and Kanter 1987:35). Likewise, Harding (1987:187) contended that:

> Once we undertake to use women's experience as a resource to generate scientific problems, hypotheses, and evidence, to design research for women, and to place the researcher in the same critical plane as the research subject, traditional epistemological assumptions can no longer be made.

Ladner (1987) asserted that her own identity as a black woman growing up in rural America helps her to understand the urban black girls' experiences of poverty and racism better than other researchers who have studied black people before her from white middle class perspectives.

On the realist side of the argument, on the other hand, the theorists believe the existence of the objective reality to be independent of the researcher's position or experiences in relation to that reality. Bhaskar (1987:51) makes a distinction between the (relatively) unchanging real objects which exist outside the scientific process and the changing (and theoretically - imbued) cognitive objects which are produced within science as a function and result of its practice. Trigg (1989:219) states that everything collapses when there is no concept of an objective reality, corresponding to each level of science, as a target or goal. Everything is then arbitrary, since there is no point in holding to one theory rather than another. Coser (1984:306) takes a similar stand:

> We deal here with a massive cop-out, a determined refusal to undertake research that would indicate the extent to which our lives are affected by the socio-economic context in which they are embedded. It amounts to an orgy of subjectivism, a self-indulgent enterprise in which perpetual methodological analysis and self-analysis leads to infinite regress, where the discovery of the ineffable qualities of the mind of the analyst and analysand and their private construction of reality serves to obscure the tangible qualities of the world 'out there'.

In fact, Delanty (2000:132) argues that the constructivist - realist divide is a false dichotomy and the real conflict lies in the various positions of the constructivists from postmodernist to feminist. Unlike the postmodernist, for instance, the feminist constructionist seeks an objective reality different from a positivist understanding of the term. For instance, Bhavnani (1995:30) introduces three questions in order to assist feminist objectivity in scientific work: are the researched reinscribed into prevailing notions of powerlessness? are the micropolitics of the research relationships discussed? and how are the questions of difference engaged?

Then, Bhavnani (1995:33-36) discusses her own research on young people and politics in respect of these three questions. First of all, she does not recognise young working-class people as social victims. Secondly, she takes into account her role as student researcher, her age, and her assumed class affiliation as sources of potential

domination, yet at the same time, her racialised and gendered ascriptions suggest the opposite. And finally, she notes that her research study did point to many continuities of experience for the young people studied, while there were also non-shared experiences and accounts such as those of racism, culture and gender.

My Position in The Debate:

Within the scope of the constructivist and realist debate, I could not easily take my stand on one side or another. On the one hand, I agree with the constructivist view that my background has certain implications in this research. Some of these implications are positive and some of them might be regarded as negative. On the positive side, since Turkish is my mother tongue, I enjoyed better communication with the young people than an English speaking person. Moreover, I can understand better than somebody who is not Turkish, the sectoral and ethnic differences in the ways people identify themselves and organise their lives. Otherwise, I might not have asked the questions about their ethnic and religious identities in detail, and assumed that all belonged to a single Muslim Turkish community. Coming from Turkey also alerted me to the ways in which changing dynamics of family and community life not only in Britain, but also in Turkey, could affect these young people's lives. In addition, being a woman enabled me to enjoy a more relaxed communication with the young women, especially on the issues of family and sexual relations. Moreover, despite the gender difference, my more mature age helped to create a relaxed atmosphere with young men during the interviews.

On the negative side, although I shared a common language with my respondents, my ethnic and socio-economic background is different from that of my respondents. I am not from Cyprus nor Kurdish, and, unlike most Turkish young people, I have an urban middle class and secular background. Additionally, I came to Britain as a student at the university level so my socialisation did not take place in this country. All these could be regarded as potential barriers between me and my respondents. Yet, my non-affiliation to any specific groups in the sample made it more comfortable for my respondents to speak with me. Otherwise, I might have enjoyed good communication with some respondents, while creating unease among others because of my background. For instance, if I had been heavily identified with a religious position, this might have made some Alevi respondents reluctant to discuss the religious issues in more detail with me. Likewise, if I was Kurdish or Alevi, this might have put off some Turkish respondents

discussing the same issues in detail. Most importantly, since I did not share the same socialisation process as the young people, they were more willing to reveal their lives more thoroughly in order to make me understand more.

Furthermore, as Benney and Hughes (1984:219) point out, where the parties to an interview are unsure of their appropriate roles they are likely to have recourse to other more firmly delineated roles that will turn the encounter into one where they feel more at home. In this regard, my lack of affiliation to any one group enabled most respondents to turn our communication into one where they felt more comfortable.

Apart from recognising the implications of my position on the selection of my research subject, the questions and on the conduct of the interviews, I am not a constructivist in the sense that I do not believe that there is no objective reality other than the researcher's subjective interpretations. Because if this was the case, I, as a sociologist, would arguably not need to bother to do any research of any kind, other than to write my personal opinions on a certain subject on my desktop. And we as sociologists might find ourselves in a situation where anything goes. However, our subjects living in certain social, cultural and economic structures or settings have real practical problems. Moreover, as Giddens (1987:215) points out, common awareness of these settings of action forms an anchoring element in the 'mutual knowledge' whereby agents make sense of what others say and do. In this respect, I tried to reach a mutual understanding with my respondents by using our common knowledge in order to understand their problems, their lives and aspirations.

In the context of the relationship between my position on [the question of] the social context of knowledge and the methods I used during the interviews, I agree with Bryman's (1988:108) argument on the subject. He states that the difference between quantitative and qualitative research is really a technical matter rather than epistemological, whereby the choice between them is to do with their suitability in answering particular research questions.

Bryman (1988:112) also adds that there are similarities in the technical problems associated with quantitative and qualitative research. The problem of the role of the researcher is the problem for both techniques. The second problem is related to our instrument's ability to capture the daily life and conditions, opinions and values of respondents in their "natural habitat". This problem occurs in various ways such as the

wording in the questionnaire and the availability of the necessary knowledge to answer a question on the part of the respondent. Thirdly, although survey interviews might be criticised for relying on attitudes and people's reports of their behaviour, both of which may bear little relation to actual behaviour, it would be difficult to assume that qualitative techniques, especially participant observation, have a technical advantage in this respect by virtue of the researcher's ability to observe behaviour directly. In a sense that it might be assumed participant observation would be better for 'capturing' behaviour rather than decontextualised attitudes in a survey, since it is observation of people in their 'natural' context. However, unless the researcher lied about his or her identity, there is no guarantee that he or she able to capture the respondents' 'natural behaviour' in their 'natural' habitat. Fourth, some of the unstructured interviews might take a more formal, ordered character like survey data collection and this might have an adverse effect on the qualitative depth of the data. When all these common problems are taken into account, Bryman (1988:126) contends that when quantitative and qualitative research are jointly pursued, much more complete accounts of social reality can ensue. In this sense, I used various methods ranging from structured interviews to focus groups and observations. My intention was to achieve both depth and systematic coverage.

Research Techniques and Sampling:

In this study, I mainly conducted interviews with a structured questionnaire, and also held two focus group discussions, and carried out intensive observations and unstructured interviews with several parents and teachers. In this way, I was able to gain as much information as possible. Although in-depth interviews might have allowed me to concentrate on a particular issue with only a small number of cases, it would have been difficult to draw a representative sample for in-depth interviews. Besides, in order to answer the question why the young people had certain attitudes, aspirations and ideas, first of all I needed to know what these attitudes were and how typical these attitudes were among the young people. In order to answer these questions, I needed a considerable sample of young people which would have been very time consuming and difficult to achieve by the in-depth interview technique. The following section will give detailed information about the techniques I used and the nature of my sample.

Sample:

The initial aim had been to achieve a large number of self-completed questionnaires, covering all age ranges in the secondary schools in Hackney and Haringey where the majority of the Turkish-speaking people live, and then interview a small sample of the students in depth. But it was realised during the pilot study covering whole age groups in a girls' school in Haringey that most of the students, especially from Kurdish origins, could barely read English or Turkish, and could only speak Turkish. Consequently, I decided to interview students between 14 and 16 years old, because they are a relatively homogeneous group in terms of employment and marital status compared to older young people. Besides they are at the final stage of their compulsory education and will make a transition from school life to adult life sooner than their younger counterparts. Students between 14 and 16 years old also concentrated on questions much better than younger age groups. Moreover, interviewing seemed better suited to young people, in order to minimise the possibility that they might misread or misunderstand some of the items in a questionnaire. Preliminary interviews and data gathering began in 1996. After a short pilot study, the rest of the fieldwork took one and half years to complete and was conducted between 1997 and mid 1998.

All the secondary schools in Hackney and Haringey were first contacted by telephone in order to ascertain whether they had a Turkish-speaking population. Subsequently, those schools which confirmed having Turkish-speaking pupils, were asked for their permission to undertake the research, by letter to the head teachers. In this way, seventeen schools were contacted. In the end few schools were willing/able to co-operate. Only four schools responded positively (two in Hackney and two in Haringey) and further contacts were made with these schools in order to explain the nature of the research. Once personal contact was established with heads of the Section 11 and deputy heads of the schools, it proved less difficult but getting that far was a problem. After several meetings with the head teachers or their deputies or the staff responsible for ethnic minority students, the schools took over the responsibility for organising a detailed timetable of interviews and allocating a private room for the duration of the fieldwork. Only one systematic classroom observation was undertaken, although the students were observed informally in all schools during their break times.

The sample was drawn from a number of schools in Haringey and Hackney. Interviews were conducted with 206 Turkish-speaking young persons, 103 girls and 103 boys, aged mainly between 14-16. There were 117 young people (56 girls and 61 boys) from Haringey and 89 (47 girls and 42 boys) from Hackney. Over half of the interviews (125) were conducted in four comprehensive schools, two (a mixed and a girls' school) in Hackney and two (again a mixed and a girls' school) in Haringey. In the sample, 45 girls were from a girls' school, six girls and 37 boys from a mixed school in Haringey. There were 14 girls from a girls' school and 16 girls and seven boys from a mixed school in Hackney. Nineteen students (three girls and 16 boys) from another Haringey mixed school were interviewed outside the school premises, mainly in their homes. The rest of the students (62) were selected from two (Turkish-speaking) Sunday Community Schools. Ten of those (two girls and eight boys) were from other Haringey schools and others (17 girls and 35 boys) were from Hackney schools. In the Sunday Community Schools, several classroom observations were also carried out. The schools arranged the interviews and they approached to the suitable pupils first and asked their permission to be interviewed. I interviewed all the suitable pupils in each school and none of them refused to be interviewed.

I am aware of the fact that where people live can have a considerable effect on their life chances, aspirations and quality of life. However, in the case of this research, Haringey and Hackney have more similarities than differences in terms of economic conditions, social and cultural relations. As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis and discussed thoroughly in later chapters, however, it is necessary to mention here that these areas, in which the Turkish-speaking 'community' is concentrated, include various other ethnic minorities and are also two of the most deprived areas in Britain.

Furthermore, regardless of where they lived and which school they attended, the young people's responses, attitudes and aspirations seemed to be in line with where they or their families came from. The Turkish-speaking students came from disadvantaged families in terms of economic prosperity. Most of the Turkish-speaking families lived in council houses. The unemployment rate of Kurdish fathers was especially high compared to that of other Turkish-speaking fathers and that of the national average.

The socio-economic background of the young people varied in terms of ethnic origins, rather than the school they attended (see chapter 4). The schools which Turkish-

speaking students attended have various numbers of other ethnic minority pupils as well but, most importantly, the Turkish-speaking students were one of the main groups in the schools. In relation to the GCSE results of the young people, the school differences would obviously have been very important, yet, in order to assess the implications of these differences, it would have been necessary to concentrate on the schools' curricula, the teachers' profiles, the schools' reports and how the teaching was conducted, etc. in more detail than was actually possible for this thesis. Then, it could be said that although all the students' backgrounds were more or less similar, the school A seemed more successful than school B because of the reason C or D.

As can be appreciated, this would have required a different project than that conducted here. I was given access in the school to the pupils but not to background data on the individual pupils' achievements and only to one classroom situation (one lesson) in one school. Nevertheless, as far as the scope of the present research is concerned, the differences between Hackney and Haringey in terms of the young people's overall GSCE results (i.e. they are for the cohort not on a pupil by pupil basis which would have enabled me to correlate data from my interview responses from particular pupils with their achievement records) will be mentioned in chapter 3 in order to substantiate an argument that multi-cultural education policies might not be sufficiently adequate in themselves to guarantee students' continued success.

In the sample, one hundred and sixteen of the young people (56%) had been in the UK less than ten years, while nine (4%) had been in this country more than ten years. Further, eighty one young people in the sample (39%) had been born in Britain. Almost all the young Cypriots had been born in this country, while all the Kurdish young people had been here less than ten years (nine in ten Cypriot, six in ten Turkish but only one in ten Kurdish young people had been born in Britain). Because of these different proportions this variable was not represented as an independent variable throughout the analysis, and, the relevance of being born in this country is only mentioned in specific contexts.

One hundred and seventy five young people (85%) came from two parent households. All of the parents were married in these households, so there were no cohabiting parents. There were 166 young people (81%) that had no other family member in their households apart from their mother, father and siblings. Of the young people, 44% had

only one sibling and 36% had two siblings. Only 20% of the young people had more than three siblings. All these household characteristics are discussed in detail in the family chapter, i.e. chapter 2.

There were four categories of young people in the sample in terms of place of origin: Kurdish, Turkish, Cypriot and mixed origin. The number of Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot young people were 92, 34 and 50 respectively. There were thirty young people of mixed origin in the sample: their mothers and fathers did not have common origins. In the mixed origin category, there were nine young people with one parent from outside the Turkish-speaking 'community'. Another ten had one Turkish and one Kurdish parent. Eight had one Turkish and one Cypriot parent and only three had one Kurdish and one Cypriot parent. I am aware of the fact that people bundled up together in a loose category like 'mixed' would vary in terms of their responses on a number of issues, yet with a sample of 206 respondents, their number on their own would not be sufficient for the purposes of statistical analysis. However, on a number of occasions, I will mention these variances in response in the mixed category in relation to specific issues. Besides, more detailed data on the young people in relation to the ethnic origin and identity is provided in the substantive chapters.

Interviews:

At each interview, confidentiality and anonymity were assured. At the beginning of the fieldwork, I thought that it might be useful to have each respondent's name in order to access their GCSE results through the school after the fieldwork. However, I then realised that this technique might diminish the relaxed atmosphere of the communication I had managed to construct therefore I abandoned this strategy. Other than the confidentiality issue, I promised respondents that I would never discuss any issue raised during the interviews with their schools or their families on an individual basis.

The interviews lasted between an hour and one and a half hours. On a couple of occasions, young people were interviewed together with their friends in compliance with their wishes to do so. On these occasions, the young people were allowed to discuss some issues in the questionnaire with each other and these discussions were also noted on the questionnaire either during the discussions or immediately afterwards. The students seemed to enjoy themselves during the interviews, especially the girls who

were very keen to discuss their families, school experiences, aspirations, expectations, and ideals. Language and translation issues are discussed below.

Nine Turkish-speaking teachers were also included in the fieldwork. Extensive unstructured interviews were conducted with four of them, while the contribution of the rest was limited to their opinions on specific issues. Only one of these interviews was tape recorded. This was transcribed and only relevant parts were translated into English.

Only five non-Turkish-speaking teachers were involved in the fieldwork. Although none of them were formally interviewed, their opinions on several issues were noted. Most of the interviews with the other teachers and parents were not tape recorded, since it was realised that they were more relaxed without a tape recorder. After the initial data gathering, two London Borough Education Authorities were contacted to obtain statistical data on Turkish-speaking pupils' GSCE results.

Apart from the students, parents and the teachers, the heads of three organisations were also interviewed: an organisation for elderly Turkish people; an organisation for Turkish-speaking women; and an educational organisation for Turkish-speaking students. The interview with the head of the educational organisation was tape recorded.

Observation:

Data were also included from direct observations of some of the students (both boys and girls) in their home and in their free time. Each of these observations was recorded in great detail immediately after each occasion. In addition, after analysing the interview data, focus group discussions were held with two groups of young people, five boys and five girls separately at a school. The girls and boys discussed the various issues mentioned in the questionnaire thoroughly. Both of these discussion were tape recorded and transcribed in Turkish and then the relevant parts were translated into English.

Twelve families were observed both in and outside their home settings. Again all these observations were documented immediately afterwards. Continued contact with seven of these families throughout the fieldwork was achieved, but the rest of the parents (both mothers and fathers) were interviewed only once. I did not use tape recorders during these interviews, but took notes. During the fieldwork, I stayed with a couple of Turkish-

speaking families. These families helped me to find other families and introduced me to those young people who were interviewed outside school hours.

During the fieldwork, all the time apart from the interviews, I was together with the young people and their families. I socialised with the women a little more than the men. However, during the family visits, weddings I had plenty of chances to spend time with the men as well. When I was with a family, they treated me as a visitor. We ate, watched television or went shopping together. We chatted about various issues such as families, make up, shopping, politics, television and life in general. These interactions were very informal. I also helped some of the family members during their doctor, school or council appointments. I translated their letters or made phone calls on their behalf.

Additionally, two textiles factories; a community meeting on International Women's Day; and several weddings and circumcision ceremonies were observed. During all these occasions, all relevant incidents were noted and immediately afterwards written down in detail. The families took me to the factories and the meetings. At one of the factories, the people (men and women) were paid on piece work and they had a little time to talk with me, but nevertheless I watched them and I talked with the ironers and some cutters. At the second factory, I had a chance to speak with the workers. These were very informal conversations. The working conditions in both factories were bad with poor air circulation, noise, dirty toilets and lavatories and crowded.

When I attended the wedding and circumcision ceremonies, I was introduced to the other families by the family I went with. I spoke to both men and women of varying ages, but usually women in these ceremonies. Apart from these, I approached to the young people (both girls and boys) and chatted with them.

Analyses:

At the end of the fieldwork, the quantitative data were analysed on the computer using SPSS (Statistical Programme for Social Sciences). I used cross tabulation to explore the relationships between variables. Since I mostly explored the relationship between more than two variables and the number of cases in each cell was not sufficient, in all the Tables I give the raw numbers for each category and use the percentages for each cell. However, when the numbers are less than twenty in a category, I put their raw numbers in brackets next to the percentage values for each cell. As I indicated before, my initial

aim was to achieve a large sample size, yet I was unable to do this for the reasons outlined above. In each table, the total may not add to 100 due to rounding.

In addition, the quantitative data were supported and supplemented by the qualitative analysis of discussions, observations and interviews, which were usually translated from Turkish into English. After analysing quantitative data, I checked all qualitative data to clarify and discuss the cross-table results in detail. In fact, especially focus group discussions helped me considerably in this process, since I conducted them after finishing the analysis of the quantitative data and I use the focus group to discuss some important results in relation to job aspirations, community belonging, friendship patterns, the role of the education or gender roles thoroughly .

The language throughout the interviews and focus group discussions was mainly Turkish, but on several occasions the interviews were conducted in English. Some young people preferred to use both languages; starting with one and continuing with another or by using some English words when they spoke Turkish, and vice versa. Since I kept detailed notes of my observations and interviews with teachers and the parents and the discussions of the young people during the interviews and tape recorded the focus group discussions and some of the interviews, I had a considerable quantity of qualitative data. I transcribed all the recorded data, but did not translate all of it into English. I only translated the data used in the thesis to support the argument, to substantiate the quantitative material, and stick as closely as possible to the original. This was also the case for other qualitative data. I did not translate all of it in English. I only translated those which I have explicitly and fully reported here.

I am aware that translation from one language to another might lose some of the meaning, yet I did my best to reduce this to minimum. In fact, the risk of losing the meaning does not only belong to cross-cultural studies. For some theorists, language is important in every research project aimed at examining and delineating aspects of a social context in which we are prone to assume everyone "speaks the same language" (Deutscher 1984:239).

1. Religious and Ethnic Identities:

Studies on ethnic and religious identities in general and Muslim and Turkish identity in particular, usually claim that religious (Muslim) identity as culture overrides ethnic identity (Turkish) as social, and then they impose distinctions between mainstream social values as secular, western and/or Christian and ethnic minority values as religious, traditional and/or Muslim. These approaches also have a tendency to ignore the practical implications of religious and ethnic identities. Instead, they focus on the importance of public representation of Muslim identities, and the role of the community based associations in the public sphere, while overlooking the meaning of religious and ethnic identities for individuals in the private sphere.

In this chapter, I will argue that the Turkish-speaking 'community' is a case which challenges those understandings in some respects. The Turkish-speaking adolescents' ethnic and religious identities should not be analysed mainly in terms of the conflict between the values of the mainstream society and the values of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. The sources of their ethnic and religious identity are the conflicts that have existed in the community for centuries (Enneli 1996). The basis of their identity is 'Muslim Turkish Cypriot', 'Muslim Turk', 'Alevi Turk, 'Muslim Kurd' and 'Alevi Kurd'. Apart from having religious and ethnic identities as a symbol, some members of the ethnic minority groups also observe religious practice individually, without participation in the activities of religious organisations.

The chapter is composed of three parts. In the first, the theoretical questions raised in the literature will be examined with specific reference to Muslim communities in Britain. In the second part, the role of religion in the public sphere in the Turkish-speaking 'community' will be discussed in the context of Muslim associations and organisations. In the final part, the role of religion in private sphere will be studied in the context of religious self-identification and the religious practices of both the young persons and their families.

1.1 Theoretical Introduction:

In the literature, it is often assumed that religious identities are cultural and ethnic identities are social. Rex (1991) connects ethnic identities with interactions of people in

their social settings, whilst cultural identities, which involve religious identity as well, are not products of ad hoc interactions of individuals or groups but are inherited from the past and impose themselves on the present. Rex (1991:13) argues that:

> the population who share a culture may be larger or smaller than that whose members are involved in group action or who share an ethnicity. The two populations may not completely coincide. Hence it is necessary to see cultural identity as something distinct from group or ethnic identity.

In the case of Turkish-speaking young people, it seems difficult to draw a line between ethnic and religious identities at the base of 'social' and 'cultural'. As far as my data on Turkish and Muslim identities are concerned, they are both cultural and social. Their identities might be called 'culturally constructed social identities'. Moreover, their religious and ethnic identities are mixed with each other, they are not separated.

The second concern in the literature relates to the nature of the relationship between religious and ethnic identities. Is it possible to identify a religious group as a part of a larger ethnic group? As Barot (1993:7) argues,

> Although it is perfectly possible to show that links do exist between a particular group and their religion in specific cases, there is no more a one-to-one relationship between ethnicity and religion than there ever was between race and culture.

In contrast with Barot's (1993) reservation about a one-to-one relationship between ethnicity and religion, Basit (1997) has endorsed a collective Muslim identity which embraces different ethnic groups:

> While British Muslims are not a homogeneous group, a collective Muslim identity transcends the regional and sectarian differences when living in a non-Muslim country which is their adopted homeland (Basit 1997:437).

On the other hand, some studies show that ethnic minority groups choose several ethnic identities, instead of one. When Lyon (1997) studied the relationship between being 'British', being 'Pakistani' and being 'Asian', he discovered that in daily life these are not conflicting identities, but reflect a different status in different circumstances. 'British' identity refers to a political and cultural status. 'Pakistani', 'Bangladeshi' or 'Indian' identities are cultural and 'Black' or 'Asian' show political alliances. Furthermore, in all

different sorts of identifications, Lyon saw the acknowledgement of boundaries as crucial. He argues that:

> 'Ethnicity' involves a classification based on duality. Logically, ethnicity expresses relationships of both inclusion and exclusion. It is a classification involving a set and its subset. An ethnic group, then, is an acknowledged subset of an acknowledged set; all members of A are also members of B; some members of B are also members of A (Lyon 1997:187).

There are several studies to show the difficulties in identifying a single Muslim community. Andrews (1993), for instance, identifies different Muslim groups in both Pakistan and the UK with special reference to Jamaat-i-Islami. He argues that the movement of Jamaat-i Islami found support from middle class intellectual Muslims but is not supported by rural people, who believed in traditional Islam.

Similarly, Eade (1993) studies the tensions between the 'real' local people and Muslim outsiders in two areas of London, Tower Hamlets and Ealing. Whilst highlighting the struggles of a Muslim community trying to build their own public space in a non-Muslim environment, the article is interesting because it illustrates the variety of Muslim groups who are seeking recognition. In the case of Tower Hamlets, until the early 1980s, the members of the Bangladeshi community defined their needs in secular terms such as housing and education, for instance. The defeat of the Labour party in the 1986 borough election broke the alliance of this secular Bangladeshi group with white radicals and the weak influence of secular activists strengthened the position of those Bangladeshis who wished to emphasise the Islamic needs of the community. Then, two Mosque organisations came on the scene to fight for their interests. One of the Mosques belonged to the Bangladeshi Community and was controlled by the Bangladeshi High Commission in London, and the other mosque was financed by Arab states in the Middle East. The first one had a low profile, but the second one drew attention to itself by broadcasting the calls to prayer (azzan). The white local residents are against both of the mosques under the guise of the preservation of historical buildings and noise pollution etc.

In fact, religious and ethnic identities do not always overlap. All groups we can call Muslim can differ from each other in terms of their religious practice and their perceived

religious identities. This differentiation can create boundaries between them such that on occasions some of the group members feel alienated, and totally excluded.

The third concern in the literature in relation to how ethnic and religious identities are defined and shaped, is the relationship between the dominant groups and ethnic minority groups: the roles of dominant groups, and other minorities and what the internal dynamics are within a specific group. The studies usually focus on the effect of dominant societies on the ethnic and religious identities of ethnic minority groups. For instance, Ullah (1985) in his study of second-generation Irish young people in catholic schools, argues that Irish group formation depends on how the group is viewed negatively by those in the English culture. Some of them totally ignore their Irish identity and define themselves as 'English', but some of them reject negative Irish stereotypes and create their own negative English stereotypes such as 'selfish English' or 'boring English'.

Kuusela's (1993) main argument in the study of Turkish Muslims in Sweden is that residential, economic and social segregation of Turkish Muslims, combined with increasing anti-migrant feelings among the Swedish people in response to a deteriorating economic situation, along with the disappearing prospect of returning to Turkey all made Turkish cultural identity stronger than before. Kuusela (1993:48) points out that:

> They turned to Islam as it constitutes a very basic framework for Turkish cultural identity. This is especially relevant for people with close connections to village life.

Other studies too assume that there is an increasing sympathy among the second generation young people with involvement in religious activities due to the economic, social and cultural disadvantages they face in Western societies. In this sense, religion is analysed as a mechanism to escape from the pressure of their difficulties. In her study of West Yorkshire Muslim women, Afshar (1993) argues that racism in education and at work destroys the delicate balance of conflicting values and identities that third generation girls, in particular, had maintained over the years. She suggests that:

> With the racial lines drawn and the Muslims as a community threatened, many amongst the youngest generation found that they had no choice other than returning to the fold and suspending all criticism of the *biraderi*. They have chosen to return to Islam, the religion that offers them a sense of identity, of belonging not only to a small immigrant minority, but

> to a vast, vibrant and vocal community, an *umma* that is prepared to defend the cause against all odds (Afshar 1993:66).

Basit (1997) disagrees with the idea of a conflicting culture between home and school for British Muslim girls. Nevertheless, she observes that young children adopt what they like in British culture and reject what they dislike in it, and by doing this they create multiple ethnic identities. The girls in her study do not seem to have conflicts about freedom and control with their parents and they want to become effective members of British society through education, without losing their Islamic religion (Basit 1997:436). In a similar study, Jacobson (1997) however argues that young British Pakistanis prefer having a Muslim identity only, which is perceived as universal and clear-cut, instead of having multiple identities.

There are three problems in this conceptualisation of ethnic minority values versus mainstream values. One problem relates to religious differences between the dominant society and minorities. Is it Christianity versus a Muslim minority? If this is so, it is difficult to define a single Christian community. Differences exist not only in Muslim communities but in Christian communities as well. Nesbitt (1993) studied children who are Irish Catholics, Orthodox Greek Cypriots, Ukrainian Catholics and finally Punjabi Christians in Coventry. She found that their churches are the centre of cultural continuity, as reminders of children's separateness from mainstream British Christian traditions.

Another problem relates to the ethnic or 'racial' identity of the dominant group. Is it 'English' versus ethnic minority? In fact, on some occasions, the English 'white' values can be articulated with values of 'black' communities in order to create nationalist discourse against other ethnic minority groups at the local level. Back (1993) studied the white peer groups' identity in relation to local neighbourhood culture, black peer groups and Vietnamese young people. He suggests that, at a local level, the idea of sharing neighbourhood and cultural syncretism including common macho attitudes result in inclusion of Afro-Caribbean children into the White peer groups, whilst excluding Vietnamese children as cultural outsiders.

Finally, the analysis of ethnic and religious identities in the context of conflict between majority and ethnic minority values under-emphasises the importance of differences within an ethnic minority group. Nye's work (1993) on the 'Hindu' community in Edinburgh emphasises two main groups in terms of place of origin: Gujuratis and

Punjabis. These two groups had different religious ceremonies, though they are both 'Hindu'. They managed to build a common temple and celebrate certain religious festivals which are shared by both Gujuratis and Punjabis. On the other hand, during the Nawratri festival, which is not as popular among Punjabis as is it among Gujuratis, there is far less emphasis upon the common forms used at other times. She argues that:

> Cultures are, of course, dynamic products of complex social situations. But too often the stress is put upon looking for cultural change in terms of reaction to external influences, rather than looking at the internal dynamics within cultures that lead to change. This is especially true of the study of religions among minority ethnic groups, where complex traditions are reduced to being mere expressions of a vague sense of ethnic or cultural identity (Nye 1993:123).

In the light of these discussions, it can be argued that ethnic identity is not necessarily a result of ethnic minority and majority group conflict. In his study of Turkish ethnic identity in the Netherlands, Verkuyten (1997:583) argues that this way of conceptualising ethnic identity is:

> a restricted and one-sided view of the process of self-definition among people from ethnic minority groups. On the one hand, it ignores or underestimates the importance of continuity or the imagined history and culture of these groups. On the other hand, it implies a tendency to place ethnic minority members in a position of helpless victims.

He shows that when Turkish people talk about their identity and their place in Dutch society, they separate themselves from not only Dutch society and other foreigners, but from traditional Turks and first generation Turks as well. However, these different features of their identity are not in contradictory positions, rather they complement each other (Verkuyten 1997:572-577).

Furthermore, some of the studies show the effects of the homeland of immigrants in creating ethnic and religious identities. Lewis (1997:126) argues that:

> Developments in communications technology, transport and information, mean that contextualised local versions of Hinduism, Islam or Sikhism will have to be located within such a global perspective. This means that Britain is not immune to the impact of inter-religious tensions in South Asia or the Middle East, and this renders any homogenising discourse about black or Asian identity increasingly problematic.

In the analysis of religious beliefs among West Indian, Indian and Muslim immigrants in Britain, Rex (1993) observed that, in each group, there are a variety of religious sects corresponding to the members' places of origin or their economic and social positions in Britain. For instance, Sikhs have more sympathy with working class and Labour politics and they are more likely to be members of the Marxist Indian Workers Association, which provides a bridge with domestic labour. However, at the same time, they continue to be involved in the politics of the Punjab and they are divided in terms of their attitude to an independent state of Khalistan. Rex (1993:19) argues that:

> In the contemporary European societies today we have a wide range of religious and ethnic groups whom we have to understand as developing their beliefs and practices not merely in relation to the world of the here and now, but in relation to past and distant social and political contexts.

Tatla (1993) studies the relationship between homeland politics and religious institutions in Britain in the case of the Punjabi community. He points out that after the invasion of the Golden-temple in 1984, many Sikhs in Britain began to support independence for their homeland. The political interests of both the Indian and British Governments put extra pressure on British Sikhs who support independent Khalistan. Tatla (1993:106) argues that:

> events since 1984 may have turned this confident ethnic community into a psychological state of 'homelessness' and the idea of a sovereign Khalistan has, perhaps for that reason, found a distinct chord of endorsement from a section of the community.

There is also a lack of studies to show the practical implications of religious and ethnic identities. Instead, they focus on the importance of public representation of Muslim identities, and the role of the community based-associations in the public sphere, while ignoring the meaning of religious and ethnic identities for the individuals in the private sphere. Indeed, ethnic and religious identities can bring members of ethnic minority groups together with a common goal, such as having a Mosque in the area, the introduction of religious education in schools or having weekend classes in their own language for the pupils. The ethnic and religious organisations are also taken into account as representatives of the communities at official level. They might be seen as the recognised 'voice' of the community.

Although religious and ethnic organisations are important places to study the cultural and social characteristics of ethnic minority communities, the lack of participation in these kinds of organisations does not necessarily mean that ethnic and religious identities are not important for these communities in their private sphere.

Modood (1997a:297) points out that religion is central to the self-definition of the majority of South Asian people, given that 96 per cent and 95 per cent of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis respectively in his research identified themselves as Muslim (Modood 1997a:298). This is more or less true for the Turkish-speaking young people as well. The majority call themselves Alevi or Muslim. In this sense, if the practical implications of these identities such as fasting, praying and mosque attendance, are taken aside, it might well be assumed that these identities are indeed very important for the young people.

However, as far as existing literature is concerned, there is no detailed research in this area. Although Modood (1997a) has some findings about attendance at religious services including Church, Hindu temples and Mosques, his research did not include other religious practices. Sixty five per cent of the South Asian Muslim men and 48 per cent of the women who are aged between 16 and 34 visit mosques once a week or more (Modood 1997a:304).

Four points emerge so far. Firstly, both religious and ethnic identities are cultural and social. Secondly, we cannot talk about a single Muslim community. Thirdly, religious and ethnic identities are not necessarily a product of the conflict between the values of the mainstream society and immigrants. The other ethnic minority groups and the different values within an ethnic minority group due to the cultural and social heritage of the homeland country of immigrants are also important. Finally, ethnic and religious identities should be analysed in two areas of the minorities' lives: public and private. Within this context, the following sections will analyse Turkish-speaking young people's ethnic and religious identities.

1.2 Religion and Ethnicity in the public life of the Turkish-Speaking 'Community':

1.2.1 Sub-groups in the Turkish-speaking 'Community':

The Turkish-speaking 'community' divides into two religious groups. It is also made up of three sub-communities in terms of differences in their place of origin. Moreover, political alliances cause a number of divisions in the community. The differences based on these political distinctions derive from developments in Turkey and Cyprus, and in the Turkish communities in other countries. In the following sections, these differences will be discussed in the context of the political and social developments in Turkey and Cyprus and in the context of Turkish community associations in Europe.

Heckmann (1997) studied Turkish community organisations in both a German and French town. She observed divisions among the communities affected by political alliances in Turkey. She chose two community organisations in order to show the struggle among Turks, between Turks and other ethnic groups and between Turks and the authorities. Heckmann (1997:107) argues that:

> Despite their recent emergence, Turkish migrant associational activities are only partly shaped by local factors. Both in France and in Germany, powerful transnational organisations act upon Turkish migrants as sources of both information and political motivations. As a result, associational activities have expanded across national boundaries, be it from Turkey to Germany and France, or from Germany to France, often despite legal and organisational barriers and borders.

The following sub-sections will identify the background of these distinctions in more detail with reference to historical development in Turkey and Cyprus.

1.2.1.1 Alevis and Sunni Muslims:

There are two religious sects among the Turkish-speaking 'community': Sunnis and Alevis. Alevi faith is a form of Shiism which emphasises the importance of Ali in addition to Allah and Mohammed. Ali was the husband of Mohammed's only child and father of Mohammed's two grandsons, Hasan and Huseyin. Together, Ali, his sons and next nine generations came to be called the 12 Imams (Dierl 1991:94-115). However, apart from a belief in Ali and the 12 Imams, the Alevi sect differs from Shiism, as well as Sunni Islam

in terms of political and social relations. While the Sunni religion is more conservative and more strict in religious practice, Alevis are often regarded as nearer to left wing political parties and Kemalist who support the ideas of Kemal Ataturk (Ercan 1997).

The lives and teaching of the 12 Imams rather than the 'Quaran' are the basis of Alevi philosophy. Alevis believe that the first three Caliphates after the death of Mohammed were deviant and distorted the original messages of the Quaran, while creating their own 'Quaran' referring to the existing 'Holy Book' of Sunni Islam to serve their interest. Most importantly these Caliphs killed Ali and caused the death of Mohammed's only child, Ali's wife Fatma, and later they killed Ali's two sons.

There are also differences in the religious practices of Sunni Muslims and Alevis. Alevis, unlike Sunni Muslims usually do not go to mosques and do not pray. On the other hand, they have their own religious ceremonies called 'Cem' and the place called 'Cem Evi' (Place of Cem). But (as far as Alevis are concerned) Cem Evi is not as distinct as a Mosque, for any house or a building which allows people to come together could be called 'Cem Evi'. Both men and women participate in these ceremonies together under the supervision of a person called 'Dede' (Grandfather). 'Dedes' are the persons who are believed to be descendants of the 12 Imams. Unlike the ceremony in the mosque, music and dance are at the centre of 'Cem' ceremonies and the latter have no definite timetable. In the villages in Turkey, the ceremonies are held once a week during the winter time, but not regularly. In fact, in Europe, the 'Cem' ceremonies are not conducted very often at all (Ercan 1997). Alevis fast, but not for thirty days. They fast only twelve days of the year in memory of the 12 Imams.

1.2.1.2 Turks, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Kurds:

In Cyprus, Turks are Sunni Muslims. However, there are differences between Sunni Muslims in Cyprus and on mainland Turkey. In Cyprus, although to be a Turk and a Muslim are one and the same thing, the situation of living with Greek Cypriots on the same island made Turkish identity more important than being a Muslim. There is always more emphasis on the Turkish identity than the Muslim one. It seems that there has never been a shared Cypriot identity. As Kyle (1997:5) reports:

> There were Turkish quarters in all of the main towns and, of the villages in 1960, 114 or about 18 per cent were mixed (though this was only a third of the number 70 years before).

> Even in the mixed villages, however, it was possible to tell the Greek and Turkish quarters apart.

In particular, the severe clashes between the two communities resulting in separation in 1974 has exaggerated their Turkishness. Constantinides (1977:276) claims that before 1974, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in London were very good and that even after this crisis, individual and working relationships still remained good. Ladbury (1977:314-5) suggests that relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be good because of the economic dependence of Turkish Cypriots on the Greek Cypriots, since the number of Greek Cypriots was bigger than that of Turkish Cypriots and there were not enough Turks in sufficiently varied occupations for them to be ethnically self-reliant. Moreover, a higher percentage of self-employed Greeks meant that they were more likely to be employers of Turks, but in social life the contact of the two communities is very limited.

Moreover, in Cyprus the experience of living under British rule until 1960 has created an extra dynamic, which is non-existent in the lives of Sunni Muslims in mainland Turkey. The situation under British rule exaggerated the underlying ambition of some Greek Cypriots to achieve *enosis*- union with Greece. This ambition of Greek Cypriots encouraged Turkish Cypriots to align with the British rulers (Kyle 1997:5). In fact, as early as the late 1950s, when the EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) made their demands for self-determination, they started to burn Turkish villages (Kyle 1997:8).

In Turkey, none of the ethnic groups represents a unique religious affiliation and vice versa. All ethnic and religious groups are heterogeneous (Enneli 1996). There are Sunni Turks and Kurds, together with Alevi Turks and Kurds. Although to discuss the ethnic and religious affiliations in Turkey in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that the people have various ethnic origins such as Lazs, Gypsies, Albanians, Bosnians, Tatars, Caucusians, Arabs and Kurds etc. In England, the majority of Turks from mainland Turkey are Sunni Muslims, while the majority of Kurds are mostly Alevi. In Turkey there are conflicts between secular and religious movements. The radical challenge to the Islamic Ottoman Empire and Caliphate by the secular Turkish Republic in 1923 put the emphasis on being Turkish, rather than on being a member of the Muslim Ummet. In 1928 Islam as a state religion was abolished. Ataturk's idea of

Turkishness had no reference to a common religion or common race. The idea referred to those people who accept being a Turk. In this sense, Turkishness does not necessarily overlap with blood ties, and was blind to ethnic differences (Pope and Pope 1997:59). In support of this, Sayyid (1997:65) quotes from the Republican Party Secretary's speech:

> We consider as ours all those of our citizens who live among us, who belong politically and socially to the Turkish nation. Our party considers these as absolutely Turkish in so far as they belong to our community of language and ideal.

The ideal of banishing religion from state affairs was encouraged by secular education, outlawing Islamic schools and organisations, the introduction of a new Civil Constitution based on Swiss laws and the introduction of Western style clothes and calendar system.

The secular project has been relatively more successful in the cities than in the villages (Mardin 1986). Research conducted among workers in Izmir in 1968 discovered that 50 per cent of the workers said they were Turk, while 38 per cent identified themselves as Muslim. Furthermore, 51 per cent of the workers who identified themselves as Turkish defined the people in the country as citizens, while 89 per cent of the workers who identified themselves as Muslim defined the people in the society as Muslim brothers (Mardin 1986:121-23). A recent survey in 1993 shows that only four per cent of those questioned in Istanbul still define themselves simply as Muslims: 21 per cent prefer to be called Muslim Turk, while two-thirds identify themselves as Turk (Pope and Pope 1997:332-3).

A study of Turkish peasants found that nationalism is thought to be a major characteristic of Turks by a majority of high school students in the villages, compared to a very small number of illiterates who overwhelmingly define themselves firstly as Muslim (Toprak 1987:221).

On the other hand, Ataturk's Republican People's Party found great support among the Alevi populations in both cities and villages. They even believed that Ataturk was an Alevi (Ercan 1997) and they have been strong defenders of Ataturk's reforms since the birth of the republic (Pope and Pope 1997:324). The following example might illustrate the respect given to Ataturk among the Alevis. During my fieldwork, one of the Alevi mothers talks about how she came to name her son:

> When I was pregnant with my son, my father-in-law had a dream of Ataturk. At the top of our house's stairs, he [Ataturk] looked at him and smiled. Next day, my father-in-law told me I was going to have a son and we were going to call him Kemal [first name of Ataturk]. Then I got my son, and we gave him that name.

Moreover, Alevis and Sunnis usually keep to their own villages and had minimum contact with each other and no intermarriages. The political and social differences between Alevis and Sunnis is reflected in the characteristics of voters for the religious Welfare Party. The party rose to power in the 1994 local election and the 1995 general election. The Welfare Party has exclusively Sunni support from Turks in Central Anatolia and Kurds in Eastern Anatolia (Ayata 1996:53). But there have been several occasions, such as the 1978 Maras' Events, when Sunni Muslims killed their Alevi neighbours. At a more recent incident in 1993, Fundamentalists burned twelve people in a hotel during the Alevi festival in Sivas. Alevis seldom declare their identity openly. They are often accused of being involved in incest during Cem ceremonies by their Sunni neighbours.

In relation to the secular ideologies of the Turkish republic, Keddie (1997) argues that the state accepted a secular ideology not as a project but as a strategy to strengthen its position against the powerful religious class (Ulema) in the Ottoman Empire. In that sense, it can be argued that the state in the 1980s used not secular ideology but Islam to secure itself against the increasing effects of left wing organisations prior to 1980. The government built mosques at the villages where the villagers were Alevi and as indicated before Alevis, unlike Sunni Muslims, usually do not go to mosques and do not pray. The government also made religious education compulsory in the schools. Mosque construction averaged 1500 a year in the 1980s and the number of mosques rose from 54667 in 1984 to 62947 in 1988, a mosque for every 857 people (Ahmad 1993:221). In this respect, Alevis have become more vulnerable following the 1980 military coup and the conscious strategy of the Government to give religion (Sunni Islam) priority against Leftist organisations.

Furthermore, since the 1980s, considerable amounts of Islamic capital have flown into Turkey from oil rich Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. This capital is also used for increasing Islamisation among the Turkish community in Europe. Islamic capital is used to initiate many Quaran courses in both Turkey and Europe. In Turkey, it is used to support poor university students and to provide free health services to poor people in *Gecekondu* areas (squatter settlements). But, most importantly, it supports small

enterprises in several towns. Several Islamic banks opened after 1980, such as Faisal Finans and Al Baraka Turk. They encourage interest-free investments. They collect a substantial amount of money from the Turks in Europe and people in Turkey to invest in Islamic firms. According to Sener (1997), Islamic capital coming to Turkey amounts to about 5 million dollars per year.

We can talk about four Islamic associations in relation to Turks in Europe. They are Diyanetcis, Milli Gorus, Suleymancis and Nurcus. Diyanet (The European federation of mosque associations under the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs) is controlled by the Turkish state and tries to control other mosque organisations and Quaran courses in Europe. The organisation was not effective until the 1990s. But once the others became threats to the secular Turkish state, Diyanet tried to influence the Turks in Europe to conform with official Islam. In 1980, there were only 20 officials from the Directorate working abroad, but by 1989 this figure had risen to 628 (Ahmad 1993:221).

Milli Gorus is the European branch of the Welfare Party in Turkey. They argue that the current Turkish political system is not Islamic and that society should not be ruled according to the vote system (Turan 1991:46). The organisation helps the Welfare Party's leaders in several municipalities in Turkey, including Istanbul, by collecting money from its supporters. For instance, in 1997 it managed to collect four and half million DM to support the Welfare Party during the election campaign (Bal 1997).

Suleymancis are followers of Suleyman Tunahan who is a Turkish migrant in Germany. The organisation is identified as a modern version of the Naksibendi Order which existed from the fifteenth century onwards in a mystic and orthodox Sunni form (Mardin 1991:127). Suleyman Tunahan gathers radical Muslims around him, has organised Quaran courses since the 1970s and opposes the Turkish official Islam.

Another one is Nurcus. According to Mardin (1991:132), Nurcus is the modern version of the Naksibendi Order. Nurcus are followers of Said-i Nursi, a Kurdish Sunni Sheikh who emerged in the 1920s. Although the Nurcus' basic doctrine is the same as that of other religious organisations, Acar (1991:292), in her study of Islamic women's journals, argues that the Nurcus' journal seems more 'liberal', compared with the others, though its stand on some critical issues such as non-believing women is very ambiguous. The *Sabah* newspaper (1997) alleges that there are 500 Nur Medrese in western Europe, especially in Germany. A typical Medrese includes a classroom, a playroom, a refectory

and dormitory. There are sub-groups among Nurcus, the most famous of which are the supporters of Fettuhlah Guven. The group has two newspapers, one journal, one television and several radio channels. It has about 300 schools in and outside of Turkey, 200 of them in middle Asian countries, such as Azerbejian. The schools give education in English and Turkish (Atakli 1997, Ozturk 1997).

In Turkish communities in Europe, especially in Germany, the various religious organisations are very powerful in representing the community at the local and national level. Schiffauer (1997:149) reports that when the German Ministry of Culture, Education and Church Affairs prepared an Islamic textbook for Turkish children, three Islamic groups out of five approached the ministry. However, after a second meeting they pulled apart in their actual objectives and the ministry said 'everybody out, we'll do it ourselves'.

In recent years, Alevis, like Sunni Muslims, have seemed well organised around religious associations in Germany (Ercan 1997, Heckmann 1997). However, their power is very limited compared with Sunni organisations. Beside, they have had some difficulties in being recognised by German officials. The German Culture Ministry recognised only Sunni Islam, when dealing with the Turkish community. However, a group of Alevi workers introduced some German studies on the Alevi sects in Turkey, and in the late 1980s were given permission from the German Culture Ministry to organise their own association called the Federation of European Alevis (Ercan 1997). Based in Köln, the building, which cost them four million DM, had a place for Cem ceremonies and dormitories for women, young, disabled and unemployed Alevis. Moreover, the head of the organisation wanted to show German society that the Turkish community is not only radical and fundamentalist; there is a secular and modern Turkish community as well (Ercan 1997).

How these developments affect the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London will be analysed in the following section.

1.2.2 Religious Involvement of the Turkish-Speaking 'Community' in London:

One of the main characteristics of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in terms of religion observed during the fieldwork, is that the members of the community think of religion as

a private activity rather than a public one. In this sense, their engagement with religious organisations is very limited.

The Turkish-speaking 'community' in London has religious associations as well. There are four Sunni organisations: Aziziye Mosque, the London Islamic Culture and Education Organisation, the London Turkish Islamic Association and finally the Centre of England Turkish Islamic Culture. Moreover, in Autumn 1998, the Sulaymanis (Suleymancilar) opened a mosque called Suleymaniye. In 1996, Feytullah Gulen opened London Meridian College and in 1998 they enlarged the school to include primary and secondary school students. At the moment, they have about 50 Turkish students. There are two Alevi organisations in London. These are the Cultural Centre of Alevis and *Cemevi,* and the Union of London *Cans* (Soul, Life, Living Being).

However, the Turkish-speaking 'community's' involvement with these organisations seems limited in comparison with the situation in other parts of Europe. Karakasoglu (1996:168) alleges that about 80 per cent of the Turkish workers living in Germany are members of the Islamic Associations. In a similar manner, Kuusela (1993) describes how the Turkish minority group in Gothenburg in Sweden struggled to build a mosque and faced considerable opposition from Swedish people. In her study, the respondents come from a village of Konya in Central Anatolia and, although she does not mention it, they are Sunni Muslims. Additionally, Konya is specifically recognised both for its potential to vote for the Refah Party and for having the biggest Islamic company (Kompassan). The majority of the shareholders of the company are Turkish workers in Germany. In 1997, one of the highest ranking managers of the company was arrested at Esenboga Airport with 15 million DM and 28 gold bracelets when he returned from Germany (Cetinkaya 1997).

The majority of Turkish Sunnis in London come from rural areas, like Turks in other European countries. Their religious identity seems more relevant to them than their ethnic identity. One might expect them to be more involved in religious organisations because of the centrality of religion in their lives. However, only a small number of Sunni Turks have relatives or co-villagers in other European countries where religious organisations are more dominant and well organised than England. Moreover, in London Turkish Cypriot Sunnis are older settlers than Sunnis from mainland Turkey and their connections with the religious sects in Germany and Turkey are not close.

The community members do not believe and trust the organisations' ability to represent the Turkish community's interests at an official and cultural level. This belief is proclaimed on various occasions by the parents and the young people. One of the Turkish parents explains how he sees the religious leaders, such as the Imam in a mosque:

> They don't care about you. The only thing they care about is the money. I have known one man since he came here a long time ago. He had nothing, we all helped him to find a job and a house, anything. Then he become a religious person, a very influential one. Within one or two years money has became nothing for him to be ashamed of. But don't misunderstand. Not everybody can benefit from these organisations in money matters. Only a small minority. The rest are the stupid people. Stupid enough to believe them and give them donations.

During a discussion with Cypriot and Turkish girls about whether the Mosque represented Turkish culture and community interests, they argued that if somebody wants to learn about the Turkish community and culture, the Mosque is not a place for getting information:

> Cypriot Girl 1: Basically go and talk to people themselves. Because nobody can represent every part of the community.
>
> Cypriot Girl 2: The school [Turkish schools], because the school's based on being Turk, not on religion.
>
> Cypriot Girl 3: They [Turkish schools] give you an idea what Turkish people are like, then you can also go to ask at Mosques as well, if you want.

The boys were also sceptical about whether the Mosque represented the community's culture and interests. One of the Turkish boys, for instance, says that:

> If you go to the Mosque, they might help you. But they cannot represent the Turkish community. The Imam [Priest] says 'don't go to the community, come to the Mosque'. He says 'come and become a member of the Mosque'. You can, if you want, but I can't say the same thing if you ask me about the Turkish community culture.

There are several reasons for the lack of interest of Turkish and Cypriot people in the religious communities. First of all, Sunni Muslims from Cyprus prefer to intensify their

contact with the organisations that emphasise their Turkish rather than Muslim identity. Ladbury (1977:307) emphasises the lack of participation of Turkish Cypriots in religious ceremonies in the 1970s. When the Turkish Islamic association was offered money by another Muslim country to buy a place to convert to a Mosque, the leaders of other organisations preferred to use the money for an all-purpose community centre instead. Turkish Cypriots do not ignore the importance of the religious establishment, but they do not give these organisations a central role in their lives. As one Cypriot father explains:

> In our early years in London, we had some problems because there were no Turkish mosques. We had to use the places where Pakistanis went. But honestly they are dirty and besides it is not the same thing like having your own Mosque. Now the situation is different. Mosques are necessary to remember the important religious days and celebrate them together with family members and community and give proper service to our dead. Also they are important for old people to spend their time in more religious activities. Otherwise life goes on in its normal path.

Some good examples of non-religious organisations are Saturday and Sunday Turkish schools, the Turkish Cypriot Women's Organisation, the Turkish Cypriots' Association for Elderly People and the Turkish Youth Centre. The London Boroughs supplied the buildings for the organisations and they work under the supervision of the Borough to which they belong. They offer their members a variety of services such as translating official letters, helping them with hospitals and Councils. For instance, the Association for Elderly people is visited by a Turkish doctor and a barber on certain days of the week to provide free services.

The most popular non-religious organisations are the Turkish schools. The teachers in the schools especially emphasise their secular character. One of the English teachers in a comprehensive school reported that:

> There is a Sunday school here for Turkish pupils. When I asked the teachers about what sort of religious education they teach the children, they told me they are progressive Muslims. They are against head scarves. They don't cover up themselves. One of the teachers also told me [it is] because Ataturk gave the women the right to vote before any European countries - by the way is that true?
>
> PE: Yes.

> Oh, very good then, anyway the teachers told me they don't want to put women in second place. That's why women's education is so important for them.

The Turkish schools were first introduced in 1960 to help underachieving Turkish students in British schools. Now there are about 42 of them in North London. The schools use the comprehensive schools' buildings during the weekends. They ask for a small fee from each child in order to pay the teachers' salaries. The Turkish Government of North Cyprus also helps some of the schools by supplying teachers from Cyprus.

The curriculum is more or less the same in each school though some of the schools provide extra GCSE classes in Mathematics and English along with Turkish classes. The age range of the students is from six to eighteen. In most of the schools there are also folk dance courses. The students first sing the Turkish National Anthem in the school hall, then they are allocated to the classes. The schools celebrate all Turkish and North Cyprus National days. One of the Turkish Cypriot mothers explained why it is important to bring her son to the school:

> These children were born here, they can see their country only once a year or two years. When we are dead, who is going to continue our language and our culture? I don't want my son to lose his Turkishness. In this school, he learns about his culture, speaks his language.

These schools not only provide a Turkish education for the students, but also act as a kind of club for the families to socialise in. They bring their snacks, they gossip, they read community newspapers, and participate in the ceremonies conducted by the schools.

On the other hand, it should be noted that the majority of the families who use these schools are from Cyprus. In other words, there is little chance of finding Kurdish Alevi students in these schools. Besides, Alevi organisations are not popular among the community members to a large extent. Several families who were interviewed did not know that such Alevi organisations existed in London. Even when they did hear about it, they were very reluctant to send their children to these organisations.

One of the reasons for this probably lies in the fact that the majority of Alevis came from two main cities: Maras and Sivas. In both these cities, the Alevis were subjected to serious violence from their Sunni townsmen. They are unlikely to admit their religious

identity for years, and most of them have been in Britain for about ten years. It might be too soon for them to dismiss their reservations about this issue. Moreover, although their networks with their relatives and co-villagers in other European countries are more intensive than that of Sunni people, the Alevi organisation in Germany is a very recent phenomenon as mentioned before.

Moreover, Alevi organisations in London have to share their power with several leftist and Kurdish organisations. It is generally observed that Alevis in London have divided loyalties to different leftist and Kurdish groups. In general, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) tries to promote an exclusive Kurdish identity. However, observations during the fieldwork suggest that the Alevi Kurds in London have a tendency to label PKK as a Sunni dominated organisation. Moreover, its way of collecting money for the organisation is not always welcomed. Normally, each year in a certain week, the groups collect money from the individual families or shops. People call these weeks 'campaign weeks'.

One Kurdish Alevi girl talked about an incident in which a campaigner visited their home and asked for a donation, but her mother refused because her husband was unemployed. The campaigner then said that they were better off here in England than the people who are fighting in Turkey and accused her family of concealing their real situation, claiming that they had a large amount of savings. In the end, her mother became very angry and asked the campaigner to leave the house immediately.

During the PKK campaign, two sympathisers visited a Kurdish Alevi house in which I stayed during the fieldwork. At the time, the house was full of family members. After an hour of introduction about the aims and achievements of the organisation and the importance of Kurdish nationalism and conspiracy about the State's role in creating fractious religious and sectional differences among the Kurds, the campaigner asked the household men and older women what they thought about these issues. One of them replied that they were here to listen and learn. In the end, the campaigners asked for donations but the head of the house replied that he had not yet got his week's salary. The campaigners insisted on getting his work address to collect the money and after 15 minutes, he complied. After they left, one of the men started to swear and said:

> They talked too much about meaningless things. These people are filthy [metaphorically this means bad person in Turkish]. They are Saffi [a very Orthodox Kurdish Sunni Sect].

> They don't like us. They say, they don't believe in Alevi - Sunni separation, but if they get you, they will cut your head off. If they really don't believe in discrimination, why don't they talk about humanity, democracy whatever you are? But instead all they talk about is being Kurdish, being Sunni, not being human. With this attitude these people miss the men who approach them. But my group [THKP Turkish People's Communist Party] listen to you, they are all human, democratic. Not like these filth.

In fact, wedding ceremonies are far more important than these organisations in most Kurdish people's social lives. Almost every weekend, there is a wedding. During these occasions, people socialise, exchange news and the latest gossip and entertain themselves. The ceremonies are almost all organised around co-villagers. Everybody knows everybody, and outsiders are recognised immediately.

On the other hand, this does not mean that religion is not important in their lives, particularly in the younger generations' lives, they simply do not present it in the public sphere.

The following section will analyse the Turkish-speaking young people's religious identity in two steps. First, self-identification will be discussed, then young people's practical involvement in religion will be explored in relation to that of their parents. Mosque attendance, fasting and praying are selected to measure the practical effect of Islam in the young people's lives. Although mosques are open to the males rather than females, they offer some religious courses to young people regardless of their gender. In order to discuss parents' religious activities, fasting and mosque attendance are chosen for the fathers and fasting and praying for the mothers.

1.3 Religion and ethnicity in the private lives of the Turkish-speaking 'community':

The following analyses are based on two steps: the first relates to the origins of self-identification, the second to the level of involvement in religious activities. In fact, these two dimensions are interrelated with each other.

1.3.1 Self-identity in terms of religion:

Turkish-speaking young people have a clear idea of their religious identity. When they were asked about their religious identity, 87 per cent of them chose to be called either

Muslim or Alevi. Moreover, there is a polarisation among the Turkish-speaking young people in terms of religious and ethnic identity. When we look at Table 1.1, 78 per cent of the young people from Kurdish populated areas called themselves Alevis, while 82 per cent of Turkish and 90 per cent of Cypriot young people referred to themselves as Muslim.

Table 1-1: Religious Identity by Places of Origin (%)

	Religious Identity				
Places of origin	Alevi (72)	Muslim (103)	Muslim, Alevi* (12)	Other** (14)	Total (206)
Kurdish Populated Areas	78	12	4 (4)	5 (5)	100 (92)
Other places in Turkey	3	82	9 (3)	6 (2)	100 (34)
Cyprus		90		10 (5)	100 (50)
Mixed	13	64	17 (5)	7 (2)	100 (30)
Total	37 (72)	50 (103)	6 (12)	7 (14)	100 (206)

* Those young people whose parents are from different sects.
** Category of others includes young people who call themselves Christian, non-believer, believer of anything and not sure.

In addition, being a Muslim or Alevi has a distinct meaning for these young people. They do not think of themselves as belonging to a larger Muslim community because of their Muslim identity. For instance, one of the Cypriot girls explains what sort of person she would like to marry:

> I don't think every Muslim is OK. He must be somebody like what you are, like Turkish. You can not pick up any Muslim you want among the others, it is not like that.

Besides, the young people have their own criteria in order to determine their religious and ethnic identity. The young people from mainland Turkey seemed to be more aware of the Alevi-Sunni distinction than those from Cyprus. For instance, one Turkish girl said that:

Girl: Alevis don't like Muslims. They don't recognise Allah, also they say bad things about Muhammed.

PE: How do you know, have you ever discussed these issues?

Girl: Ooooh, lots of times. Some of them even don't recognise Muhammed. Take Ayse [an Alevi girl in the school] - she is the most militant one.

Alevis are also keen to emphasise the differences between Muslims and themselves. During a discussion with two Alevi girls, they talked about how important being an Alevi was and how severe are their differences:

> Girl 1: During the Maras events, they killed my aunt. She was pregnant. It was her next door neighbour. One night before, they are in her house for the dinner. But think about it, even your enemy does not kill you like that. But don't misunderstand me, it is not us who discriminate against them, but they do discriminate against us. For me, everybody should worship in his own way. We are all human.
>
> Girl 2: It is true, you know. There is a girl in my class. I know she is a Muslim. I heard she called me *Gavur* [Heathen] behind my back. They see us as *Gavur*.

Turkish and Kurdish young people's religious self identification seems to not confirm the popular misconception of Muslims as a whole and undivided community. According to Tyler (1999:1), because 'they believe in God - and actually dare to show it - British Muslims are something of a challenge to a secular society'. And, the Turkish and Kurdish young people seems to be a challenge to the misconception of the idea that Muslims are opposed to the secular.

On the other hand, Cypriot young people think that everybody from Turkey is Turkish and Muslim. The following extract from a discussion between Turkish and Cypriot girls about whether Alevis are a part of the Turkish community or not gives a good example of young people's different priorities:

> Cypriot Girl 1: I don't know what is Alevi.
>
> Turkish Girl: They are Kurd.
>
> Cypriot Girl 1: Kurds have got the same traditions, cultures, religion.
>
> Turkish Girl: No. They don't believe in Muhammed or the Quaran, they just believe in Ali actually. They practice their own religion. They just don't believe the Quaran. They just don't go to the Mosque, stuff like that. Totally different religion.
>
> Cypriot Girl 2: But, they [Alevis] are really Turkish, because practically everything [is the] same. I know their language is slightly different. Do you know what I mean?

Cypriot Girl 3: It is not like Greeks, because Greeks and Turks got big things, isn't it? Like in the dance last week, do you remember? [to the others]

Cypriot Girl 1: When we played folk dance, there were Greeks in the dance hall, probably the same age as us. They shouted to us 'fall down and die'. This is their background, how they are brought up.

Cypriot Girl 3: It's their parents. We are in this culture now, we are not in Cyprus, not in Turkey now. We try to get along, you know. Forget that barrier for a moment you know. But even though she is not brought up in south Cyprus, she just has that hatred because of her parents, what they tell her. Our parents told us what Greeks did them in Cyprus, but we try to get along with them. But she don't want to know.

Cypriot Girl 2: Deep down, Greeks and Turks hate each other, a group of Greeks and a group of Turks are doing this. Of course, that doesn't include every single Greek.

In this context, it is clear that the Turkish Cypriot young people's self identifications are influenced more by different historical backgrounds than are those of Turkish and Kurdish young people. In fact, the young people's place of origin not only shapes their religious identity, but their ethnic identity as well. As can be seen from Table 1.2, 72 per cent of all the young people from Kurdish populated areas call themselves overwhelmingly Turkish Kurd or Kurd (72 per cent), and 47 per cent of the young people from other places in Turkey describe themselves as Turks. The percentage of young people from Cyprus who call themselves Turkish Cypriot or Cypriot is 58 per cent.

Furthermore, Table 1.2 shows that religious and ethnic identities are paired off according to young people's places of origin: Alevi-Kurd, Muslim-Turk, Muslim-Turkish Cypriot. 78 per cent of the Alevi young people from Kurdish populated areas identified themselves as Turkish Kurd or Kurd, while half of the Muslim young people from other parts of Turkey called themselves Turk and 58 per cent of the Muslim young people from Cyprus refer to themselves as Turkish Cypriot or Cypriot. It can be argued that young people usually think of their ethnic and religious identity as interchangeable. In other words, they use Turk for Muslims (or Sunni) and Kurds for Alevis. The following extracts from the structured interviews show how young people use Kurd for Alevi and Turk for Muslim interchangeably:

> Turkish Girl 1: The person I will marry should be Turk. Because, we can't marry with Kurds. They don't practice our religion.
>
> Turkish Girl 2: If I marry with a Kurd, my Mum will cut me in pieces. He should be a Muslim.
>
> Kurdish Girl: I would like to marry somebody like me. Not a Turk. My family don't let me otherwise. They don't want somebody going to Mosque or praying.

Ethnic and religious identities are blurred for their parents as well. For instance, when one of the Alevi Kurdish parents talked about his Sunni Kurd neighbour, he said:

> They can speak Kurdish, but they are Turk, they fast during Ramadan and they have all Arabic-written home decoration. They know we are Alevi, so they avoid speaking about religion. But we know as well.

However, this overlap makes the young people who are not 'Alevi and Kurdish' or 'Muslim and not Turkish' confused about their identity. This is especially the case for the non Turkish Sunni young people. Table 1.2 reveals that almost five in ten call themselves Turk, while only one in ten of their Alevi counterparts do so. One of the interviews with the 'Kurdish' boys who are Sunni and Alevi Kurds shows the blurred boundaries between being Kurdish and being Alevi:

> Sunni boy: I am a Turk, I go to Mosque and fast, everything.
>
> Alevi boy: But you are with us, aren't you?

One day after, the same Alevi boy talked about the Sunni boy's 'other' friends in the Turkish Youth Centre, which belongs to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot young people, and how they saw him enter the centre several times. One of the boys said:

> He [Sunni boy] is a nice person, he seems [to be] enjoying himself when he is with us. But I don't know exactly what he is doing with others.

Although in the sample there is only one child who is Alevi and Turkish, it could be argued that being Alevi and not coming from a Kurdish populated area is no easier either. They call themselves Alevi, but neither Turkish, or Kurdish, thus ignoring their ethnic identity, whilst sticking to their religious identity.

Table 1-2: Religious Identity by Ethnic Identity (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas				
Ethnic identity	Alevi (72)	Muslim (11)	Muslim, Alevi (4)	Other (5)	Total (92)
Turk	10	46 (5)			13
Turkish Kurd/Kurd	78	36 (4)	100 (4)	40 (2)	72
Turkish Cypriot/Cypriot					
British	11	18 (2)		60 (3)	14
Other*	1				1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Other Parts of Turkey				
Ethnic identity	Alevi (1)	Muslim (28)	Muslim, Alevi (3)	Other (2)	Total (34)
Turk		50	67 (2)		47
Turkish Kurd/Kurd					
Turkish Cypriot/Cypriot					
British		50	33 (1)	100 (2)	50
Other*	100 (1)				3
Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Cyprus				
Ethnic identity	Alevi	Muslim (45)	Muslim, Alevi	Other (5)	Total (50)
Turk		9			8
Turkish Kurd/Kurd					
Turkish Cypriot/Cypriot		58		60 (3)	58
British		33		20 (1)	32
Other*				20 (1)	2
Total		100		100	100
	Mixed				
Ethnic identity	Alevi (4)	Muslim (19)	Muslim, Alevi (5)	Other (2)	Total (30)
Turk		26 (5)	20 (1)		20
Turkish Kurd/Kurd	50 (2)	5 (1)	20 (1)		13
Turkish Cypriot/Cypriot		42 (8)			27
British	50 (2)	26 (5)	60 (3)	100 (2)	40
Other*					
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*Category of others includes the young people who insisted on identifying themselves only in religious terms rather than in ethnic terms or were not sure.

When the Turkish-speaking young people construct their identities, they identify a Muslim Turk not only different from English Christian identity, but from Pakistani and

Bangladeshi Muslim identity as well. During a group discussion with Turkish and Cypriot girls, they separated Turkish Muslims from others, including English and Pakistani communities in Britain. One of the Turkish girls put it like this:

> I don't eat pork. In the English school, they eat pork. But other than that there is alcohol, some Muslims, I mean Turks, drink raki [Turkish drink]. But in Quaran, alcohol is forbidden.

A Cypriot girl argued that the differences basically originate in their culture:

> Different culture, such as people from Pakistan. They are Pakistanis, aren't they? They are Muslims, but still they have different, they have different beliefs. Although they are Muslims, in their culture, let's say their cooking is different from us and the way they treat their children is different from our children. You know what I mean?

Another Cypriot girl concentrates on the appearances and behaviour which differentiate Turkish Muslims from others:

> Ours is just culture, we are not really religious. We do not wear head scarves. Nothing like that. We walk around wearing make-up, everything. That's our culture. We are not religious basically. We eat pork, I have never been in the mosque.

Another ethnic identity with which the young people associate is British. During the focus group discussions with Turkish and Cypriot young people, the cultural and social meanings of being British, if any, were questioned. It might be suggested that if somebody was born in Britain, the chance for him/her to call himself or herself British would increase. However, it does not seem to be the case for Turkish-speaking young people. Although nine in ten Cypriot young people and only six in ten Turkish young people were born in Britain, the proportion of Turkish young people who feel themselves British is greater than that of Cypriot young people who feel themselves British. As can be seen from Table 1.2, Cypriot young people (32 per cent) do not call themselves British as often as do Turkish young people (50 per cent) and only 14 per cent of the Kurdish young people believe themselves to be British.

Britishness was defined as a form of citizenship by the young people. To an extent the young persons simply believe that if somebody is born in this country or has a British passport, this person is a British citizen.

Turkish boy: British means people who live in this country. If they are on holiday, they are not British, but if you are born here and live here, you are British. But we are less British than English people, because English people originate in this country. I was born here, my family came from Turkey, generations are in Turkey.

Cypriot Boy: My mum was born here, dad in Cyprus, he came here when he married with my mum. He has been here now for 20 years. So then my dad could be British, but not as much as an English person is, because he was born in a different country.

Turkish boy: If one English person go to Turkey and have a family and a child, because the child is born in Turkey, he is Turkish more than English. I think like that.

Turkish-speaking young people are also aware of the cultural dimension of being British: being British does not make them similar to other British young people, but more different from the young people in Cyprus or Turkey.

Cypriot Girl 1: You could not exactly say how you feel about [being] British. To me I love this country. When I go to Cyprus or Turkey, I feel different. I feel more relaxed in this country. I don't know, it is more freedom, because in Cyprus, everybody knows everybody, too close.

Cypriot Girl 2: Yes, when I go to Cyprus, I put on an act to impress my uncle. You have to follow them to everywhere, make all the coffees, everything. When I am here, I can say to my uncle, 'why you don't go and make your tea yourself'. But if I said this to my uncle in Cyprus, I think I'd be dead.

In that sense, by being British, they feel themselves more free than their counterparts in Cyprus or Turkey. However, when the question is whether they feel themselves British in relation to other British people in Britain, they think that British identity belongs to English people more than it belongs to the Turks.

Cypriot Girl 1: I suppose I don't use this British thing. I think British people use it more than Turks. But the thing is that when we went to Cyprus a year ago, the first thing people said to us there, was 'you are English'. But how can we be English, you know? Our roots are Turkish, my parents are Turkish, my grandma's Turkish, my grandpa is Turkish, my whole generation is Turkish. So maybe I am British, because I was born in this country, but I still count myself Turkish. And I am proud to be Turkish, you know.

> Cypriot Girl 2: When I said I am Turkish Cypriot, they say to me 'but where's you born in?' I said I am a British citizen, but I am still Turkish Cypriot. Because I was born here in Britain, doesn't make my culture, my traditions and my blood any different.

Similar responses to the relationship between being English or British and white was reported in a study of 14-18 year-old Londoners (Phoenix 1998). Phoenix (1998:119) argues that many black and mixed parentage young people construct themselves as excluded from the nation.

Turkish-speaking young people generally argue that even if somebody is born in this country, she or he could not change the culture they inherit from their family background and that culture determined their identity, rather than place of birth. On the other hand, when they visit their parents' country of origin, they feel different to the rest of the population and this difference originates in the country of birth, namely Britain. Their feelings about Britishness, need to be investigated with respect to their friendship patterns in order to understand the implications of this identification.

1.3.1.1 Friendship Patterns of the Turkish-speaking Young People In Relation to Their Ethnic and Religious Identities:

Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1996) investigated the preferences for contact with ethnic out-groups among ethnic majority - Dutch - and minority - Surinamese, Moroccans and Turks - young people living in the Netherlands. They reached several conclusions. First, all ethnic groups preferred contact with in-group members. Second, among each group there was an agreed hierarchical pattern of preferences in acceptance or rejection of other ethnic groups. Third, among the Dutch, Surinamese, Moroccans and Turks, there was a consensus on the ethnic hierarchy which is Dutch at the top followed by Surinamese, Moroccans and Turks respectively. Fourth, the Dutch young people rejected other groups more significantly than did ethnic minority young people (Verkuyten and Hagendoom 1996:1115-6).

In Britain, there are similar patterns of rejection among the young people from different backgrounds. Davey (1983) argued that children in British primary and secondary schools have strong preferences for own-group friends which is established at an early age and intensifies with age.

Similarly, in the USA Kelly and Schauffler (1996:50) observed the prejudices and antinomies among Nicaraguan, Cuban, Haitian, Mexican and Vietnamese migrants and their children against each other and inner city blacks. Some of the children describe themselves as having more self-respect, more sense of cleanliness, a work ethic, compared with others, especially Blacks (Kelly and Schauffler 1996:50).

Furthermore, in his study of a Mexican community, Smith (1998:212) found that the second generation young people have negative views about Blacks and Puerto Rican neighbours and embracing American racial and ethnic hierarchies helps them feel like they are fuller members of American society.

The Turkish community in Germany also has very restricted social contact with other groups. Caglar (1995:310) observes that, compared with other foreigners, Turks have less contact with Germans and it is true for the second generation Turks too. Kursat-Ahlers (1996:117) observes that most of the young Turks have only Turkish friends and no contact with Germans.

In London, Turkish-speaking young people spent most of their time within their groups, usually amongst their relatives too. Moreover, their contacts with other groups in the same area are very limited. In order to analyse the Turkish-speaking young people's relationships outside of their immediate social environment, they were asked to choose an ethnic group or groups in which they have a friend and then, they were asked to choose a group or groups from which they would have reservations about choosing a friend.

As shown in Table 1.3, the overwhelming majority of the young people, regardless of their places of origin, have friends from other ethnic backgrounds such as English, Indian or Pakistani. On the other hand, the level of involvement with these friends is not as high as their involvement with their Turkish-speaking friends. As one English teacher observed:

> Turkish children are always together. They eat together, they leave school together. Boys and girls alike. But I think the girls are more open to having friends from other groups as well.

The young people's involvement with other groups is usually restricted in the classroom. They sit together or sometimes they engage in a common project with the others.

Moreover, when a Turkish-speaking child has an inter-ethnic friendship, s/he usually has another Turkish-speaking friend's company at the same time. In other words, they do not engage in an inter-ethnic friendship on their own. In fact, outside of the school, they are with their Turkish-speaking friends.

It is reported that none of the young people have invited a friend from another ethnic group to their house or have been invited by these friends to their houses. Most of them think that their friendship might not be approved by their parents. On the other hand, the parents think more positively about their children's involvement with certain groups, while they disapprove of involvement with others. They like their children's friendships with (white) English pupils, and dislike their friendships with black children. In fact, they are proud to send their children to what they call an 'English school' which means that the majority of the pupils are white English.

They believe that if they manage to send their child to an 'English school', the child might be more successful than the other Turkish-speaking children. One of the Cypriot mothers said:

> In my son's school, there are no Turks. All of the students are English. He can't speak Turkish in the school. His English is better than the other Turkish children. I encouraged him to come to this school [Saturday Turkish School] to learn his culture, but the rest of the week, he is together with the English students. It is best for him.

The Turkish-speaking young people, like their parents, value friendship with English students in the school in terms of their academic success. As one of the Kurdish boys said:

> I want to change my school. I want to go to an English one. There I can have a chance to be with English children. At other times I am with my Turkish friends, but it is not good for my English.

Although the majority of the young people have foreign friends, they also have reservations in having a friend from some groups. As can be seen from Table 1.3, the negative feelings against some groups among the Turkish and Cypriot young people are not as intense as among the Kurdish ones. Seventy three per cent of the Kurdish young people have some reservations against some groups, while 47 per cent of the Turkish and 26 per cent of the Cypriot young people admit that they prefer not to have a friend

from a certain group. This percentage is 36 per cent for the mixed origin young people. On the other hand, none of the young people have reservations against (white) English young people. Most of them have negative feelings about black and Irish young people. The common reasons they gave for their rejection of Irish children is Irish children's violent behaviour. In rejecting black children, the Turkish-speaking young people claim that black children have no moral and family values, and that they can easily steal.

Furthermore, negative feelings against foreigners are higher among the boys in each group, though the gender differences are less obvious for the Kurdish and Cypriot young people. Seventy per cent and 75 per cent of the Kurdish girls and boys respectively admit that they have some reservations about choosing their friends from certain groups, while less than three out of ten Cypriot girls and three out of ten of the Cypriot boys said that they do not want to have that sort of friendship. On the other hand, over a third of the Turkish girls said that they would choose not to be a friend with somebody from certain groups, compared with about six out of ten Turkish boys. Moreover, less than two out of ten mixed origin girls and half of the mixed origin boys reported that they have negative feelings towards certain groups.

Table 1-3: Foreign Friends by Place of Origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas					
	Having Foreign Friend			Having Negative Feelings about some foreign groups		
	Female (40)	Male (52)	Total (92)	Female (40)	Male (52)	Total (92)
Yes	93	81	86	70	75	73
No	8	19	14	30	25	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Other Places in Turkey					
	Having Foreign Friend			Having Negative Feelings about some foreign groups		
	Female (17)	Male (17)	Total (34)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Total (34)
Yes	94 (16)	77 (13)	85	35 (6)	59 (10)	47
No	6 (1)	24 (4)	15	65 (11)	41 (7)	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Cyprus					
	Having Foreign Friend			Having Negative Feelings about some foreign groups		
	Female (33)	Male (17)	Total (50)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Total (50)
Yes	97	100 (17)	98	24	30 (5)	26
No	3		2	76	71 (12)	74
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Mixed					
	Having Foreign Friend			Having Negative Feelings about some foreign groups		
	Female (13)	Male (17)	Total (30)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Total (30)
Yes	85 (11)	94 (16)	90	15 (2)	53 (9)	36
No	15 (2)	6 (1)	10	85 (11)	47 (8)	63
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

To some extent, it could be argued that the young people's reservations about some ethnic groups are not a result of their actual experiences with these groups, but rather a function of some common prejudices of the majority population in Britain. In fact, as Table 1.4 indicates, whilst only 48 per cent of those who have an inter-ethnic friendship admit negative feelings towards some groups, that percentage is over eight out of ten of those who have no inter-ethnic friendship.

Table 1-4: Having Negative Feelings About Some Foreign Groups by Having Foreign Friends (%)

	Having Foreign Friends		
Having Negative Feelings About Some Foreign Groups	Yes (184)	No (22)	Total (206)
Yes	48	82	52
No	52	18	48
Total	100	100	100

It should be noted that the actual social boundaries around the Turkish-speaking young people might even not cross the inner boundaries of the sub-communities. As can be seen from Table 1.5, many young people choose their friends from the same group. Sixty four per cent of the Kurdish, half of the Turkish and 64 per cent of the Cypriot young people only have friends who are Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot respectively. Young people from mixed origins show an even distribution amongst the groups.

Furthermore, although the girls' friendships within the network of close relatives and villagers are more acceptable for their families, there is no persistent pattern to suggest that girls are more likely to choose their friends within their own group than the boys. Indeed, Kurdish girls seem to have Kurdish friends less often than the Kurdish boys. On the other hand, Turkish girls seems more dependent on their own groups for friendship than the boys. More than six out of ten Turkish girls have a Turkish friend, compared with just over third of the Turkish boys. Moreover, the Cypriot young people, regardless of their gender, prefer another Cypriot for friendship.

Table 1-5: Turkish-speaking Friends' Places of Origin by Young People's Place of Origin (%)

Turkish-speaking Friend	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other Places in Turkey			Cyprus			Mixed		
	Fem (40)	Male (52)	Total (92)	Fem (17)	Male (17)	Total (34)	Fem (33)	Male (17)	Total (50)	Fem (13)	Male (17)	Total (30)
Kurdish Populated Areas	55	71	64	12 (2)	24 (4)	18	3	6 (1)	4	8 (1)	29 (5)	20
Other Places in Turkey	28	17	22	65(11)	35 (6)	50	24	6 (1)	18	31 (4)	29 (5)	30
Cyprus	5	4	4	18 (3)	24 (4)	21	64	65(11)	64	39 (5)	41 (7)	40
Don't know	13	8	10	6 (1)	18 (3)	12	9	24 (4)	14	23 (3)	0	10
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In conclusion, it can be argued that Turkish-speaking young people are divided in terms of their religious and ethnic identities and these divisions were reflected in their friendship patterns too. However, religious and ethnic identities do not only depend on self-identifications. Religious practice is also an important part of religious identity. It is important to describe the relation between these two dimensions.

In this context, the following section will analyse young people's religious practice in relation to their self-identified religious identity. Moreover, in order to explore the nature of their involvement with religious activities, their parents' religious involvement will also be taken into account.

1.3.2 Religious Practice:

There are three characteristics of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in terms of religious practice. Firstly, the members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' are not keen to practice religion in general. Secondly, there is more involvement of women in religious activities than men and, finally, there is a clear differentiation according to place of origin in terms of religious practice. Young people's engagement with religion in their daily lives corresponds more or less with that of their families. In other words, they do not engage in religious practices very often. However, the girls are more involved in religious practice than the boys, and their origins and particular religious sects have effects on their religious involvement.

Religious practice will be analysed in terms of three basic activities: fasting, praying and mosque attendance. However, when comparison between different sects is made in terms of religious practice, fasting is chosen since it is common to all sects whereas praying and mosque attendance are not.

Although eating habits such as abstinence from pork products or alcohol can also show the effects of religion on daily lives, it is difficult to determine whether eating habits might directly link to religious affiliations or are part of general cultural habits. None of the households, which were observed during the fieldwork, consumed pork, but nor did they consume sea foods except fish; brussels sprouts; some exotic fruits and frozen vegetables. Moreover, although alcohol consumption among females is very rare compared with males, again it is difficult to define this as a result of religion rather than

as a result of traditional patriarchal rules. In fact, smoking was also very rare among the women.

Furthermore, the families purchase cosmetics such as lip sticks or facial creams and snacks such as crisps, without paying attention to whether the products contain pork fat or alcohol. The issue of Halal meat, which is meat from animals slaughtered in accordance with Islamic rules, does not seem crucial for the majority of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. They consume meat from the main supermarkets and the younger generation visit well known burger houses such as McDonalds. Besides, the label of 'Halal Meat' in the window of most Pakistani shops rarely appears in Turkish Kebab Houses or food stores.

1.3.2.1 Fasting, Praying, Mosque Visits Among the Parents:

In general, the fathers do not seem keen to keep a religious routine. As revealed in Table 1.6, about 62 per cent of them do not fast at all, while nearly 69 per cent do not go to the mosque at all, even once a year. However, there are clear differences among the fathers in terms of their place of origin and in terms of religious affiliation.

Fathers from Kurdish populated areas in Turkey are less likely to fast and attend mosque services, while the fathers from other places in Turkey overwhelmingly seem to fast and go to the mosques. Like most of the fathers from other places in Turkey, Cypriot fathers are Sunni Muslims too. Yet their attitudes on religious practices show a similar pattern to those from Kurdish populated areas in terms of fasting and mosque attendance. Moreover, in general Sunni fathers are clearly more keen to fast than Alevi fathers. Only 17 per cent of the Alevi fathers fast compared to 57 per cent of Sunni fathers.

When we look at Alevis and Sunnis' fasting practice in terms of places of origin, it is clear that Kurdish fathers, both Alevi and Sunni, engage in religious activities slightly less than their Turkish counterparts. Only 26 per cent of Turkish Sunni fathers do not fast, compared to less than half of Kurdish Sunni fathers and only half of the Turkish Alevi fathers. It can be seen from Table 1.6 that Kurdish Alevi fathers are at the bottom in terms of engagement in religious activities.

Table 1-6: Fathers' Religious Practice by Place of Origin (%)

Fathers' Religious Practice	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other places in Turkey			Cyprus		Total		
Fasting	Alevi (67)	Sunni (12)	Tot (91)	Alevi (2)	Sunni (35)	Tot (41)	Sunni (39)	Total (46)	Alevi (70)	Sunni (86)	Total (178)
Yes	16	58 (7)	23	50 (1)	74	71	41	37	17	57	38
No	84	42 (5)	77	50 (1)	26	29	59	63	83	43	62
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mosque Attendance	(67)	(12)	(91)	(2)	(35)	(41)	(39)	(46)	(70)	(86)	(178)
Yes	0	67 (8)	10	0	80	73	41	37	0	61	32
No	100	33 (4)	90	100 (2)	20	27	59	63	100	40	69
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In contrast, the mothers seem more engaged with religious activities. 55 per cent of the mothers do fast, compared with only 38 per cent of the fathers. Although the number of the mothers who pray is slightly less than that of the fathers who go to the mosque (23 per cent of the mothers compared with 32 per cent of the fathers), most of the fathers go to the mosque only once or twice a year during the religious holidays, while the mothers pray daily. There is a clear asymmetry between the fasting behaviour of Alevi mothers and Sunni mothers. While 64 per cent of the Alevi mothers do not fast, most of the Sunni mothers do (73 per cent).

Moreover, the difference in place of origin of the mothers reflects similar patterns to those of the fathers in terms of religious practices. Table 1.7 shows that the mothers from Kurdish populated areas in Turkey are less interested in religious activities than those from other places in Turkey. Besides, the Cypriot mothers like the Cypriot fathers do not engage in religious activities as much as the Turkish mothers.

Again, when we look at Alevis' and Sunni's fasting practice in terms of place of origin, the gap between Kurdish Sunni mothers and Turkish Sunni mothers is not as obvious as it is for the fathers. Nine out of ten Kurdish Sunni mothers and nearly the same number of Turkish Sunni mothers fast. Also, Kurdish Alevi mothers like their husbands are at the bottom in terms of engagement in religious activities.

Table 1-7: Mothers' Religious Practices by Place of Origin (%)

Mothers' Religious Practice	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other places in Turkey			Cyprus		Total		
Fasting	Alevi (70)	Sunni (10)	Tot (90)	Alevi (4)	Sunni (30)	Tot (43)	Sunni (53)	Total (58)	Alevi (74)	Sunni (96)	Total (196)
Yes	34	90 (9)	42	75 (3)	87	79	67	59	37	73	55
No	66	10 (1)	58	25 (1)	13	21	33	41	64	27	45
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Praying	(70)	(10)	(90)	(4)	(30)	(43)	(53)	(58)	(74)	(96)	(196)
Yes	0	60 (6)	7	0	53	35	42	41	0	44	23
No	100	40 (4)	93	100 (4)	47	65	59	59	100	56	77
Total	100	100	100		100	100	100	100	100	100	100

As a result, it can be said that young people from Turkish Sunni family backgrounds have grown up in a more devout religious environment than the other young people. The young people least affected by religion are those from Kurdish Alevi families. The following section will analyse the young people's involvement in religious activities, and the extent to which their families' religious involvement affects them.

1.3.2.2 Fasting, Praying and Mosque Visits Among the Young people:

Table 1.8 indicates that the majority of the Kurdish young people (62 per cent) do not fast at all. Furthermore, although most of the Turkish and all of the Cypriot young people are from the Sunni sect, more than half of the Cypriot young people do not fast, while only 23 per cent of Turkish young people do not do so. Mosque attendance among the Cypriot young people is also not very high, compared to that of Turkish young people. Only 18 per cent of Cypriot young people go to the Mosque, while half of the Turkish young people do so.

When we look at mosque attendance of the young people, again Kurdish young people like Cypriot ones do not go to the Mosque as often as Turkish young people. Moreover, the praying practices among the young people reflect the same pattern. Forty four per cent of Turkish young people pray, while only five per cent of Kurdish and 24 per cent of Cypriots do so. However, like their parents, there is a clear differentiation between young people from Alevi or Sunni sects. When we look at Table 1.8 in accordance with religious differences, an opposition can be seen between Alevi and Sunni young people.

Sixty six per cent of the Alevi young people do not fast, while about the same percentage of Sunni young people do. Furthermore, like their mothers, Kurdish Sunni young people are slightly more engaged in religious activities than Turkish Sunni young people. More than seven out of ten Kurdish Sunni young people fast, compared with more than half of Turkish Sunni young people. Like their parents, Kurdish Alevi young people seem the group least likely to engage in the specified religious practices, though a comparison with non Kurdish Alevi young people could not be made, since there is only one child who is non Kurdish Alevi in this sample.

Table 1-8: Young People's Religious Practices by Place of Origin (%)

Young People's Religious Practice	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other places in Turkey			Cyprus		Mixed			Total		
Fasting	Alevi (72)	Sunni (11)	Total (92)	Alevi (1)	Sunni (28)	Total (34)	Sunni (45)	Total (50)	Alevi (4)	Sunni (19)	Total (30)	Alevi (77)	Sunni (108)	Total (206)
Yes	33	64(7)	38	100 (1)	82	76	42	42	25(1)	68(13)	57	34	60	48
No	67	36(4)	62		18	24	58	58	75(3)	32(6)	43	66	40	52
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Mosque Attendance	(72)	(11)	(92)	(1)	(28)	(34)	(45)	(50)	(4)	(19)	(30)	(77)	(108)	(206)
Yes	0	73(8)	9	0	57	50	18	18	0	32(6)	20	0	37	19
No	100	27(3)	91	100 (1)	43	50	82	82	100 (4)	68(13)	80	100	63	81
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Praying	(72)	(11)	(92)	(1)	(28)	(34)	(45)	(50)	(4)	(19)	(30)	(77)	(108)	(206)
Yes	0	46(5)	5	0	54	44	22	24	0	32(6)	20	0	35	32
No	100	55(6)	95	100 (1)	46	56	78	76	100 (4)	68(13)	80	100	65	69
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

In order to measure the effect of parents' religious involvement on the young people's relationship to religion, the fasting practice, which is common among all the sects in one form or another, is chosen as a criterion. This permits the inclusion of Alevis - who do not go to the Mosque and do not pray - in the sample, for the purpose of analysing the effect of religious practice on their young people's religious practices. The analysis omits non Turkish Sunni, non Kurdish Alevi young people and those from mixed origin, in order to study the effects of the parents from the main groups, which are Kurdish-Alevi, Turkish-Sunni and Cypriot, with further clarity.

In general, regardless of their origin and religious identity, girls are more keen to fast than boys. As shown in Table 1.9, more than half of the girls with a Kurdish Alevi background fast, while only two out of ten boys from the same background do so. The girls least involved in religion are Cypriots and the most involved are Turkish Sunnis. Cypriot girls see religion as a matter of personal faith, and they do not feel that it is necessary to show it with a religious practice like fasting.

> Cypriot Girl 1: A lot of people just hide behind their religions as well. People who hide behind their religion just say 'you are less Muslim than me, because I practice better than you'. You know it does not make you a better Muslim. Some people hide behind their head scarves, behind their religion which to me I don't think I like it. Like a woman I know. She is a quite religious woman. I have no disregards, I think good OK. But the thing is the way she is coming out with things. She's just talking about rights and wrongs. You know she is a helper. But when you look at her children, they are not grown up better than me or my brother and sister. Because her children are just wild. I was sorry for her, she is just a quite religious person, but her children have no respect for her.

> Cypriot Girl 2: You don't have to cover up and wear all these head scarves, you know just to be a Muslim. I mean if you are still a believer and, you know, leave it to the God. You know, trying to do right things, not the wrong things and that makes you Muslim as much as the person who may cover her head.

Furthermore, the Turkish Sunni boys are involved in religious activities more than Kurdish Alevis and Cypriot boys. They even practice religion more than Kurdish Alevi and Cypriot girls. The differences in terms of religious involvement not only depend on gender, but on place of origin as well. Turkish Sunni young people are more religious than the others and, most importantly, Turkish Sunni girls are the most religious group. Just under nine out of ten of these girls fast. Furthermore, the Cypriot boys and girls' involvement with the fasting practice are considerably less than other Sunni young people.

When we look at the effects of family involvement on religion, we should be cautious about drawing a final conclusion, since this research lacks a sufficient numerical base of the mothers and fathers for some categories. Nonetheless, the comparisons might be able to give a general idea, rather than definitive answers.

Kurdish Alevi girls and boys are more affected by their mothers' religious involvement than their fathers'. When their mothers do not fast, they do not fast either and vice versa. More than six out of ten Kurdish Alevi mothers who fast have daughters who fast as well, while nearly the same proportion of the mothers who do not fast have their daughters not fasting too. Nearly six out of ten Kurdish Alevi girls' fathers who do not fast have daughters who do not fast as well, while all of the Kurdish Alevi fathers who fast have daughters who fast.

The mothers' effect is much more powerful for Alevi Kurdish boys. More than nine out of ten non fasting mothers have sons who do not fast, while nearly seven out of ten fasting mothers have sons who fast. When their fathers fast, there is no profound effect on their sons, but when the fathers do not fast, nearly nine out of ten of their sons do not fast either.

Turkish Sunni girls are affected by both their parents, especially the parents who do not fast. Bearing in mind that the young people's accounts *report* parental behaviour, it is clear that when the parents fast, both fathers and mothers, more than eight out of ten of their daughters fast as well, and when their parents do not fast, they don't fast either. Turkish Sunni boys are influenced by the mothers who are fasting and their fasting behaviour appears to be independent of their fathers' religious involvement.

Cypriot girls, like Turkish Sunni girls, are influenced by both parents. If their parents fast, they fast as well and vice verse. On the other hand, Cypriot boys are affected by their mother rather than their father. Especially, if the mothers do not fast, seven out of ten of them have their sons not fasting as well.

In the final analysis, what is obvious is that if at least one of the parents is reported to be involved in religious activities, the chances for children getting involved increases. It is difficult to say if the mothers are more influential than the fathers or vice versa. However, we can say that the mothers' involvement in religious activities has an effect on both girls' and boys' religious involvement, regardless of their origins and sects. In other words, if the mothers are reported to fast, the children fast too and vice versa. The mothers appear to create an encouraging atmosphere in the home. Organising food and arranging time tables for suppers during the Ramadan and the Alevi fast are the responsibilities of the mothers. In that sense, if the mothers do not fast, it is more likely

that the children do not fast either. The young people seem to accept their families' religious attitudes in their lives. For instance, one of the Cypriot boys said:

> My family is not religious. My wife should adapt herself to us. Especially my mum doesn't like her daughter - in - law to pray or fast and cover her hair.

The effects of the fathers' fasting behaviour, unlike that of the mothers, is differentiated by gender, religious sects and origins. As can be seen in Table 1.9, the effects of fathers who fast can be observed on the fasting behaviour of their daughters regardless of their origin. When the fathers do not fast, this affects all children from Kurdish Alevi and Cypriot background and only girls from Turkish Sunni background. It can be argued that the religious fathers, especially Turkish Sunnis like to control their daughters' behaviour and they want to see their daughters more religiously involved. One Turkish Sunni girl explains how her father is impressed when he sees her and her sisters fast and pray. She says:

> My father likes to talk about religion with me. When I finished to read all the Quoran in Arabic, he was very impressed. Because I keep my religion, he trusts me more. Because you know he sees all the Turkish girls with their boyfriends, stuff like that. And he believes religion protects us from this kind of thing. He likes at least one of us to be educated in a religious school in Turkey, but in that case we should stay with one of our relatives in Turkey, but he does not like the idea to send us away from home.

Alevi tradition does not have the same kinds of restrictions on women's social behaviour as the Sunni tradition. The religion itself is less sexist, compared to Sunni Islam. The Cem ceremonies include both men and women, unlike the men only rituals in the Mosques. Beside, the Alevi women are not obliged to cover their hair. On the other hand, religiously involved Alevi fathers, like their Sunni counterparts, want their daughters to adopt the Alevi religion to prevent any possibility of inter-sect marriages. One of the Alevi girls explained the fears of her family, especially her father, about her making that kind of 'mistake':

> One of my dad's nieces married with a Turkish boy. Her family did not like it, but there was nothing they could do about it. The girl escaped from home with the boy. But then, her mother-in-law forced her to cover her hair and become a Muslim. They beat her. When she had a son, her mother-in-law did not let her feed her baby with her milk. They said her milk was not Halal for their grandson. She had brothers in Germany. All the family, including my

> dad, sent money to Turkey to arrange her to go to Germany, she manage to escape, but left her son with her husband's family. Now all her life is ruined. My dad said to me to take an example from that girl's mistakes. If I make the same mistake, he promises he will never help me, let me die.

Non religious Sunni parents do not approve of their children being involved in religious activities as often as religious Sunni parents approve of their children practising religion. One Cypriot girl talked about her experience with her parents:

> My family doesn't like any sort of extremism. I had a friend in the school last year. She covered her hair and stuff like fasting. She liked to talk about religion. I believed some things she told me and I decided to fast too. When I told my decision to my mum and dad, they disapproved. My mum said, 'we don't bring you up to have backward-looking ideas. You are young. These things shouldn't be in your mind now. You should only think about your education, your future.' My dad has forbidden me to see that girl again. My mum asked my other friends whom she knows personally to tell her if they saw me with that girl in the school. Now, I don't speak with that girl.

On the other hand, non religious Alevi parents do not refer to religious Alevis in negative terms, unlike non religious Sunni parents. It seems that they give relatively more freedom to their children to fast or not to fast. A girl explains her parents religious affiliations as:

> We are Alevi, but we don't exaggerate about being Alevi. My mum always says to me 'the important thing is your heart. If your heart is clean, it is not important whether you practice religion or not. Watch your mouth, watch your hands and watch your waist [This is the pillar of Alevi philosophy. It means avoid harming others by your words, avoid stealing -with your hands- and avoid sex outside marriage]. The rest is nothing. It is totally up to you'. It is what being Alevi is about.

In short, our numbers have sometimes been small, but it is still quite clear that it is difficult to define uniform religious attitudes among the Turkish-speaking 'community' in general and among the Turkish-speaking young people in particular. There are differences in terms of place of origin and in terms of religious sects. Alevis seem to have more relaxed attitudes towards religious practice. Cypriots have attitudes which are almost as relaxed, although they share the same faith with Turkish Sunnis.

Table 1-9: Young People's Fasting Practice by Parents' Fasting Practice (%)

Young People's Plc of Ori, Rel. & Gender	Young People's Fasting	Frequency	Fathers' Fasting		Mothers' Fasting	
			Yes	No	Yes	No
	Number of Cases	(31)	(4)	(25)	(14)	(16)
Kurdish Alevi Females	Yes	52	100 (4)	44	64 (9)	36 (6)
	No	48	0	56	36 (5)	63 (10)
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Number of Cases	(41)	(7)	(29)	(9)	(30)
Kurdish Alevi Males	Yes	20	57 (4)	10	67 (6)	7
	No	81	43 (3)	90	33 (3)	93
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Number of Cases	(14)	(9)	(3)	(12)	(2)
Turkish Sunni Females	Yes	86 (12)	83 (7)	0	85 (10)	0
	No	14 (2)	17 (2)	100 (3)	15 (2)	100 (2)
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Number of Cases	(14)	(9)	(3)	(12)	(2)
Turkish Sunni Males	Yes	79 (11)	78 (7)	67 (2)	83 (10)	50 (1)
	No	21 (3)	22 (2)	33 (1)	17 (2)	50 (1)
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Number of Cases	(28)	(8)	(15)	(16)	(10)
Cypriot Females	Yes	43	63 (5)	33 (5)	63 (10)	20 (2)
	No	57	38 (3)	67 (10)	38 (6)	80 (8)
	Total	100	100	100	100	100
	Number of Cases	(17)	(7)	(6)	(9)	(6)
Cypriot Males	Yes	41 (7)	43 (3)	33 (2)	56 (5)	33 (2)
	No	59 (10)	57 (4)	67 (4)	44 (4)	67 (4)
	Total	100	100	100	100	100

1.4 Conclusion:

Broadly speaking, in order to understand the dynamics which shape religious and ethnic identities, it is better to avoid any generalisations and comparisons such as a 'Muslim community' versus 'secular British society' or of 'Turkish community' versus 'British society'. The construction of religious and ethnic identities can not be explained only by comparison of the values of ethnic minority groups with those of the dominant group. The values of a particular group are shaped by the internal dynamics as well.

Moreover, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is complex. They do not always go hand in hand. It is absurd to call all members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London solely 'Muslim' and 'Turkish'. Making assumptions about religious identity is not a good starting point for analysis. When we assume a group's identity as Muslim, we can make three basic errors. First, we can miss the differentiation at the level of self-

identification of the individuals. In other words, because somebody calls another a Muslim, does not necessarily mean that they regard themselves as a Muslim. Secondly, some practical implications of this identity can be missed. There are many differences in terms of religious practice. In other words, there are people who practice their religion and others who don't and this is an extra dimension of their identity. Thirdly, by assuming a group of people to be Muslim regardless of the differences, the religious associations might be mistakenly assumed as 'real' representatives of the community. In fact, the ethnic minority associations are not necessarily representatives of a particular community. However, these consideration do not suggest that religion and ethnicity are not important for the members of the community. On the contrary, they are very keen to keep their religious and ethnic identities.

Members of the community are not only aware of their differences in comparison to the members of the dominant society, they are also yet more aware of differences within their community. The fragmented nature of the Turkish-speaking 'community' further creates fractions based on religious and ethnic identity. These fractions are not creations of a process of interaction with the dominant society, but rather a product of internal processes of interaction between various Turkish religious and ethnic sectors. In other words, when the young people I interviewed identified themselves in religious and ethnic terms, their reference point is not British society, not even other non-Turkish-speaking Muslim communities in Britain, but the ethnic and religious differences within the Turkish-speaking 'community'. Their identity started from a micro level affiliation: Turk-Muslim, Kurd-Alevi and Turkish Cypriot- Sunni. It means that they do not identify themselves as 'Muslim' or 'Turkish' when they make a comparison with mainstream values, preferring to keep their micro level identities.

The differences in self identification are also connected to the young people's practical involvement in religion, but their involvement with religion depends on a number of other factors too. It is not simply a matter of where they are from or the sects to which they feel they belong. It is rather a matter of more complex social relations, depending on whether they are male or female and whether their mother and father practices religion or not.

2. Turkish-speaking Families in London:

2.1 Theoretical Introduction:

Contemporary studies which concentrate on Turkish families in Europe point to a fixed notion of the so called 'traditional' Turkish family represented by parents in conflict with the modern, emancipated Western family exemplified by children, especially daughters. Mørck (1998:136), for example, claims that Danish society is gender-free compared to the strict gender ideology in Turkish culture:

> One great difference between the gender ideology that dominates the homes of the young immigrants compared with those of the rest of Danish society is that among the former, an ideology of difference dominates whereas in the latter an ideology of sameness rules.

She also claims that:

> In the Western world, youth or the 'teenage years' has a different meaning than it does in Turkey or Pakistan. In the countries of origin it is not common to use the category of 'youth', because someone is ether a child or married adult (Mørck 1998:140).

In another study of Moroccan and Turkish runaway girls in the Netherlands, Brouwer (1998:163) suggests that:

> The low social position of Moroccan and Turkish migrant families, and their sometimes unstable family situation, makes for a very complex situation in the Dutch context. Parents want to protect their daughters against 'bad' Western influences by exerting severe control over them and restricting their movements.

Tan and Waldhoff (1996:139) argue that children import the norms of German society into the family and interact with their parents according to these norms, and their attitudes create generational conflicts.

In relation to the second generation young people in Britain, studies have often claimed that their families' ethnic and cultural values are different and that these differences create conflicts with the mainstream values. Using this perspective, Weinreich (1979) for instance, separated ethnic minority young people in accordance with the degree of conflict in their self-identification. Weinreich (1979:101-103) argued that Asian boys and

girls have conflicting identification in relation to the native white population, but not, significantly, with their parents' ethnic background; Caribbean boys had a conflicting identification in relation to both their own ethnic background and the native white population; Caribbean girls had conflicts with the community, their families, but not with the values of the native white population. Ballard (1979:114) also writing in the 1970s, argued for a more complex picture:

> The second generation participate in the British educational system and they are exposed to the values of their British peers. A gulf between them and their parents is inevitable, but it is usually neither so wide nor so clear-cut as outsiders may assume.

But, Ballard (1979:118) then added that:

> The fact that many Asian parents find themselves culturally and linguistically handicapped when they come into contact with British people and British institutions can have far-reaching effects on the balance of authority in the family.

However, there are disagreements about the practical implications of such conflict. Some recent research argues that these conflicts prevent the possibility of change in families and encourage the children to keep their family values in their later lives. According to Tyler (1999:1),

> young British Moslems are caught as they are between the strict culture of their parents and the easy-going ways of their peers. When they reject the rules of their home- no alcohol, no sex before marriages - they tend to reject everything. 'This kind of person will explode'.

The danger of explosion seems to discourage the second generation from changing and later they become 'full time Muslims'. Pedersen (1998:83) describes a typical Turkish boy in Denmark in the following way:

> A nice, polite and respectful Turkish boy paying regards to his family can quickly turn into a stylish conversationalist among Danish youth. The poster in a young man's bedroom might juxtapose the actor and martial arts champion Bruce Lee with religious signs. When they marry, they may well choose 'a quite normal girl with long black hair and light, brown eyes' because the time has come to be a full-time Muslim. In other words, there is a time to be young and a time to be a Muslim.

On the other hand, some authors believe that this conflict resolves into the assimilation or integration of the second generation young people into mainstream society. There are several theories to identify this process. Rumbault (1996), Waters (1996) and Zhou and Bankston (1996) classify them into two main models. According to the 'straight-line' model, second generation young people are expected to adapt to the white middle class life style at the end point of a process that begins with acculturation, proceeds through structural assimilation and intermarriage, and is accompanied by an absence of prejudice and discrimination in the core society. This model is sometimes thought to be applicable to second generations of European immigrants in the USA (Rumbault 1996:125).

The second model, 'segmented assimilation', proposes that the adaptation of second generation young people is not expected in a unilinear line, but multiple ethnic identities may emerge, corresponding to distinct modes of immigrant adaptation and social contexts of reception. This model assumes that some second generation members may retain strong ethnic attachments and identities, while achieving socio-economic success and others may assimilate into mainstream sub-cultures with limited socio-economic mobility (Waters 1996:176). Thus, according to this model, an explanation of differential patterns of adaptation must take into account the normative qualities of immigrant families and the patterns of social relations surrounding these families (Zhou and Bankston 1996:201).

Such approaches, on the other hand overlook similarities between the families from various ethnic backgrounds, while emphasising the 'different' nature of families regarding ethnic variations. This line of argument often oversimplifies the characteristics of ethnic minority families. As Morgan (1996:62) argues:

> Popular white discourses, indeed, often identify different groups according to their supposed family practices: 'Asians' are considered to be more family orientated, more caring, have arranged marriages etc., while Afro-Caribbean families are perceived as being more disorganised, more prone to breakdown. If we are to avoid the danger of reproducing widely held stereotypes we require more detailed analysis.

The family practices characterised as specifically immigrant activity might be valid for non-immigrant groups too. In a study of immigrant households in South Florida, Pèrez (1996:118) makes similar claims that:

the importance of parenting arrangements and socio-economic variables in determining household structure among non-immigrant groups also may hold true for immigrant households, despite the tendency to attribute immigrant patterns primarily to cultural variability.

In Britain, for instance, as Bhachu (1991a:401) points out:

> Sikh women's cultural locations are constantly renegotiated and filtered through the same economic, political and media forces that affect white 'indigenous' women.

In the late 1950s, in a study of working class families in an East London district, Young and Willmott (1957) found very powerful kinship ties, especially among the women. They argued that:

> In an unstable economy, nearly all men were at some time unemployed and at all times frightened of it; and even when they were in work, they frequently kept their families short of money. So the wife had to cling to the family into which she was born, and in particular to her mother, as the only other means of assuring herself against isolation. The extended family was her trade union, organised in the main by women and for women, its solidarity her protection against being alone (Young and Willmott 1957:158).

More than three decades later, in another study of this kind in Manchester, Finch and Mason (1993:163) claim that extended family support is still alive and has a tangible reality in most people's lives. Moreover, they did not observe a straightforward relationship between the degree of support which members of a particular family might offer each other and these members' social status, gender, occupation, ethnicity or incomes (Finch and Mason 1993:164). In fact, they admitted that:

> we are struck more by the similarities in the experience of our white interviewees and those of Asian or Caribbean descent, than by the differences between them (Finch and Mason 1993:165).

Moreover, even if there are differences between immigrant families and non immigrant ones in terms of household types such as single or extended, these differences do not automatically bring given degrees of kin network support. For instance, Bien, Marbach and Templeton (1992) find in their study of social networks of single-person households in Germany that although the percentage of lone households has increased since the

1950s from 18 per cent to 35 per cent of all households, people living alone in households have a family support network as dense as the whole population.

In this respect, the assumption that lone parenthood and cohabitation, which are more common amongst Caribbeans, brings less family solidarity and lack of kin support is questionable too. In fact, in a study of living arrangements, family structure and social change among Caribbeans in Britain, Chamberlain (1999) observes that the siblings played an important role in childhood and child-bearing and the social responsibility for children is beyond the sole obligation of parents, but extends to the wider family and neighbourhood. Chamberlain (1999:142) adds that:

> to look at the Caribbean family through a particular conjugal prism may not offer the most useful perspective for understanding Caribbean life, and may simply replicate... 'categorical error' which sees, and has seen, Caribbean families as anarchic and dysfunctional.

Positioning existing generational conflict as a result of differences between immigrant families and non-immigrant ones, might also ignore the fact that non-immigrant children cannot be assumed to be immune to conflict with their parents, regardless of the degree of severity. As Jamieson and Toynbee (1990:103) indicate; in contemporary British families the parents, especially mothers, became vulnerable because their children's own social networks may provide knowledge of alternative, more liberating life styles and examples of extravagant generosity with which to torment their own parents.

Indeed new conditions in the receiving country change the ethnic minority families. But change cannot simply be explained by the assimilationist effects of the mainstream society. Emphasising the conflicting existence of migrant values misses the constantly changing nature of the family both in sending countries and in receiving countries.

It is evident that ethnic minority families have been constantly changing and these changes cannot be reduced simply to the influences of the dominant society, since the families in the sending countries are not static either. Indeed, the Turkish-speaking family has been changing continuously, both in Turkey and in other countries. As Kagitcibasi (1982:4) points out, widespread social change is almost an everyday matter for people in Turkey. Even Turkish villages, through market relations, have already experienced many changes that affect the family. Similarly, Nichols (1996:1)

emphasised the massive change in Turkish society since the advent to power of Ataturk in 1923. Kandiyoti (1990:96) has argued that when capitalist penetration initiates the erosion of extended families, this erosion is faster among landless families than others. The proportion of nuclear families in rural areas in Turkey was found to be 44 per cent among farmers, 64 per cent among share-croppers, and as high as 79 per cent among agricultural wage-workers.

As far as Turkish migrant families are concerned, there are differences between the first generation and second generation families and this is true not only for the international migrants but national migrants too. Erman (1998a, 1998b) observes that the younger generation migrant women in Ankara's squatter settlements questioned their position in society, especially their relations with their husbands. Most of the women become free from some aspects of oppression by moving away from the control of in-laws and strict norms of the village, and this is a major source of satisfaction for the first generation migrant women, while younger ones want more since younger women do not have an experience of direct control of in-laws who are in the village.

In this chapter, it will be argued that Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes and their own parents' family structure do not fit well with Muslim family stereotypes. It will also be suggested that assimilation discourses do not provide an adequate basis for understanding these attitudes and the changing nature of Turkish-speaking families.

In this respect, it is not reasonable to assume a fixed traditional Turkish family, and rather than making a comparison between the typical Turkish family in London with a typical western style, it is better to concentrate on changes within the Turkish-speaking family. In this chapter, first of all, the existing changes in authority relations in favour of young people, especially the girls, will be discussed. Secondly, young people's attitudes towards sexual relationships before marriage will be analysed in order to show the extent and limitations of change. In this context, the next part will concentrate on the young people's attitudes towards inter-ethnic marriages. In the fourth part, however, it will be argued that the Turkish-speaking young people prefer to have smaller family sizes and do not like their families interfering in decisions about marriage partners. They are also against the idea of the extended family. In particular, the scarcity of the extended family form itself works as a 'buffer institution' against a changing family structure (Kiray 1982) and engenders a considerably higher level of lone motherhood.

Kiray (1982) argued that extended family members provide the working couples in the nuclear families with support for child care and domestic responsibilities and in this sense, extended family work as a 'buffer institution' against a changing family structure. Then, in the last two parts, in the context of their changing attitudes, young people's perceptions of gender roles will be analysed.

2.2 English as A Bargaining Lever against Parents:

The most obvious change in Turkish-speaking families has occurred in relationships between parents and children. Apart from the patriarchal division of labour, the Kurdish and Turkish families' limited English language skills creates a new dynamic in terms of the authority relations in the household. Levine (1982:340) argues that in the Turkish family, adults dominate children in all aspects of life and children do not have any rights until they are grown up. Moreover, in Cyprus too, the children are taught gender roles from an early age. In particular, girls' chastity and modesty are directly related to their families' honour (Ulug 1981:20-23).

Fisek (1982) argues that in Turkey while the status of children is low, boys definitely have higher status than girls. The expectation of the obedience of children to authority transcends differential sex role expectations. Compliance, meekness, respect and quietness are rewarded, while activity, liveliness, curiosity, talk and initiative are punished in both the boys and the girls. Thus, the individual's use of initiative and autonomy would be constricted, and only expressed through approved outlets, such as militarism, heroism, and over-valuation of maleness.

Furthermore, Fisek (1982:302) claims that early sex role training leads to an early and intense identification with the parent of the same sex and an early adoption of adult roles and attitudes, which further serve to inhibit curiosity and initiative and to foreclose on the experimentation of childhood and youth.

However, in London, this authority structure has been changed. When the parents need to see their GP or deal with a council matter, they take their children to translate. A Turkish education officer believed that this is the main reason for children's truancy. The children also deal with letters and bills etc. This factor gives them extra power and makes their parents dependent upon them. A Turkish teacher claimed that:

> Language gives these children power over their parents. After spending some time doing translations for their families, they don't respect their families. They think they are cleverer than their father or mother. And because they believe they have more knowledge than their parents, they start not to listen to their parents. This creates a lack of a proper role model in their life. Their friends become the only role models.

The young people use their linguistic skills to provide a limited kind of freedom for themselves. On the other hand, as will be discussed later, losing authority is debatable. The parents do not lose authority, but the young people obtain a certain amount of freedom or a bargaining power.

As can be seen in Table 2.1, only four out of ten Kurdish young people can communicate in Kurdish in their household. In addition, most of the young people can only understand the language, but not speak it. The majority of the Kurdish families use a Turkish-Kurdish mix, rather than pure Kurdish. Kurdish mothers who are older than 40 seem more comfortable speaking Kurdish than Turkish. Language is a serious burden for the mothers, especially older ones. Their generation usually did not have any formal education and they are illiterate in both languages. Erturk (1995:143) compares Kurdish men and women in Eastern Anatolia:

> Many of the women over 30 years of age, in the region, do not speak Turkish- the official language; many are married by religious law which is not recognised under the modern/secular legal system; many are not registered with the central population bureau and thus do not "officially" exist. Although there may be men who share similar status, by and large, they are more integrated into the institutional nexus. For reasons of schooling, the military, and employment, male children are registered at birth or shortly thereafter.

Kurdish women's limited language ability makes it difficult for them to learn English in this country. They cannot use free public services to learn English, because the lessons are in Turkish. They are totally dependent on their husbands or other family members. Moreover, they cannot understand official letters, even if they are written in Turkish. Kurdish fathers do not have these problems since the majority of them can read and write in Turkish. However, their problem is with English. Most of them have no ability to speak or write in English.

The problem of illiteracy is not unique to the Kurdish mothers. It is also a fact for the Turkish mothers. The older generation of Turkish mothers, like their Kurdish counterparts, have a dependency on other family members in their public life. These family members are usually their children. The dependency of the mothers on their children has reduced their authority over the children's lives. If she cannot understand what exactly is going on, then she can not control them. One of the Turkish boys explains his relations with his mother as follows:

> My mother is a very nice person, you know. Even if she become suspicious about something I did, I can convince her otherwise very easily. My father does not bother about my life too much. In fact, he is always in the shop. For instance, when the school sent a letter, I showed it to my mum. But even if I show it her up side down, she can't recognise it. Then she asks me about its content. If it is something bad, I lie about it. If it is something OK, then I might say the truth.

Although both parents suffer from a lack of language ability, it has more effect on the women. The women's restricted movement in the public sphere seems a common phenomenon among migrant groups. As Yuval-Davis (1997:197) points out, wives of immigrants are often excluded from the public sphere because of legal restrictions, lack of work opportunities or linguistic inadequacies.

Turkish-speaking men in London prefer to spend most of their time in the public sphere. In fact, they have very long working hours and very short leisure time. However, even if they are unemployed, they leave the house after having their breakfast. They visit their friends' shops and usually go to the coffee houses. Since most of their friends are Turkish-speaking men, they do not need to speak English at all. For instance, one of the Kurdish fathers replied to a question concerning the difficulties in his life due to a lack of English skills:

> I have lived here for nearly ten years now. I know the surrounding area very well. By my car, there is no where I could not go without any help. Outside, I have my friends. As you can see I don't need any English. Anyway it is too late for me now. But the children should learn the language well not only for their own sake, but for helping us as well.

The women manage to visit their relatives within walking distance. However, when they need to travel long distances, they need their husbands to give them a lift. Alternatively,

if they go to somewhere together with other female relatives, one available male member picks up all of the women and gives them a lift.

This condition might not be peculiar to the Turkish-speaking young people in London, but the young people from other ethnic minority groups and Turkish young people in other European countries as well. Khan (1979:50) observed in a study of the Mirpuri community in Britain that:

> children who were born in Britain or have undergone most of their schooling in this country have a greater facility in communication than their parents. Elders may feel threatened or insecure, and although many minors maintain the public authority and respect due to elders, occasions arise when minors publicly question or disobey their elders.

Tan and Waldhoff (1996:144) point out that first generation Turkish migrants have a lack of language skills and can only communicate with the 'German world' through their children's translation. Brouwer (1998:153) reports the same phenomena among the Turkish community in the Netherlands.

However, there is a fragile balance between having freedom from the parents and being under their control. From the young people's points of view, their linguistic ability means freedom, while from the parents' points of view, the help children offer is simply an extension of the children's responsibility in the family. Ultimately, both sides tend to find a middle way. The condition certainly creates bargaining power for the young people. For instance, one of the families needed their daughter to go to a doctor with them. At first she refused because of important lessons she needed to attend the following day. Her mother said that she should go with them, because there was nobody else. After fifteen minutes discussion, the daughter accepted on condition that she could buy a dress she saw in a shop.

On the other hand, the young people's power has its limit too. If they push the boundaries too far, punishment will follow accordingly. For instance, one of the Turkish teachers talked about one experience of this kind:

> One Kurdish boy had not been in the school for two weeks. The school sent letters both in Turkish and English, and forced the boy to bring the signed reply letter from his parents and he did. However, he continued his truancy. Then, the class head asked me to call his parents by phone and we understood that he just wrote the reply letters and his mother put

her name at the end. I told his mother about his truancy. Next day he came to the school with a donkey hair cut [this is a common punishment in Turkish school for the boys who have unsuitable hair cuts or are not clothed according to the school's proper dress code. The teacher cuts the children's hair in an ugly way and they end up with very short hair cut to correct it]. Then I felt so bad. I didn't mean him to get hurt, I just wanted them to speak with him.

Furthermore, as can be observed in Table 2.1, an overwhelming majority of the young people prefer to speak Turkish and English with their brothers and sisters. It should be noted that when young people said they speak Turkish and English, they do not mean to speak five minutes of English only, than the next five minutes of Turkish only. They usually create a mixed language (perhaps best called 'Turkish and English'). They sometimes use Turkish words for English ones such as:

20 pounds - 20 **lira**.

On other occasions, they use the grammatical structure of Turkish with English words:

She invited me her birthday party - Beni **birthday** partisine cagirdi - Beni dogum gunune cagirdi.

I went shopping - **Shopping**e gittim - Alisverise gittim.

Or they use a direct translation from English into Turkish:

I took a taxi - Taksi aldim [in Turkish it means that I bought a taxi] - Taksiye bindim.

Tan and Waldhoff (1996:145) observe a similar situation in Germany. They point out that the second generation Turks speak a mixed language, which is neither Turkish nor German. This language includes a particular form of grammar, phonetics, and even pitch, breathing and intonation. This Turkish-German mixed language has various forms from the simple use of German words such as 'Tschüß' (bye bye) into a Turkish conversation, to changing spoken Turkish into the logical pattern of German, or using German suffixes with Turkish words, or changing some German names into the Turkish ones according to sounds (Tan and Waldhoff 1996:146-7). Tan and Waldhoff (1996:145) also emphasise that:

> The speaker of such a mixed language does not perceive his or her communicative ability as *Halbsprachigkeit* (a partial command of language)- as a deficiency- since both languages together constitute the linguistic repertoire and cannot be separated. This pattern of speech and communication is a specific form of bi-lingualism and not the restricted code of semi-competence.

Moreover, only 11 per cent of Kurdish young people speak Kurdish with their brothers and sisters. Mixed usage of Turkish and English increases considerably when the young people speak with their brothers and sisters. The percentages of Turkish and Cypriot young people who speak Turkish and English with their brothers and sisters is even higher than among the Kurdish young people, 88 per cent and 92 per cent respectively. Speaking English is a very good way to escape from parents' control in the home. This is especially true for the girls. A Turkish girl talked about how speaking English is useful for her to escape her mother's attention:

> When I am together with my friends in the home, we talk about girl stuff, you know, something like boys. But if my mum heard, or understood, it will be disastrous. Then we speak English. We can't go to the other room, because if we go, then our mums ask if we are planning something secret, we should sit with them. If they bother to ask what we are talking about, we just reply we are studying English and talk about our lessons.

Again on an occasion, a Kurdish mother did not like the colour of her daughter's nail polish. She asked where she found this 'bitchy colour' and told her to remove it. Her sister said:

> Annemi ignore et [Ignore mum]. Nice renk [nice colour]. Nice degil mi [Isn't it nice]?

Table 2-1: Spoken Language in the households by place of origin (%)

Language spoken in the home with the parents	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
Turkish	53	71	34	53	52
Turkish-English	8	29	66	47	31
Other*	39				18
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Language spoken among the young people	(92)	(34)	(50)	(30)	(206)
Turkish	29	12	8	14	19
Turkish-English	61	88	92	87	77
Other*	11				5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*this category includes 'Kurdish', 'Turkish-Kurdish' and 'Kurdish-English'

On the other hand, in spite of their new bargaining power in the family, these young people are not so keen to change on two issues relating to the family: cohabiting and inter-ethnic marriages.

2.3 Attitudes Towards Sexual Relationships Before Marriage:

In Britain, according to data collected by the ethnic minority survey, 11 per cent of white and 18 per cent of Caribbean and only 2-4 per cent of South Asian partners of all ages are cohabiting (Berthoud and Beishon 1997:28). In my sample of the Turkish-speaking young people, none of them have cohabiting parents. Furthermore, none of the Turkish-speaking young people have never-married lone mothers, compared to about 32 per cent, six per cent and one per cent of the Caribbean, whites and South Asian families in Britain respectively (Berthoud and Beishon 1997:39).

In this respect, the Turkish-speaking parents do not accept the family forms based on arrangements other than a marriage. The following observation is a typical attitude of the parents towards cohabitation. At a party for Women's Day at the Islington Council Hall, a speech was given about having children outside of marriage. The speaker said that:

> We as women should have a right to choose when and with whom to have a child, and if we want, we should be able to have a child outside of marriage.

A middle aged woman interrupted the speaker and said:

> Look, you told us there was a party for women and I brought my daughter. Now what sort of things are you trying to say in front of these young girls? They are not good examples for the young brain.

On the other hand, in his study of ninety-three Turkish young people in London, Kucukcan (1998) found a high approval rate of pre-marital sexual relations. Although he admitted that his respondents (42 boys and 51 girls aged 12-18) were reluctant to talk about the subject, according to him, the reason behind this approval is that:

> The first generation is not successful in transmitting religious values to their children. It may also be suggested that the young people are adopting some of the values of the larger society where such relations are regarded as natural and practised by their peers (Kucukcan 1998:126).

The findings of my research do not support his result and his assumptions. In terms of Turkish-speaking young people's points of view, the family forms based on cohabitation seem not to be a reasonable option. As indicated in Table 2.2, the majority of the young people, like their parents, do not approve of having a sexual relationship before marriage. As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of the young people also have their friendships within their own peer group. Besides, since in my research the young people, especially girls, are very keen to speak about these subjects, their responses show that the subject is not simply a matter of approval or exposing the 'conflicting value system and multiple group belonging' (Kucukcan 1998:127) or emerging 'British-Turkish identities' (Kucukcan 1998:128).

Table 2.2 reveals that more than half of the young people do not think that it is appropriate to have a sexual relationship before marriage. The number of girls who disapprove of this kind of relationship is slightly less than that of the boys who are against the idea. Moreover, the number of boys who think they can get involved in a relationship before marriage is more than that of girls. It means that the girls' attitudes towards sex are more liberated than boys, but they feel more social control than the boys. One Turkish girl explained that:

> It will be nice to share the same house with my boyfriend before marriage to know him better. But there shouldn't be any sexual relationship between us. Because, if I don't like him anymore, I can't leave him then and I have to marry him. Anyway, this is out of the question for me. Because even if nothing happened between us, you can not explain it to

> your family or any body else. In the end, you have to marry him anyway, so what is the meaning of this trial? Also, if you accept a sexual relationship with your boyfriend before marriage, what happens to you if he changes his mind and refuses to marry you? Who is going to accept you anymore?

Furthermore, both the girls and the boys think that this decision must be made by the girls and both of them agree that possible negative results affect the girls, not the boys. One of the Cypriot girls gave an example:

> If my son has a relationship and has a child at the end, I can force him to marry the girl. Even if he refuses me, nobody will condemn him. But if my daughter has a child in the same condition, how can I force somebody else's son to marry my daughter? Didn't his family ask me where was your daughter's mind, when she made this mistake? What can I answer them? Then how can I accept her? What might people say about us?

In another interview, one of the Turkish boys explained the differences between boys and girls in this matter:

> We as men are not clever. It is easy to trick us. In some situations, you know what I mean, man cannot control himself, but a girl must always behave herself. They should not be tricked. I don't like the idea of a relationship before marriage, but even if I made a mistake, I can turn my back and forget. But for a girl, it is not something to be ignored. Life for her finishes.

This unbalanced distribution of responsibility seems to create a paranoia between boys and girls about each other. A discussion with a group of Kurdish girls is a good example:

> Girl 1: If a boy really loves and respects you, he will never ask you something like that. Because he knows you are not that type of girl.
>
> Girl 2: But may be he tries. If you say yes, then he thinks you are that kind of girl, sometimes boys do this kind of things you know. I don't experience something like that myself, but I heard from other girls. Anyway, you should be very careful.

In an example of mistrust from the boys' side, a Kurdish boy claims that:

> If a girl says she loves me and if we had this kind of relationship, how can I be sure that I can trust her. If she does it now, she can do it later with somebody else.

Question: But she can do it, even after you are married. How can you guarantee something like that?

That's why you should not get married with somebody in the first instance. You should evaluate everything very carefully. You must be sure you can trust her fidelity and love and she should know her responsibilities as your wife.

Table 2-2: Sexual Relationships before marriage by Place of Origin (%)

Is it OK to have a sexual relationship before marriage?	Kurdish Populated Areas		Other Places in Turkey		Cyprus		Mixed		Total	
	Female (40)	Male (52)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Female (103)	Male (103)
Yes	28	27	29 (5)	29 (5)	42	41 (7)	62 (8)	29 (5)	37	30
No	68	65	53 (9)	65(11)	42	35 (6)	31 (4)	53 (9)	52	58
Don't Know	5	8	18 (3)	6 (1)	15	24 (4)	8 (1)	18 (3)	11	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Could you have a sexual relationship before marriage?	Kurdish Populated Areas		Other Places in Turkey		Cyprus		Mixed		Total	
	Female (40)	Male (52)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Female (103)	Male (103)
Yes	8	31	18 (3)	35 (6)	36	47 (8)	46 (6)	47 (8)	23	37
No	88	64	82(14)	53 (9)	52	24 (4)	46 (6)	41 (7)	70	52
Don't Know	5	6		12 (2)	12	29 (5)	8 (1)	12 (2)	7	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Apart from their attitudes towards sexual relationships before marriage, the young people also do not approve of inter-ethnic marriages, though the number of those who were not against the idea, is considerably higher than the existing number of inter-ethnic families.

2.4 Attitudes Towards Inter-Ethnic Marriages:

Berthoud and Beishon (1997:31) in their study of ethnic minority families in Britain comment that there was virtually no sign that the various minorities saw each other as forming a common pool from which to select non-white partners.

Indeed, choosing a future partner from another ethnic community is an important indicator to show whether the community will be able to open its boundaries to others in the future or not. In relation to this subject, Kibria (1997:524) argues that:

> for members of ethnic groups, inter-marriage often poses a 'boundary dilemma' or a conceptual space within which to consider questions about one's ethnic identity. That is, as they reflect on the meaning and consequences of out-marriage for their ethnic affiliation, group members also inevitably confront questions about the definition, meaning and significance of the boundaries that mark their identity.

It is a fact that very few Turkish-speaking young people prefer to marry somebody from outside their communities, though they approve of marriages between sub-groups. The boys seem more open to accept a partner from other groups in Britain than the girls. Table 2.3 indicates that 28 per cent of the boys and only 14 per cent of the girls said that they would like to have a partner who is English, Irish, Pakistani and so on. On the other hand, some groups seem more preferable than others, as with their friendship patterns discussed in the previous chapter. Most of those who would prefer to marry somebody outside the Turkish-speaking 'community' want an English person, followed by other white groups such as Irish, Scottish, Italian and so on. There are only two girls who want to marry a Caribbean man, while none of the boys would prefer to marry a black girl.

Moreover, these young people seem to have an open mind with regard to marrying somebody whose origin might cross the inner boundaries of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. Half of the girls and more than half of the boys would prefer to marry somebody within the Turkish-speaking 'community', regardless of his or her origin or religious affiliation. The number of the boys who want to marry a girl from a specific religious group is very low. Only one per cent of them admit that kind of preference. Similarly, only seven per cent of the girls have some religious preference. For these, their husbands should be either Alevi or Muslim.

On the other hand, it does not mean that they have no prejudices about each other. For instance, some of the Kurdish and Turkish girls think that Cypriot boys are less trustworthy compared with the Kurdish and Turkish boys, while some Cypriot and Kurdish girls claim the Turkish boys are more religious and Kurdish boys more traditional and rural compared with their own group. For instance, one of the Kurdish Alevi girls had

a Turkish boyfriend, and her friends thought that if she continued this relationship, it would be very harmful for her. One of them said:

> This girl [pointed to the girl with Turkish boyfriend] is blind with her love. She could not see the future. What happens if she marries him? They will probably be very strict on her.

The girl with the boyfriend replied:

> As you know [to her friends], Ahmet is not like that. He is not like others. He is not religious, he is a modern man.

Furthermore, some Kurdish and Turkish boys believe that the Cypriot girls are less committed in a relationship, while some Cypriot boys are afraid of the family pressure on Turkish and Kurdish girls.

There are some differences between the preferences of boys and girls in terms of their places of origin. As can be seen from Table 2.3, Kurdish girls seem more reluctant to marry somebody from outside the Turkish-speaking 'community' than the other girls. Moreover, over a quarter of the Turkish girls admit to preferring to marry somebody outside the Turkish-speaking 'community'. This number is the highest, compared with the other girls. Some of them think inter-marriages are a kind of protest against their families' preferences for them. For instance, a Turkish girl talks about how intimidating her uncles' beliefs about inter-marriages are:

> My uncles like arranged marriages. To me it seems odd. They don't really know what this person is really like. All my uncles are married. One of my aunts is English. I have another one who is Irish, and another one who is half Indian, half English. But, even though they married outside their culture, they still come up to me and start preaching how I should actually marry up, and not get involved with Arabs [Arab refers both to somebody who is Black or Arab in Turkish], not get involved with English people, they don't have respect ever. One of my uncles preach to me about how I should marry inside my culture. But his wife is Indian. She is Asian. But he still thought he has the right to come to preach to me about his wrong doings. I mean it is just stupid, if I want to marry with someone, I should have the right to marry him. It is nothing to do with my uncle.

Table 2-3: Ideal Ethnic Identity of the Partners by Young people's Ethnic Identity (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas		Other Places in Turkey		Cyprus		Mixed		Total	
Ethnic Preferences for Future Partner	Female (40)	Male (52)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Female (103)	Male (103)
Don't mind	3	4	12 (2)	12 (2)	18	29 (5)	31 (4)	6 (1)	13	10
Non-Turkish Speaking	10	33	29 (5)	24 (4)	15	24 (4)		24 (4)	14	28
Turk*	65	54	47 (8)	59 (10)	39	35 (6)	39 (5)	65 (11)	51	53
Turk/T.Cyp./T .Kurd	13	10			27	12 (2)	23 (3)	6 (1)	17	8
Muslim/Alevi	10		12 (2)	10 (1)			8 (1)		7	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*includes somebody from Turkey or Cyprus, regardless of places of origin or religious affiliation.

The young people with mixed origin show more or less similar attitudes with others on this issue. On the other hand, while the number of the girls with mixed origin who don't mind their future partner's ethnic identity, is higher than that of girls in other groups, none of the mixed origin girls want to have a partner outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. This pattern is also observed among five girls and four boys one of whose parents were outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. None of these girls want to marry somebody outside the Turkish-speaking 'community' either and half of these boys want to marry somebody from the Turkish-speaking 'community'.

Broadly speaking, the hierarchical order based on age in the Turkish-speaking family was damaged under the influence of living in London. The families' lack of English language gives their children a bargaining power in the family. Yet, at the same time these young people do not approve of sexual relationships outside of marriage and do not prefer inter-ethnic marriages, though the number of young people who wish to marry somebody from outside the community is greater than the existing number of that kind of marriage. Their reservations about sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages can be regarded as 'the reflections of differences between a Muslim family and western values'. Even so, however, a deeper analysis of the issue shows that young people would not fit a common Muslim family image in many respects.

2.5 'Unrealistic Dreams of Youth'?

As discussed earlier, it is sometimes assumed that, although young ethnic minorities are influenced by the values of the dominant society, such influences hardly create substantial changes in their family life. In this part, it will be shown that young people, first of all, have very different ideas on various issues from the classical Muslim family typologies. However, it will also be argued that such differences do not imply fundamental differences from their own families, since their families might not fit the classical Muslim family typologies, either. Given that most of the parents are first generation migrants in the UK, their differences cannot simply be discussed within the context of the influences of the receiving country. Therefore, the young people's different attitudes from conventional Muslim family understandings, cannot be understood without referring to the changing family structure in Turkey.

2.5.1 Preferences regarding the number of children:

In terms of the number of children in the household, Turkish families in London are similar to Pakistani and Bangladeshi families. The majority of the white, Caribbean, Indian and African Asian families have one or two children, while more than half of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi families have three or more children (Berthoud and Beishon 1997:41).

Regardless of the place of origin, having only one child or two children is not common among the families in the Turkish-speaking 'community'. On the other hand, Cypriot families are smaller in size, compared with others including families having one of the parents from outside the Turkish-speaking 'community'. More than six in ten Cypriot families have one or two children, while only about three in ten Kurdish families and half of the Turkish and mixed families do so. As can be seen from Table 2.4, 72 per cent of the Kurdish families have three or more children, compared with 36 per cent of Cypriot, 46 per cent of mixed and 53 per cent of Turkish families.

Table 2-4: Number of the children in the Households by Place of Origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
up to 2 children	29	47	64	53	44
Three children	44	32	26	33	36
More than three	28	21	10	13	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100

As shown in Table 2.5, Turkish-speaking young people, especially Kurdish ones do not want the size of their future families to be similar to their existing ones. More than 60 per cent of Turkish-speaking young people prefer a small number of children. Nearly six out of ten Kurdish young people prefer to have up to two children. Other young people also want smaller families for themselves, though the differences between their preferences and the actual size of their families is not as dramatic as it is for Kurdish young people. Moreover, the girls in each group are more likely to prefer to have fewer children than their families. The difference between Turkish boys and girls is especially apparent. There are differences between the boys and girls in terms of the reasons to want less children. When the girls explained their preferences, they thought not only in terms of financial problems, but also in terms of the physical and psychological responsibilities of bringing up a child. But the boys seemed only interested in the financial side of the problem.

Table 2-5: Preferred Number of Children by Place of Origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other Places in Turkey			Cyprus			Mixed			Total		
	Fem (40)	Male (52)	Tot (92)	Fem (17)	Male (17)	Tot (34)	Fem (33)	Male (17)	Tot (50)	Fem (23)	Male (17)	Tot (30)	Fem (103)	Male (103)	Tot (206)
None or up to 2 children	63	56	59	71 (12)	53 (9)	62	61	70 (12)	64	54	59 (10)	56	63	59	61
Three children	33	37	35	24 (4)	41 (7)	32	33	12 (2)	26	23	35 (6)	30	30	33	32
More than three	5	8	7	6 (1)	6 (1)	6	6	18 (3)	10	23	6 (1)	13	8	9	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Is this difference simply a result of the unrealistic ambitions before being a 'full time Muslim'? No. It is not. Having two children - one girl and one boy - is very preferable among the young Kurdish and Turkish families and their preferences seem to be encouraged by the older generation. As one father said:

> My father could not know all of us by our names. We are twelve brothers and sisters. Then I married at 18 years old. My wife was only sixteen. I had five children. Three girls and two boys. Bringing up all these children is very difficult job. But believe me if I had my current views, I probably would have stopped at three. The new generation are more clever than us. Though economic conditions also force them to have less children. Children want more now than before.

In fact, the average number of children per family in Turkey has been in decline too. The ratio of the children in the age group 0 to 14 years old, compared with rest of the population has declined from 78 per cent to 58 per cent between 1935 and 1995 (SIS 1996:72). Moreover, the average number of children aged 0 to 14, per household has also declined from 2.6 to 1.8 between 1965 and 1990 (SIS 1971, 1996).

2.5.2 Attitudes towards Arranged Marriages:

The Turkish-speaking young people even oppose the idea of arranged marriages as the main features of the family in traditional societies. Marriage without their parents' consent is difficult for the girls. In practice it means breaking all ties with their families. On the other hand, it should be noted that if everything goes all right in the marriage, the families gradually tend to accept their son-in-law. However, if something goes wrong with the marriage, the girls know that it is difficult to ask for help from their parents. Moreover, there is a general belief that when the girl gets married without her parents' acceptance, her parents-in-law might treat her badly or they can take advantage of her helplessness. A Kurdish girl talked about her own family experiences:

> My family were against my sister's marriage, because she was so young and the boy worked in his father's shop. He was not independent. But she didn't listen to them and escaped to him. They are now married and have a daughter. She has some problems with her mother-in-law, because they live in the same home. But my mum never let my sister talk about her problems. She said to her 'You are on your own, we have no power to intervene now. What do they say to us? They probably say that we didn't want your daughter. She came herself.' I think my mum is right, she can't intervene now. Because of this, if I found myself in the same situation, I might think twice. For instance, I will never marry somebody without a job, I will never marry somebody if we will live with his family.

The families do not give up on their sons, except in extreme conditions. For example, one of the Turkish families has a son who married his maternal uncle's ex-wife. Their

relationship started when she was still married to his uncle. When the family heard about it, they refused to see both their son and his uncle's wife. At present, only his sisters have contact with him. However, the parents do not know about this. Other than these kinds of conditions parents do not refuse to see their sons, and after a couple of years, the parents have usually accepted their son's wife and marriage.

The families' various attitudes to the girls' and boys' marriages makes the girls relatively more cautious when they think about marriage. Although, like the boys, the girls prefer to make their own decisions, they believe that in order to reject their families' opinion about their boyfriend, the relationship with him must be more powerful than that with their families. As one Turkish girl explained:

> If my family do not like the person I wish to marry, first I will ask them about their objections. If they are reasonable, I will think again. I will try every possible way to convince them. But if I really love the boy and trust him more than I trust my family, I might escape.

However, if their family rejects their relationships, the boys are reluctant to leave their girlfriends. For example, a Cypriot boy said that:

> There is only one condition in which I listen to my family. That is if they saw my girlfriend with somebody else. But not on the street or something. If they saw her hand in hand. Even then, I would not break my relationship. First I would ask her if it is true or not. If I trust her answer, then I don't listen to my family.

On the other hand, the young people believe that the possibility of their family's rejection of prospective partners will be very small because their choice will be responsible. A responsible choice means that, as much as possible, the person should meet the basic cultural and economic criteria of the families, that is being Muslim or Alevi and/or having a means of earning money. As one of the Cypriot girls explained:

> My family trust me. They know I am capable of avoiding wrong things and doing right ones. If he has a good job, earns good money, has a good house and a good family, they don't mind what religion he is. Of course, a big catch like that might not come to me.

Table 2-6: Marriage against family wishes by Place of origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas		Other Places in Turkey		Cyprus		Mixed		Total	
Marriage against family wish	Female (40)	Male (52)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Female (103)	Male (103)
Do not marry	40	12	24 (4)	18 (3)	18	29 (5)	31 (4)	6 (1)	29	15
Marry against my family wish	60	89	77 (13)	82 (14)	82	71 (12)	69 (9)	94 (16)	71	85
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

One again, is this difference simply a result of unrealistic ambitions before becoming a 'full time Muslim'? Again, no. It is not. Young people's attitudes towards arranged marriages could not be understood as a result of being in Britain, in fact arranged marriages are not common among the majority of people in Turkey (although this is dependent on family background). Gokce et al. (1993:115) found that in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir *Gecekondus* [urban settlement built over night], 65 per cent of men and 67 per cent of women do not have arranged marriages. The proportion of the arranged marriages was 16 per cent in Western Anatolia, 22 per cent in South Anatolia, 33 per cent in Inner Anatolia and 33.3 per cent in the Black Sea Region (although this kind of marriage is the norm in *Gecekondus* in Eastern Anatolia, where 57 per cent of the men and 46 per cent of the women in the area observe this tradition). This is more or less true for Cyprus too, arranged marriages in Cyprus have become less and less a common practice.

Ulug (1981:22) notes that in Cyprus arranged marriage, despite a common assumption that girls are forced into this form of marriage, is usually a form of match making. The boy and girl are introduced to each other by their families and if they like their companion, marriage will be arranged. However, at any point, both sides can change their minds.

Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the young people, irrespective of gender, indicated that if their families were against their choice of a partner, they would go ahead with their decisions. In addition to their willingness to have fewer children and make their own decision on their future partners without their family's interference, the young

people's attitudes towards the extended family as a traditional family form, are also very negative.

2.5.3 Attitudes towards the Extended Family:

In order to measure attitudes towards extended families, the Turkish-speaking young people were asked whether they would like to share the same household with their parents or parents-in-law after marriage. The majority of them did not like the idea and their answers were negative.

The number of girls who were against the idea was larger than that of boys. There are not such large differences in terms of the places of origin. The attitudes of the young people whose parents were from outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community', are also similar to the rest of the young people. As can be observed in Table 2.7, 86 per cent of the girls and 78 per cent of the boys do not like the idea of sharing the same home with their families after marriage. The girls think that living with parents-in-law gives, to the latter, extra control and allows more interference. A Kurdish girl admitted that she does not like the idea of sharing:

> Today, even village girls in Turkey don't accept living with their parents-in-law. I don't like that idea. If you live with your husband's parents, they will always interfere in your relations with him and your children. There will be no personal life. Also the house could never be yours, it will be your mother-in-law's home. She will probably try to control you. No, not for me thanks!

Like the girls, the boys do not want to share the same household with their parents. They think that it is not a matter of losing control, rather that it shows a lack of personal responsibility for their life. One Turkish boy believed that:

> If you want to marry, you should have the responsibility to provide a home, food and everything else for your wife and children. If continue to live with your family, it means you still depend on them to look after you and your own family. If your mother and father need your support, like if they are ill or something, if they cannot live on their own, then of course I should look after them and they can live in my house, but not the opposite.

Table 2-7: Sharing the same household with parents after marriage by place of origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas		Other Places in Turkey		Cyprus		Mixed		Total	
Sharing the same household with parents after marriage	Female (40)	Male (52)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Female (103)	Male (103)
Yes	3	15	12 (2)	6 (1)	9	18 (3)		35 (6)	6	18
No	88	81	83 (14)	77 (13)	85	71 (12)	92 (12)	53 (9)	86	74
Not know	10	4	6 (1)	18 (3)	6	12 (2)	8 (1)	12 (2)	8	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Is this difference simply a result of unrealistic ambitions before becoming a 'full time Muslim'? Again, no. As shown in Table 2.8, the extended family household is not common in existing households in London. Turkish-speaking households are usually nuclear families. Due to this characteristic, Turkish-speaking families are clearly different from Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Indian/African and Chinese families, and similar to white and Caribbean families. In Britain, 49 per cent of Pakistani/Bangladeshi, 42 per cent of Indian/African Asian and 40 per cent of Chinese households have three or more adults, compared to 17 per cent of white and 18 per cent of Caribbean households (Berthoud and Beishon 1997:46). As can be seen in Table 2.8, there are no grandparents, uncles or aunts in 81 per cent of the Turkish-speaking homes.

When the newly married couple live with their parents (usually the husband's family), the condition is temporary and it would be discussed before marriage. Otherwise, the bride has the right to cancel the marriage or return to her family house. In one such situation, a Kurdish family found a suitable bride for their son from Turkey, the couple were married there, and they planned a later ceremony in London. However, the groom's family did not explain to the bride and her family that they would be living with the groom's family for a time. When she understood the situation, she asked for a divorce and left the house to live with her relatives in London. It took another six months for the boy's family to persuade her to live with them for not longer than one year. Finally they agreed and the London marriage ceremony was conducted.

Turkish-speaking women, especially, do not like to share the same home with their mothers-in-law. At the party in Islington Council Hall described above, one speech concerned the financial freedom of women by virtue of having separate bank accounts. But one of the old women shouted:

> I was here with my daughter-in-law. We supplied everything she asks, even more. If my son abused her in any way, he should deal with me first. But by these words, you put bad thoughts between husbands and wives. The young generation is lucky anyway. In my time, we even couldn't speak in front of our parents-in-law. [She turned to her daughter in law, and asked her to say something, she was a very young and shy girl and just smiled.] [4]

The woman next to me said in a very low tone:

> I am glad mine [her mother-in-law] is in Turkey. I am sure this one interferes in everything between her son and her daughter-in-law.

Table 2-8: Other Family Members in the Home by Place of Origin (%)

Having Others in the home	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
No	84	91	76	70	81
Yes	16	9	24	30	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100

It might be assumed that the majority of the grandparents of Kurdish and Turkish families are in Turkey or Cyprus and when the first generation became older, they might share the same household with their children. However, the extended household is not common in Turkey and Cyprus. Senyapili (1982: 237) claims that the family has always been nuclear with between two and four children in the rural as well as urban areas in Turkey. Olson (1982) also observed that in rural and urban areas in Turkey, regardless of their backgrounds, families are usually nuclear.

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[4] These words were recorded in shorthand and fully reconstructed immediately following the meeting.

Duben (1982:76) indicated that as early as the 1950s (the beginning of the mass migration from rural areas to the cities) only 25 per cent of the Turkish rural households were extended. Moreover, in the *Gecekondu* areas the percentage of the nuclear families were even higher than in the metropolises as a whole. The literature on the Turkish family in Cyprus is very limited. However, it could be argued that family structures and relations are not substantially different from those in mainland Turkey - as Ulug (1981:20-23) asserts, typical Cypriot families are nuclear.

It is important to note that where there is some continuity of the extended family form, even with its lower incidence, it now has new functions due to changing needs of the Turkish-speaking families. As the Turkish scholar Kiray (1982) indicates, the extended family form serves structural changes in Turkey. As a 'buffer institution', extended families enable both parents to work by sharing the responsibility of child-bearing with their own parents (Kiray, 1982: 61). Noticeably, my findings in London also imply that extended family structure functions as a mechanism of structural change in family life. The proportion of lone mother families is not so much different than the overall average of lone parenthood in the United Kingdom as will be explained below.

2.5.3.1 The Extended Family as a 'Buffer Institution':

When there are not two parents present in the household together, the other family members seem to substitute for the absent parent. As can be observed in Table 2.9, 15 per cent of the young people have only one of their parents in the home. In other words, about one in seven Turkish-speaking young people live in one-parent families. In terms of the percentage of lone parents, Turkish-speaking families are a little lower than Caribbean and white families, and higher than South Asians. In Britain, 72 per cent of white families with children have two formally married parents, compared with 40 per cent of Caribbean, and 90 per cent of South Asian families (Berthoud and Beishon 1997:39).

In the Turkish-speaking sample, there is a strong relationship between family types and places of origin. Young people from mixed origin and Cypriot backgrounds are more likely to have a lone parent, compared with Kurdish young people. Two out of ten Cypriot and just under a quarter of mixed households are lone parents. This number increased to more than half of the families in which one of the parents was from outside the Turkish-speaking 'community'. That proportion is reduced to just over one in ten of the

Kurdish households and of the Turkish households. In other words, in my study the lone parenthood pattern among the families from mainland Turkey is similar to that of South Asians, while that of Cypriot and mixed origin families are similar to whites and Caribbeans respectively.

In the Turkish-speaking sample, lone parenthood is usually the result of divorce, rather than death. Divorced parents made up one in ten families. According to Berthoud and Beishon (1997:39) 15 per cent of white parents, 13 per cent of Caribbean and six per cent of South Asians are divorced. In other words, Turkish-speaking families are more or less similar to the white and Caribbean ones.

About 68 per cent of the Turkish-speaking lone parents had divorced their partners. The rate of divorce among the Cypriot lone parents is the highest. Nine out of ten Cypriot lone parents had divorced their partners. Mixed origin families follow the Cypriot ones in terms of divorce. Most of the lone parent households are female-headed.

Whilst the reasons behind such divorces are important, it is difficult to get detailed and accurate data about these sensitive issues from the young people. On the other hand, according to an officer at a Turkish-speaking women's organisation, the most common reasons for divorce are violence, men's adultery, and/or gambling problems.

The officer added that divorce has more dramatic consequences for Kurdish women than other groups. When Kurdish women ask for asylum for the first time, they are registered as dependent on their husbands, rather than as a single asylum seeker. All of their income support is organised under their husband's name and, if they work, they give all of their earnings to their husband. When they escape from their husband's violence or if their husband leaves them for another woman, Kurdish women face extradition to Turkey. This is probably the reason why lone parenthood is rare among Kurdish families compared with others.

Table 2-9: Types of Households by Place of Origin (%)

Types of Households	Kurdish Populated Areas	Other Places in Turkey	Cyprus	Mixed	Total
Lone Parent Households	**11** (10)	**12** (4)	**20** (10)	**23** (7)	**15** (31)
Divorcees (% of all lone parent households)	60 (6)	25 (1)	90 (9)	71 (5)	68
Widows (% of all lone parent households)	40 (4)	75 (3)	10 (1)	29 (2)	32
Two Parents Households	**89** (82)	**88** (30)	**80** (40)	**77** (23)	**85** (75)
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

When a mixed marriage breaks up, ex-partners usually have no contact at all. In this situation, the support of the other family members becomes even more essential for the moral and financial well being of the children. For example, one boy whose father is Pakistani and whose mother is Cypriot, talked about how important his grandmother and grandfather were in his life:

> When I was five years old, my dad decided to go to Pakistan, because he missed his family. But my mum thought about our future and education, and refused to go. Then they divorced and he settled down in Pakistan. When I was small, he telephoned us, now he doesn't. We heard he married again. Since he left, my grandfather and grandmother have settled down with us. My mum works as an interpreter in a law company. I can say we have grown up with my grandfather and grandmother rather than with my mum. They are like a father and mother to me.

It is true, in general terms, that ex-husbands have difficulties continuing contact with their children, especially if they have remarried and have a new family. One boy whose mother is Irish and father is Turkish talked about his experiences with his step mother:

> My father never forgot me. We still have regular contact. He has a factory in this area. Before my father remarried, my relationship with my father was better. His new wife is Turkish. Even, at the beginning of their marriage, I stayed with them for a while. After they had a child of their own, she started to dislike me. She thinks me a threat to her son's heritage. That's why I moved to my mum. Now, I visit my dad at the factory instead of at his home.

When the parents are separated, other family members substitute for the absent parent. In this sense, the extended family works as a 'Buffer Institution'. As can be seen from Table 2.10, more than half of the lone parent households have other family members in

the house, compared with 13 per cent of two parent households (lone parent households regardless of their origin appreciate support from a family member). The proportion of them is especially considerable among mixed lone parent families, nearly nine out of ten of them having a family member in their household. This figure is not different for the lone parents whose ex-partners were from outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community'.

British lone parents also sometimes share the same household with other family members or had support from them. Drake (1994:5) notes that in 1983-4, 41 per cent of single lone mothers occupied a household with kin outside the immediate family - nearly a third living with their own parents, (although this ratio was 64 per cent of all single lone parents in 1975). Furthermore, in her study of lone mothers living on a large inner city council estate in North London, Standing (1999:125) emphasises how essential it is for the women to get practical and emotional support from other female family members for child care.

Table 2-10: Other Family Members in the Home by Types of Household (%)

Having Others in the home	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other Places in Turkey			Cyprus			Mixed			Total		
Numbers:	Lone (10)	Two (82)	Total (92)	Lone (4)	Two (30)	Total (34)	Lone (10)	Two (40)	Total (50)	Lone (7)	Two (23)	Total (30)	Lone (31)	Two (175)	Total (206)
No	50(1)	88	84	50 (2)	97	91	60(6)	80	76	14(1)	87	70	45	87	81
Yes	50(1)	12	16	50 (2)	3	9	40(4)	20	24	86(6)	13	30	55	13	19
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The evidence so far clearly indicates that young people's attitudes to the family were not simply a matter of their unrealistic ambitions before being a 'full time Muslim'. In this sense, their attitudes on gender roles are also worth analysing. The gender roles are analysed with respect to two levels. Firstly, the young people's ability to identify female and male roles outside of family boundaries will be discussed. It will show the degree of readiness of these boys and girls to think of women outside the home. Secondly, their

attitudes on the division of labour will be analysed. This will show degree of acceptance of change in relation to women's domestic responsibilities.

2.6 The Attitude of Turkish-speaking Young People Towards Gender Roles:

Bott (1971:53) classified the organisation of familial activities in terms of relationship between spouses in three ways: 'complementary', 'independent' and 'joint'. In complementary arrangements, husbands and wives have different activities which are separate, but fit together to form a whole. In independent partnerships husbands and wives have separate activities without reference to each other. In joint ones husbands and wives act together or do the same activity at different times. In terms of this classification, the existing Turkish-speaking families have a high degree of segregation of conjugal roles both in the public sphere and private one. Yet, at the same time, some of their activities complement each other.

In the Turkish-speaking families, women are responsible for the social representation of the family outside of the home. The women decide whose wedding or circumcision ceremony they should attend and what sort of gift they give. There are many factors they have to take into account: the degree of their relation with the other family, the social and economic status of their own family and the other family; the quantity and quality of the gifts which they have already exchanged; and the timing of the possible gift exchange between families. As one Kurdish woman explained:

> I try to attend every wedding ceremony. If I can't, I send my gift with one of my relatives. On some occasions, you need to give a whole coin [24 ct gold coin valued about £50], sometimes a half coin. I have my son's circumcision ceremony in the near future and I am going to have another child very soon. All these gifts will return to me very soon. Because I go to theirs, they will come to mine.

There is a very sensitive balance between giving too much and too little. If a woman gives too much, the other women label her and her husband as naive, and if they give too little, they can easily be called greedy. This labelling does not only affect her, but her husband as well. For example, if the family needs financial support, the others might refuse it because the family does not have the ability to make enough money to pay it back, or because in the past they did not give enough.

In other words, the sexual division of labour does not only provide Turkish-speaking women with domestic tasks, but rather it gives different tasks to both men and women in the public sphere as well. Davis (1991) argues that women's disadvantaged position could not simply be explained as a result of their subordinate position with respect to men in power relations. On the contrary, she observes that:

> women routinely undermine asymmetrical power relations or display some degree of penetration of what is going on, despite being unable or unwilling at that particular moment to do anything to alter the course of events (Davis 1991:80).

In her study of divorced parents in Britain, Smart (1999:105) claims that while a mother has a disadvantaged place as an independent citizen in the public sphere, compared with a father, she is clearly far from powerless in terms of inter-personal relationships, especially her relationship with her children's father as a mediator between him and the children.

On the other hand, instead of the power that women might gain in certain conditions in relation with their husbands inside the home, men are doing nothing and all the burden of the household is carried by the women. Even when women work outside of the house, they are still responsible for the household's maintenance. Unemployed men with working wives think that they help their wives in the household tasks, but the majority of them heat their food or cook a light snack for themselves and sometimes wash the dishes afterwards. On the other hand, because they are all considered to be female tasks, the men think that they have made enough sacrifice. (In fact, most of the women think that way too.) One of the Kurdish mothers who works in a textile factory explains her husband's recent difficulties because of unemployment:

> I feel sorry for him. He has not been working for six months now. I prepare his breakfast before going work. He wakes up later and eats. In the lunch time, he comes home and prepares his own food and sometimes, when I have to work late, my daughter prepares dinner. But he said 'he became like a woman, he cooks like a woman should do'. He is right. But what we can do?

Moreover, the women usually do not criticise the division of labour in the households. In fact, with the help of technological household tools, some of them assume that their household tasks are easier than men's outside jobs. In the party at the Islington Council Hall, described earlier, speakers talked about the double exploitation of women in the

home and at the work place and having bank accounts separate from their husbands in spite of very low participation of women in the labour market. Due to the nature of their discussions most of the women in the hall gossiped with each other. One of the young Turkish women with two small children whispered to the women next to her that:

> Mine [her husband] never let me work. The poor soul drives a taxi the whole day and most of the night to bring home our bread. In the home, all the jobs are done by machines, I personally never put my hand into hot or cold water [I do not do any physical jobs]. Now, if I tell him that he exploits me, even my son laughs at me. Life is easy for women here.

However, this domestic division of labour is not peculiar to Turkish-speaking families. Beishon, Modood and Virdee (1998) emphasised that in Caribbean, African Asian/ Indian, and Pakistani/ Bangladeshi families, the household division of labour is asymmetrical - that is, women perform all the household tasks such as cleaning and cooking. On the other hand, this is not characteristic of only ethnic minority families, as Gittins (1993:131) describes:

> However a society or household is organised, there has always been the assumption that a certain core of domestic work is by definition woman's work. This is regardless of whether she engages in paid work, whether she is totally or partly dependent on a husband or father, regardless of whether she is single, married, widowed or divorced, young or old. There is no equivalent assumption for men.

Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes towards gender roles show both similarities and changes in relation to the existing roles in their families. In general, Turkish-speaking girls are more critical of the existing situation, while in contrast the boys are more likely to prefer the existing roles and this is also true for the young people whose own parents were from outside of the Turkish community. In order to understand how the young people perceive gender roles in relation to the family, they were asked to define their ideal men and women, and subsequently the answers were categorised in terms of whether they are family related or not. Family related preferences are those concerning the roles and responsibilities of females and males in the home, for example those on maintaining the household such as nursing the children, cleaning, cooking and being a breadwinner. It should be noted that none of the family related references used for the 'ideal man' relate to cleaning, cooking and nursing, instead they were earning money, protecting the wife and the children, and educating them in a good manner.

Those which described non-family related references are physical appearances and general moral characteristics such as being honest with friends, being brave in a fight, hard working in school and in the work place.

As can be observed from Table 2.11, the perception of the ideal woman varies from Kurdish young people to others and from girls to boys. Half of the Kurdish girls think that the ideal woman is not defined by the family criteria, while half of the Kurdish boys define the ideal woman with reference to the family. It should be noted that there are some differences between non-family related references for girls and for boys. Girls are more likely to choose characteristics such as working and self-confidence. A Kurdish girl defined an ideal woman as:

> A woman who trusts herself. She should look after herself, if she becomes alone. She has to earn her money. When she speaks, she should be able to make everybody listen to her.

On the other hand, the majority of girls, including Kurdish ones, concentrate on the image and material possessions of this self-confident woman, rather than her qualifications, and they link the successful self-confident image with money:

> She has a nice car, house, and nice clothes. She should own her business, or work in an office. But, she should definitely have money. Because if you have money, everybody respects you, it doesn't matter if you have won a lottery or have your own shop.

More than half of the Turkish girls, unlike Kurdish ones, are keen to identify women with reference to the family. On the other hand, they think women's roles in the family differ from their mother's ideals. Their mothers have their responsibilities in the house independent of their husband, but complementary to him. On the other hand, Turkish girls introduce a new dimension into wife and husband relations. They identify a household as belonging to both women and men together.

> When my father comes to the home, he says, 'he is so tired', then he expects everything from us, even that we bring him water when he feels thirsty. If I refuse, my mum says, 'because he works outside for our well being, we should do our best to comfort him'. But mum is working at home as well.

On the other hand, there are not many differences between Kurdish and Turkish boys' definitions of an ideal woman. More than half of the Kurdish boys and just over four out

of ten Turkish boys define their ideal woman in terms of family criteria. However, unlike Turkish girls, the boys do not expect women to have reciprocal relationships with their husbands. The boys define the existing women's role as ideal. A Turkish boy defined an ideal woman as:

> A good cook. She always listens to her husband. She never does anything against her husband's wishes or without having his approval. She gives respect to her husband and her older relatives and disciplines her children in a proper way.

Moreover, it should be noted that the boys who use the non-family related references do not use the same criteria as the girls who refer to the non-family related categories for a woman. The boys use physical beauty, instead of self-confidence or self-image.

> An ideal woman is a beautiful woman, especially her face. She is like Hulya Avsar [a famous Turkish singer]. When you look at her, you could not turn away. If she is beautiful, it doesn't matter how clever or how educated she is.

Both Cypriot boys and girls think of women outside of the family, just over one out of ten of them give family roles for an ideal woman. However, like their Kurdish counterparts, Cypriot boys refer to physical appearances such as a beautiful face or a slim body, while Cypriot girls use self-confidence or being career-oriented. Young people from mixed origins show a similar pattern to Cypriot ones. Seven out of ten of both boys and girls identified the ideal woman in terms of non-family related criteria such as appearance and career.

Apart from the Turkish young people, and regardless of their gender, young people overwhelmingly define their ideal man in terms of non-family related references. However, the gender differences observed in the non-family related references for the ideal woman are not the case for the definition of the ideal man. Only a small number of girls use appearances as criteria for their ideal men. Both girls and boys who define their ideal man in terms of non-family related criteria choose self-respect, confidence, career, and honesty. However, the boys concentrated on non-family related moral codes for an ideal man, while the girls who chose non-family related criteria refer to material assets as well as moral codes for an ideal man. A Turkish girl stated:

An ideal man trusts himself to do everything successfully. He works hard and has lots of money. Everybody asks his advice and he is a clever man and never makes a fool of himself.

A Kurdish boy identified an ideal man from a different perspective:

An ideal man is a best friend, trustworthy. He never turns his back on his friend, when they need help. He is also a brave man. When he stands up in front of somebody, that person is scared. He always says what he thinks openly. He never gossips like a woman.

Turkish girls, unlike others, define the ideal man in terms of his family obligations. About 53 per cent of them think that an ideal man should fulfil his responsibilities in relation to his wife and his children, he should be faithful to his wife. As a Turkish girl stated:

An ideal man spends all his money and his time with his family. He doesn't look at other women or lose all his money in the gambling machines. He tries to provide everything his wife and children asks for. He should live for them.

Table 2-11: Ideal Women and Men by Place of Origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas					
	Ideal Woman			Ideal Man		
Number of Cases	Female (40)	Male (52)	Total (92)	Female (40)	Male (52)	Total (92)
Non Family Related References	50	46	48	60	71	66
Family Related References	43	52	48	38	27	32
Other*	8	2	4	3	2	2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Other Places in Turkey					
	Ideal Women			Ideal Men		
Number of Cases	Female (17)	Male (17)	Total (34)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Total (34)
Non Family Related References	35 (6)	24 (4)	29	35 (6)	35 (6)	35
Family Related References	53 (9)	41 (7)	47	53 (9)	29 (5)	41
Other*	12 (2)	35 (6)	24	12 (2)	35 (6)	24
Total	100	100	100	100		100
	Cyprus					
	Ideal Women			Ideal Men		
Number of Cases	Female (33)	Male (17)	Total (50)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Total (50)
Non Family Related References	64	65 (11)	64	55	65 (11)	58
Family Related References	12	12 (2)	12	27	12 (2)	22
Other*	24	24 (4)	24	18	24 (4)	20
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Mixed					
	Ideal Women			Ideal Men		
Number of Cases	Female (13)	Male (17)	Total (30)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Total (30)
Non Family Related References	69 (9)	71 (12)	70	62 (8)	82 (14)	73
Family Related References	15 (2)	24 (4)	20	23 (3)	6 (1)	13
Other*	15 (2)	6 (1)	10	15 (2)	12 (2)	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

*includes those replies with 'don't know', 'having no ideal woman or man', 'don't believe any criteria to be set as ideal'

In conclusion, the Turkish-speaking young people's perceptions of gender roles are different from their fathers' and mothers' perceptions of their roles and responsibilities.

Besides, there is no doubt in their parents' minds concerning these roles. It could be argued that these various understandings of men's and women's roles among the Turkish-speaking young people might cause tension between the sexes in terms of power relations in the future. The following section will discuss the expectation of the young people in relation to the division of labour.

2.7 The Attitude of Turkish-speaking Young People towards the Division of Labour:

As indicated in the previous section, most of the girls define an ideal woman outside of the family criteria, while the boys define an ideal woman in relation to the family. This gap in their perceptions became less obvious when they were asked about their preferences for an ideal partner's occupation. Thorne (1993) points out that gender relationships might not always be understood as 'separation and difference':

> To move our research wagons out of the dualistic rut, we can, first of all, try to start with a sense of whole rather than with an assumption of gender as separation and difference. One way to grasp this complexity is by examining gender in context rather than fixing binary abstractions like "boys emphasize status, and girls emphasize intimacy." Instead we should ask "which boys and girls, where, when, under what circumstances?" (Thorne 1993:108).

It seems that there is an agreement among the boys and girls about the gender division of labour in the household. The husband is regarded as the main breadwinner, while the wife is thought either complementary, if she works, or dependent if she is a housewife.

Table 2.12 shows that except for Kurdish girls, the majority of the girls do not mind about their partner's occupation as long as he is not unemployed. A mixed origin girl claimed that:

> I don't have any specific ideal about my future husband. He shouldn't be a lazy person. He should always find a way to bring money to the home. Actually, if he can't earn enough money, I don't mind working as well. But if he lays down in the home and I work, I mind very much.

Unlike other girls, most of the Kurdish females want a professional partner. They prefer a professional partner not only because professional jobs are more prestigious compared

to the others, but because they believe that the other alternatives are worse than being unemployed.

> If I am destined to marry somebody who works in a factory or has a shop, I would rather stay single. For me, these occupations mean being unemployed or even worse. Because when he is unemployed, at least he does not work to death for nothing. So the only option open for me to marry somebody with a proper job such as office worker, council worker, or teacher.

In fact, the number of girls who prefer a non-professional or self-employed partner is not high among any category. The girls seem to value these alternatives only under certain conditions. As a Turkish girl explained:

> Who am I going to marry depends on what sort of job I might have in the future. If I had a professional job such as lawyer or doctor and so on, my husband should be a professional too. But most importantly how much money I might be going to have in the future. We should at least earn an equal amount of money. But preferably he should earn more than me. On the other hand, if I can't do well in the future, I don't mind what sort of job my partner might have. Then it really depends on luck. He can be a professional or a shop keeper or a factory worker. But the most important think is that he should be better off than me. If he is worse off, then we can't be happy. Because he will always feel inferior. Also everybody thinks he is not man enough, because he spends my money. I can't respect him either in that position. Because I always look at him from above.

There is not much differentiation among the boys' preferences for their future partner's employment status. The majority of the boys want their future partner not to be employed at all. They want their wife to be a housewife. On the other hand, the boys explain their preferences not with reference to the roles of the women, but to the roles of men. In other words, if their wife will be other than a housewife, they would not feel like a 'real man'. A Kurdish boy said that:

> I don't want my wife to work. If she works in the house, it is enough. I think a man should be capable of providing his wife with whatever she needs. If I can't do that, it is better for me not to marry at all. In fact, all the girls I know want to marry somebody who has money, so if you tell them there is a possibility they might need to work after marriage, they will probably run away.

In a similar vein, the following discussion between a Turkish and Cypriot boy shows how the boys relate breadwinning to manhood:

> Cypriot Boy: I prefer my wife to stay at home ['staying home' means housewife in Turkish]. But if she insist on working, then she can work for herself. I don't expect her to contribute to household income in anyway. I should always be a main bread winner and her earnings shouldn't be more than mine.
>
> Turkish Boy [with a cynical laugh]: what about Sibel Can [a singer whose fame is well beyond that of her artist husband]? She is beautiful and buys expensive gifts to her husband. Don't you want yours to buy you a Porsche?
>
> Cypriot Boy: In the future, tell your wife to buy you one. It seems to suits you. I am thinking of buying two Porsche myself, one for me and one for her.

However, the boys' self perception about work and manhood are not peculiar to them. In a study of young men's attitudes towards gendered work in Britain, Lloyd (1999) found that the majority of them had more traditional perceptions of being a man such as having a job, defending your family and being a good father. He concludes that:

> Work attitudes and also attitudes towards the domestic environment are changing for possibly substantial numbers of young men. However, attitudes towards masculinity and the male role, are lagging behind (Lloyd 1999:30).

Table 2-12: Ideal Employment Status of a Partner by Place of Origins (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas		Other Places in Turkey		Cyprus		Mixed		Total	
Ideal Employment Status of Future Partner	Female (40)	Male (52)	Female (17)	Male (17)	Female (33)	Male (17)	Female (13)	Male (17)	Female (103)	Male (103)
Non-professional employee	23	12	6 (1)	12 (2)	18	18 (3)	15 (2)		18	11
Professional employee	43	14	24 (4)	24 (4)	21		23 (3)	29 (5)	30	16
Self-employed	20		29 (5)		12		8 (1)		18	
Don't mind/Stay Home*	15	75	41 (7)	65 (11)	49	82 (14)	54 (7)	71 (12)	35	74
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*'Staying at home' is boys' choice and 'don't mind' is girls' choice.

As a result, as far as the young people's perceptions are concerned, the future power relations in the Turkish-speaking households bring both change and continuity. It might change since the girls' perceptions of womanhood are considerably different from those of their mothers. They want more in relation to the outside world. However, the boys do not share this perception, they still think of women in terms of family criteria. This seems to create a conflict between women and men in the Turkish-speaking 'community'.

On the other hand, this conflict might not be so severe because of resistant elements in the power relations in the future. This resistance comes from their ideals about their future partner's employment status. Also both the girls and the boys agree on what the division of labour in the households should be. They think that domestic tasks are mainly women's jobs, while the man is the main breadwinner. In this sense, the future Turkish-speaking women might be more disadvantaged than their mothers, if they also engage in paid employment. They will be responsible for the household's maintenance whilst in paid employment, while their earnings might not count as being as essential as that of their husbands. In other words, there might be a double subordination of these girls in the future.

2.8 Conclusion:

In the sociological literature, Muslim family structure was associated with extended family size, a higher level of solidarity and patriarchalism. Accordingly, it was contended that these differences do not allow families to develop convergent patterns with Western families. Through reference to Muslim ethnic minority families in general and the Turkish-speaking migrant families in particular, it was claimed that, even though ethnic minority young people is affected by the western-style families of mainstream societies, such influences do not create any necessary implications for their future-life.

More recent studies have indicated greater complexity and my study too has confirmed this. It is a fact that amongst Turkish-speaking young people, there was some adherence to traditional values. Most notably, attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages were very conservative. Yet this is not the whole story.

First of all, young people's attitudes diverge considerably from those expected in a traditional understanding of the family in many respects. The majority of young people do not want to have more than two children in their future families; they have a strong opposition to arranged marriages; they claim that they would marry someone even at the expense of their parents' disapproval if necessary; and they are also rather reluctant about living in extended families. It is also important to observe that girls, in particular, have positive attitudes towards employment in their future marriages. However and more importantly, it appears to be rather difficult to portray these sorts of attitudes simply as rhetorical repetition of the dominant society's family values before becoming 'full time Muslim'. Although such ambitions can be regarded as western values, young people's attitudes are not markedly different from their own parents. Given that most families are first-generation in the UK, such differences from conventional Muslim family images cannot be understood without referring to the changing family structure in Turkey within the wider process of economic and cultural transitions across the society.

Moreover, even the continuity of the extended family (albeit at a very low level) serves the change in family structure. In Turkey, it functioned as a child caring mechanism for working parents in the cities (Kiray, 1982). Similarly, the extended family serves, in London, as a mechanism of change by supporting child bearing, not in nuclear family households but lone parent households (the rate of which is not fundamentally lower than the overall average of lone motherhood in the United Kingdom). In general, it can

be argued that despite young people's reservations concerning pre-marital sex and inter-ethnic marriages, they have a very considerably 'modern' understanding and this is not simply part of the 'unrealistic dreams of youth' created by the dominant society, but reflects otherwise continuing changes in the Turkish-speaking families both in the UK and in Turkey.

3. Problems With Existing Multi-cultural Education Policies:

3.1 The Theoretical Framework of Multi-culturalist Education:

In recent years, attempts to explain the under-achievement of ethnic minority students with reference to the effects of social and economic disadvantage have been largely replaced by debates centred on culture. Levels of achievement by these pupils are considered later. But, because there has been so much current emphasis on the importance of culture in explaining ethnic minority under-achievement, the chapter begins with a discussion of this. Conservative approaches began to emphasise the cultural backwardness of such groups in order to understand their educational problems. In reaction to these approaches, however, a growing number of multi-culturalist scholars tended to claim that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is not because of cultural backwardness, but because of the lack of the recognition of their cultural assets. Accordingly, in order to improve the success of students, the multi-culturalist advocates formulated education policies such as promoting religious and ethnic identities and teaching ethnic minorities their own languages.

The focus in the 1960s on under-achievement in the context of low IQ shifted in the 1970s to the cultural area and assimilation policies (Mirza 1998:122). Then, in the 1980s, the well known Swann Report was published on the subject. Along with many others, the Report made some assumptions to explain the differences between Turkish and Greek Cypriot children's achievement (Swann Report 1985: 688-89). It observed that the Greek community was more self-confident, because they outnumbered the Turkish Cypriot community. Greek Cypriots supported their children's education more successfully, because of their greater financial security. Greek Cypriots were better educated and more urbanised and they had lighter skin compared to darker skinned Turkish Cypriots. In the schools where there were Turkish and Greek Cypriot children together, the former were deemed the representatives of 'barbarism', while the latter represented 'civilisation' by the majority community. According to the Report (Swann Report 1985:689), these different stereotypes had a direct bearing on society's and teachers' expectations of, and empathy with, Turkish Cypriots.

On the other side of Europe, in Germany, Muslim identity was also added to the list of factors behind the Turkish children's educational problems. In research on the

educational problems of foreign children in West Germany, Mahotra (1985), for instance, asked the teachers in several schools to complete forms for individual children to indicate educational problems. There were some questions such as 'social position in the class: hero or one of the leaders; average/inconspicuous; marginal/pariah' or 'social integration: liked by most classmates; average/indifferent; disliked by most classmates' (Mahotra 1985:302-303) or those related to 'personality traits': 'Intelligence: above average; average; below average' and 'Looks like a foreigner: no; yes' (Mahotra 1985:304 and 308).

At the end, the author concluded that Yugoslavian children mostly from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina [although not mentioned, it is clear that the Muslim population was 'cleansed' from this interpretation], who are the immediate cultural neighbours of Germany and German speaking areas, are most fully integrated into Germany, while because of the Muslim background, which is a totally different social and cultural heritage from that of Germans, Turks have difficulties in integrating into German classes and are often rejected by their classmates (Mahotra 1985:296-7).

In the 1990s, the multi-culturalist approach (later leading to the critical multi-culturalist approach) developed and argued that the cultural assets or deficits of the ethnic minority students are not the reason behind their under-achievement, on the contrary it holds that the lack of recognition of these assets in schools is the problem. As Verma and Mallick (1981:52) argue:

> The realisation and recognition of the identity and culture of the ethnic minority children are not only important to the child's self-image, his intellectual functioning and social behaviour, but are also crucial for his occupational and social adjustment.

This approach demands a curriculum covering the ethnic minority students' culture and languages. Nieto (1996:293) commenting on this line argues that:

> Rather than attempting to erase culture and language, schools should do everything in their power to *use*, *affirm*, and *maintain* them as a foundation for students' academic success.

In this line, Corson (1998:111) investigates the problems of the urban poor in inner-city schools from a particular perspective which:

> Recognises the pressing need for increased funding for inner-city schools, [but] also presents the urban poor as groups who have their own distinct values, norms, and cultural practices.

Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997:31) represent an understanding of critical multi-culturalism referring to the ability to examine the domains of race and white supremacy, gender and patriarchy, and socio-economic class and upper-middle and upper-class privilege in relation to and as functions of one another. Later, however, what they offer basically is a kind of abstract solidarity:

> With a spirit of solidarity among teachers, students and working people, such humane proposals draw upon the diverse experiences of white and non-white peoples, men and women, individuals from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds and those from lower socio-economic class settings (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997:43).

According to its critics, the multi-cultural approach runs the risk of sharing a common approach with right-wing explanations of cultural relativism (Bauman 1997:56). It also enhances the already existing polarisation of society:

> Under-achievement now wears the new clothes of anti-racist, post-modern difference. We are told schools have been colour-blind, differences and diversity must be addressed, racism is to ignore differences. It sounds right, it sounds good. But then, I worry, I think to myself, 'differences....making distinctions between groups, was that not the cause of all of our problems in the first place? How can we progress out of this moral maze?' (Mirza 1998:122)

Wieviorka (1997:148) also notices the possible racist implications of multi-cultural approaches:

> In an imaginary world in which all cultures are homogeneous and distinct from one another, relativism or even ethnocentrism in no way implies the suspicion of racism. But our societies are characterized by the co-presence of many different cultures, and by their fragmentation; cultural differences are produced and reproduced in this context, being subject here and there to ethnicisations and even racialisations which are not necessarily rejected by the members of these groups.

Moreover, Gokturk (1998) questions multi-culturalism not only in terms of its potential to create polarisation in society, but also its effect in inhibiting communications between groups in the context of Turkish- German relations:

> Well-meaning multi-culturalist projects often result in the construction of binary oppositions between 'Turkish culture' and 'German culture'. The focus on cultural difference which claims to be liberating, in practice, often covers up existing cross-cultural traffic and makes dialogue and interaction more difficult.

In terms of educational policy implications, Carter (1987:57) points out that:

> No one is a 'cultural police officer'. In order to reduce racial disadvantage and discrimination we need the sensitive provision of services in education to all as individuals and not as cultural, class, gender, or racial categories.

Singh (1995:12) favours promoting 'universal values' against 'particular ethnic values' in school curricula:

> In most democratic societies today some of the values we all share would include parliamentary democracy, the concept of freedom of speech and assembly, the independence of the judiciary, respect for persons, economic pluralism whereby individuals can advance themselves according to merit, the right to an occupation, the right to advance oneself according to merit and a commitment to learning and speaking the English language as a basic value for all British subjects.

These studies have often overlooked how the existing policies might be perceived by the students and teachers in the schools. The following sections will study the implications of some of the existing multi-cultural policies from the actors' point of view. It will be discussed how multi-culturalism is perceived by young people as opposed to how it is served up for their best interests. However, it should be noted that the main aim of this thesis is not to discuss the whole range of multi culturalist initiatives, but rather to show how the Turkish-speaking young people might perceive the main multi-cultural policies which are already available to them.

The first part will discuss the Turkish-speaking students' academic achievements. It will be argued that although multi-cultural initiatives might work in favour of academic success in one situation, it will not always bring the same amount of academic success in others. The second part will comment on the limitations of multi-cultural initiatives with

reference to the Turkish-speaking students' responses to the policies regarding religion. Then, in the third part, the critical multi-culturalist efforts will be discussed in order to overcome the limitations of existing multi-culturalism. The section will conclude that their efforts might not be effective, unless they produce some solutions to two important problems: the students' lack of English language skills and the inadequate number of ethnic minority teachers in mainstream classes together with existing ethnic minority teachers' undervalued status. Finally, the last part will address the need to go beyond cultural initiatives in order to overcome the feelings of exclusion of the Turkish-speaking students in British schools.

3.2 The schools and academic performance of the Turkish-speaking students:

The schools which Turkish-speaking students attend have highly concentrated numbers of ethnic minority pupils but, most importantly, the Turkish-speaking students are one of the majority groups in the schools. Over ten per cent of pupils in maintained primary and secondary schools in England are from ethnic minority backgrounds, and over seven per cent of pupils do not have English as their first language (DfEE and OFSTED 1997:109). In Hackney, in 1989, Turkish was the second language for 16.19 per cent after Bengali (18.16 per cent) among the pupils whose home language was other than English (London Borough of Hackney 1996). In 1997, a total of over a hundred languages were spoken in Hackney (OFSTED 1997:7) and 10 per cent and 3 per cent of all GCSE candidates were Turkish including Cypriots and Kurds respectively. In this Borough, only three out of ten GCSE candidates were English, Scottish or Welsh (Hackney Education Authority).

In Haringey, 59 per cent of the 9673 secondary school students were from an ethnic minority. A total of 138 languages were spoken in the Borough. In 1981, Turkish was the third most common language being spoken by 4.5 per cent of the students. In 1994, Turkish became the second most common language with 8.2 per cent of pupils speaking it. In 1997, 3.9 per cent of all GCSE candidates were Turkish Cypriot, 4.4 per cent spoke Kurdish and 5.2 per cent Turkish. The students who had English, Scottish and Welsh backgrounds made up of only 25.7 per cent of all GCSE candidates (Haringey Education Authority).

Moreover, the allocation of pupils from different ethnic backgrounds to the schools is not even. In Hackney, one of the schools included in my research had 61 per cent of its students from ethnic minorities and 35 per cent and nine per cent of all pupils had Bengali and Turkish origins respectively. In another school, 48 different languages were spoken and Turkish-speaking students represented the largest group with 28 per cent, while none of the pupils had UK origins.

In Haringey, the situation is not so different. Although 13.5 per cent of all 1997 GCSE candidates in Haringey were Turkish-speaking and 25.7 per cent were of UK origin; their numbers are represented unevenly in the schools. In one school, 67 per cent of the pupils were of UK origin and only 3.8 per cent were from the Turkish-speaking 'community'. In another one, these percentages were 24.1 per cent and point five per cent respectively. In another extreme, Turkish-speaking pupils formed 35 per cent of all pupils, whereas the percentage of pupils with UK ethnic origin was only 8.7 per cent. In the rest of the schools in the Borough, similar patterns existed.

At the policy level, the multi-cultural composition of the students was recognised and appreciated in both boroughs and the particular schools in which fieldwork was conducted. Their policies encourage students from various backgrounds to reveal their 'cultural values' and show them that the school valued these cultural assets. There are several initiatives serving this purpose. Some of the schools organised parents' nights specifically for Turkish-speaking pupils' parents. Others organised entertainment activities for all pupils to perform their cultural dances and music and share their cuisine. Besides, in the corridors or classrooms, there were posters to show the richness of other cultures and their achievements in history. The schools also invited their pupils to respect and be tolerant of each others' cultures in posters on which the two words 'respect' and 'tolerance' were written in the languages of the children. Moreover, the schools put in efforts to recognise the needs of Muslim children and some of them allocate rooms to these children for praying, while others were considering such initiatives. The religious education covered all religions, including Islam. All of the schools had GCSE level Turkish language classes.

Language support under Section 11 programmes was widely available, especially for refugee children. Section 11 programmes are designed to increase these children's language abilities in order to follow the curriculum and adapt in the schools. Section 11

(S11) of the 1966 Local Government Act empowers the Home Secretary to pay grants to Local Authorities and other institutions to support the costs of employing additional staff to help ethnic minority groups overcome linguistic and other barriers. Since September 1993, with the introduction of the Local Government Act, the original insistence on New Commonwealth origin as a condition of grant aiding has been waived in favour of including all ethnic minority communities. Over the years the greater part of the funding has been allocated to education (DfEE and OFSTED 1997:110). Projects concerned with teaching English as a second language (ESL) to bilingual pupils form the largest group of S11 education.

In other words, none of the existing policies is what the multi-culturalist approach suggest are totally 'culturally blind' or 'assimilationist'. In fact, the contrary is true. In this respect, these two Boroughs might provide a test ground in order to analyse to what extent their existing policies are adequate to improve the Turkish-speaking students' achievements. Additionally, the ideas of the Turkish-speaking students and teachers might provide a good basis for assessing how these policies are received by the actors at whom they are aimed and to access their potential for the creation of more interaction between different groups.

3.2.1 Turkish-speaking Pupils' Academic Achievement in two Boroughs:

In the early years, there were no studies specifically focused on Turkish students in schools, let alone on Turkish, Kurdish and Turkish Cypriot students separately. In the early years, Turkish-speaking pupils were studied under the category of 'immigrant' or 'Cypriot' children. In 1966 the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) surveyed children's performances in verbal reasoning tests, and English and Mathematics in 52 schools. They also took into account the heads' responses. They reached the conclusion that immigrant children, especially West Indian children, were below average compared with white pupils (Sonyel 1988:24). Moreover, other research in that year in 10 secondary modern schools in Haringey also concluded that Caribbean and Cypriot pupils had the worst achievement records in those schools (Sonyel 1988:24).

In 1975, there was additional research about the reading attainment of the total population of ten year olds in an inner London borough. Forty Turkish Cypriot children were included in the survey. It found that the comparable reading scores for West Indian,

Turkish Cypriot, Greek Cypriot and non-immigrant children were 86, 84, 84 and 95 out of 100 respectively (Sonyel 1988:26).

According to the report prepared by the Inner London Education Authority to show the 1985 and 1986 O levels and GCEs (this public examination was replaced by GCSE in 1987) results for students from different ethnic backgrounds, Turkish children are the worst achievers along with Bangladeshis and Caribbean pupils (ILEA 1987:14). The report evaluated a total of 17058 pupils of which 268 of them are Turkish aged 15 and 16 years old. It states that 21.3 per cent of the Turkish children were not entered for any examination, compared to 19 per cent of all children (ILEA 1987:4). Moreover, only 8.8 per cent of Turkish pupils were awarded GCE grade 1, compared to the overall 9.8 per cent of pupils (ILEA 1987:5). 47.6 per cent of Turkish children were awarded O level grades A, B or C, whilst this figure was 55.3 per cent for all children (ILEA 1987:5).

In 1986, the ILEA surveyed 15042 pupils and 285 of them were Turkish (ILEA 1987:2). In this year, 25.3 per cent of Turkish children did not enter any exam compared with 20.1 per cent of all children (ILEA 1987:6). Only 6.8 per cent of Turkish children got Grade 1 from their GCE entries, compared to 8.7 per cent of all children (ILEA 1987:5). However, 55.3 per cent of Turkish children got grade A, B or C from their O level exam which is slightly more than the general average of 54.8 per cent (ILEA 1987:5). It is clear that although the number of Turkish students who manage to get grades A, B or C is lower than the average in 1985, it was point five per cent higher in 1986.

In the 1990s, Dedezade (1994) studied the GCSE English and Mathematics results of Turkish and non-Turkish-speaking pupils from several North and East London schools. For the years 1990-93 inclusive, only 26.4 per cent of Turkish-speaking pupils got C grade and above from their GCSE English, compared with 38.4 per cent of non-Turkish speakers. In Mathematics, 25.4 per cent of Turkish-speaking and 28.7 per cent of non-Turkish-speaking pupils achieved grade C and above grades (Dedezade 1994:24). The gap between the Turkish-speaking and other pupils is more obvious in the English GCSE examination (12 per cent), and it is less obvious in Mathematics where the gap is only 3.3 per cent.

There are problems of access to the data on Turkish-speaking students' achievements. The schools' reports at borough level on their pupils' achievements do not show statistics for Turkish-speaking pupils separately. They are analysed either under the

category of 'others', 'European others' or in some cases under the category of 'Asian pupils'. Besides, there are no available data covering several years in a systematic way. And finally, the available data do not show gender differences.

During the research, the most useful way of gaining data seemed to be to put young people's names on the questionnaire, and then request their exam results from the schools later, but then it became clear that revealing their names made some of the young people uncomfortable, so this idea was abandoned. Nevertheless, some data were obtained from one school, but were not adequate for a comprehensive analysis, since only 14 pupils in the sample came from that school. Besides, a quarter of the pupils were interviewed outside of their school premises and some of these students went to the schools which were either not contacted or refused to participate in this research project. In order to overcome these obstacles, two borough Education Authorities were contacted and the Kurdish, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot students' GCSE results for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 were requested. Only the 1997 GCSE results were provided in this way and the following analysis is based upon that data.

As can be seen in Table 3.1, there are differences between the students in terms of the number of GCSE exams they sit. Among the Kurdish students, 12 per cent did not enter the exams at all, compared to six per cent for Turkish pupils and eight per cent for Cypriots. More than 80 per cent of all pupils enter five or more GCSE exams, while only 47 per cent of Kurdish pupils and 66 per cent of Turkish ones did so. Yet, Cypriot students were able to enter more GCSE papers than the total group (88 per cent).

Kurdish students perform relatively worse than the other groups in the Haringey schools. However, the gap between them and the others is narrow. Turkish and Cypriot students are doing even better than those from English, Welsh or Scottish (EWS) origins and all groups in Haringey Borough in 1997 GCSE exams.

Table 3-1:1997 GCSE Results in Haringey (%)

	Kurdish (74)	Turkish (88)	Turkish Cypriot (66)	EWS (437)	All Groups (1700)
Achieving 1 or more Passes at A-G Grades	85	89	91	84	88
Achieving 5 or More Passes at A-C Grades	78	82	89	78	79
0 GCSE papers entered	12	6	8	10	9
1-4 GCSE papers entered	41	28	5	7	10
5 or more GCSE papers entered	47	66	88	82	81

Source: Haringey Education Authority.

Turkish-speaking pupils' achievement varies in terms of the borough to which their schools belong. Table 3.2 indicates that there are considerable differences between the Haringey and Hackney schools. In Hackney, only seven per cent of Kurdish pupils got five or more GCSE passes at A-C Grades. This is almost 74 per cent behind the Kurdish pupils' achievement level in Haringey. This is also the case for Turkish and Cypriot students. Nearly nine out of ten Cypriot students and eight out of ten Turkish students get five or more good passes in Haringey, while only 17 per cent manage to do so in Hackney. On the other hand, it seems that the schools in Hackney fail not only the Turkish-speaking students, but all children as well. Only three out of ten English, Scottish and Welsh origin students get five or more grade A-C passes from their GCSEs, compared to 78 per cent of those in Haringey.

Gilborn and Drew (1992:562) note that individual schools have the power to influence the educational experiences, achievements and future life-chances of their students. In other words, an important issue is to what extent ethnic minority pupils attend less effective schools (Drew and Gray 1991:170). This confirms the findings of Smith and Tomlinson (1989:305) in a study of 20 multi-racial comprehensive schools in different parts of England:

> what school a child goes to makes far more difference (in terms of exam results) than what ethnic group he or she belongs to. The relative performance of different ethnic groups varies somewhat between schools, but such variations are trivial compared with the very large school differences across all ethnic groups. In other words, some schools are much better than others, and the ones that are good for white people tend to be about equally good for black people.

In fact, Thomas et al. (1997:465) find in their analysis of the effect that differing secondary schools make to the educational attainment of different ethnic groups based on the performance of different pupil groups over three years period in inner London schools that:

> it is the less effective schools ...with low GCSE attainment ... that are... widening the gap between ethnic minority and 'white' pupils. In contrast, more effective schools...with high GCSE attainment... are... narrowing the gap between ethnic minority and 'white' pupils.

Table 3-2: 1997 GCSE Results in Hackney (%)

	Kurdish (43)	Turkish and Turkish Cypriot (142)	EWS (426)	All Groups (1420)
Achieving 5 or More Passes at A-C Grades	7	17	30	30

Source: Hackney Education Authority and DfEE (1997:1).

Broadly speaking, the evidence presented so far suggests that the Turkish-speaking students do not show a uniform pattern in terms of achievement in different boroughs, though these boroughs adopted a considerable level of multi-culturalist policies. Besides, the following part highlights the wide-spread scepticism amongst both students and teachers which makes such policies even more controversial. To examine the concerns of students and teachers, an attempt will be made to analyse the case of religious policies in schools.

3.3 Some Problems with Multi-cultural Policies:

In line with the attempts designed to underline the importance of the cultural assets of ethnic minorities, multi-culturalist scholars put a great deal of emphasis on introducing some religious incentives at schools. From this point of view, Jenkins (1991:580), for example, comments that:

> There is a clear need to foster a multi-cultural perspective within discrete subject areas, particularly at secondary school level, and to boost the morale and identity of Muslim children. Muslim matters will not disappear from an administrator's frame of reference but will find expression in parent dissatisfaction and community advocacy. Far better to develop policy ahead of time which addresses areas of concern thus avoiding crisis-management techniques and providing enlightened school leadership.

Modood (1997b:167) calls the current situation one of 'culture blind indirect discrimination':

> The English custom that requires staff to work on Fridays, the day of collective worship for Muslims, while recognising that it is unreasonable to demand work on Sundays, may have no justifiable grounds other than local custom. What is thought in schools, the character and delivery of medical and social services, the programme schedules of television and radio, the preference for certain forms of entertainment and culture, can all be sites of culture-blind indirect discrimination.

However, policies to address these problems often do not take into account the fact that Muslim students cannot be put into a single category. Indeed, when the attitudes of the Turkish-speaking students towards religious education were examined, it became apparent that they were not too keen on it. A head teacher in one school planned to allocate a prayer room for the Turkish-speaking pupils. During the fieldwork, however, It became apparent that the majority of pupils in this school were Alevi, not Sunni, and Alevis do not have Sunni religious practices. In other words, the sectarian differences of young people (which is discussed in the first chapter) have effects on this issue. Moreover, this head teacher might not comprehend the relatively powerful secular focus of education in the majority of young people's minds which has its roots in the Turkish secular education system. As was discussed in the first chapter, secularism is a social project which has been on Turkey's political agenda since the 1920s and the reforms in the education system were at the centre of the secular project designed to break the new Republic's links with the Ottoman Empire.

As can be seen in Table 3.3, only four out of ten Turkish-speaking pupils wanted a quiet place in the school for Muslims to go and nearly two out of ten had not made up their minds on this particular issue. The number of Kurdish students who actually wanted such a place was about three out of ten, while only about four out of ten Cypriot students answered this question positively. It seems that only Turkish students approve of such an initiative (over six out of ten Turkish students). Even in their case, 27 per cent still said 'no' to the allocation of a room for Muslims and the other 12 per cent were neutral about it.

When the young people's religious identity was taken into account, it became evident that the Alevis are less keen to have a quiet place for prayers, in comparison to the

Muslims. As can be seen in Table 3.3, more than half of the Alevis do not approve of such a place and half of the Sunnis approve. Besides, it seems that the Cypriots and Kurdish Sunnis are less likely to approve of such a place, compared to the Turkish Sunnis.

Table 3-3: A quiet place in school for Muslims to go to (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other places in Turkey			Cyprus		Mixed			Total		
	Alevi (72)	Sunni (11)	Total (92)	Alevi (1)	Sunni (28)	Total (34)	Sunni (45)	Total (50)	Alevi (4)	Sunni (19)	Total (30)	Alevi (77)	Sunni (103)	Total (206)
Yes	33	36 (4)	33		68	62	42	38		58 (11)	47	31	52	41
No	53	36 (4)	50	100(1)	18	27	36	38	75 (3)	26 (5)	33	55	29	41
Don't know	14	27 (3)	17		14	12	22	24	25 (1)	16 (3)	20	14	19	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The number of the students who personally wanted to have such a place was even less than that of the students who approved of the idea. Table 3.4 shows that 43 per cent of the pupils do not mind whether such a place exists or not. It is especially striking that only two out of ten Kurdish pupils and about three out of ten Cypriot ones actually wanted a place in the school for Muslims to go and pray. A Kurdish girl comments on the issue:

> if they want to locate a separate place for Muslim children to pray, I don't mind, but personally I don't like it, because school and prayer are different things. We are here to be educated not to pray.

Even the number of Turkish pupils who personally wish for such a place is only 44 per cent. Some of them, like the Kurdish girl quoted above, disapproved of the idea on the grounds that school and prayer could not be mixed. Others are against the idea for totally practical reasons such as appropriate personal cleaning before every prayer or difficulties of having a clean room. For instance, a Turkish boy said:

> Praying in a school might not be easy you know. You could use the lavatories in the toilet. But then, the toilets are not clean enough. And imagine you have to do that several times each day. Also they have to provide two rooms. One for us and other for girls. It is very

difficult. Maybe it is possible just for Fridays. I don't know, it may be better to leave praying at home.

The Turkish students who personally do not prefer such an idea also mentioned that this policy may not help to deal with already existing prejudices and stereotypes. A Turkish boy explains that:

> Now, let's say they provide a room for praying. If you don't use the room, it makes you a bad Muslim. If you use the room, then it makes you Muslim and nothing else.

The religious sectoral differences are again obvious between the young people in the context of their personal preferences for a prayer room. As Table 3.4 indicates, nearly half of the Alevis do not want such a place, while nearly four out of ten Sunnis do. Moreover, half of the Turkish Sunnis actually like the idea of having a prayer room, in comparison with 31% of the Cypriot Sunnis. The number of Kurdish Sunnis who prefer a quiet room is more or less similar to that of Turkish Sunnis.

Table 3-4: Personal preference for a quiet place in school for Muslims to go to (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other places in Turkey			Cyprus		Mixed			Total		
	Alevi (72)	Sunni (11)	Total (92)	Alevi (1)	Sunni (28)	Total (34)	Sunni (45)	Total (50)	Alevi (4)	Sunni (19)	Total (30)	Alevi (77)	Sunni (103)	Total (206)
Yes	15	46 (5)	20		50	44	31	28		37 (7)	23	14	39	26
No	44	18 (2)	40	100(1)	21	29	13	18	75(3)	16 (3)	27	49	17	31
Don't mind	40	36 (4)	40		29	27	57	54	25(1)	47 (9)	50	39	45	43
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Some multi-culturalist policies turned out to be a mechanism for making outcasts of those students who do not conform to uniform typologies. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1993:193) pointed out in the context of the multi-culturalist norms that:

> their presumptions about being the keepers of the 'true' religious way of life, are unanswerable. External dissent is labelled as racist and internal dissent as deviance. In the politics of identity and representation they are perceived as the most authentic 'Others'.

Indeed, although being Muslim, for the students, does not necessarily mean following every practice, unfortunately, the schools sometimes fail to recognise this fact. The

following statement of a Turkish girl was one of the most typical complaints in the case of 'authentic exclusions':

> When the subject is Islam, the teacher doesn't think what we say is true. He always needs other Muslim children's approval that what we say is 'true' or not. I mean, because a Somalian girl cover her head, it does not mean she knows more than me or she is a better Muslim than me. And sometimes, when we can't answer a question, he acts like I don't know, he didn't expect us to know anyway.

3.4 The Critical Revision of multi-culturalism: Interaction and Language Problems:

In recent years, in order to overcome the problems of multi-cultural policies, what is called a critical multi-culturalist approach has been promoted by some revivalists of multi-culturalism. In line with this, Short and Carrington (1996:74) emphasise the danger of ignorance because of negative perceptions of difference as shown in exaggerations of their symbolic meaning:

> whilst we accept the importance of children learning about similarities, we are mindful that negative perceptions of difference do not evaporate as a result of teachers choosing either to ignore or underplay them. On the contrary, if unfamiliar rituals and beliefs are not discussed in a rational and informed way, there is a danger that children may exaggerate their symbolic significance.

May (1999) indicates that the 'critical multi-culturalism' which refers to students' critical engagement with all ethnic and cultural backgrounds, including their own, might solve the problems of ethnic minority children along with poor performance. May (1999:32) also adds that:

> It is one thing, after all, to recognize and describe cultural differences as they affect the educational performance of minority groups. It is quite another to unmask the reproductive processes which underlie these and which lead the school to prefer certain cultural values and practices (those of dominant group) over others. In this respect, the normalization and universalization of the cultural knowledge of the majority ethnic group, and its juxtaposition with other (usually non-western) knowledge and practices, should be critically interrogated.

This approach basically proposes a multi-cultural education which helps the students to 'distinguish unusual behaviour or cultural practices that are harmful to the interests of

the wider community from those are not', encourage them 'to debate the merits of any cultural practice and argue for the proscription of those they find morally and socially unacceptable' and finally identify and correct 'children's misconceptions of other cultures' (Short and Carrington 1999:186). Burtonwood (1996:234) suggests the same kind of multi-cultural education called 'critical rationalism' which encourages dialogue across differences. In the same tradition, Cummins (1996) offers a bilingual education for culturally diverse students in order to empower them and their communities through negotiating cultural identities with their educators. According to this argument, students should be encouraged to reflect critically on both their own cultural background and the mainstream society culture (Cummins 1996:4).

Indeed, the emphasis of critical multi-culturalists on the importance of interaction between different cultures becomes most crucial, as long as the children are able to find suitable conditions to interact with each other. In this respect, two important problems seem to be overlooked by this new revision of multi-culturalism. One is that the undervalued positions of the ethnic minority teachers in multi-ethnic schools prevent these teachers from participating in the process of preparing the children to interact with each other on wider grounds. Another problem is the language. These students are not competent enough in English to interact fully with others.

3.4.1 The Problems of Ethnic Minority Teachers:

As indicated earlier, the pupils in the schools were from various ethnic minorities and the Turkish-speaking pupils usually made up a majority of the students in the schools. With respect to this point, a Turkish teacher from one of the Haringey schools that had a majority of its pupils who were Turkish-speaking, noted that:

> They [teachers in the school] talked about multi-cultural education. What kind of multi-culturalism they talked about I am not sure. Take this school as an example, 99 per cent of the children are from an ethnic minority, most of them Turkish-speaking. The only British persons in this school are teachers, not students. These students spend all their time in their community. Believe me some of them even cannot write 'yes' correctly. But anyway in the name of multi-culturalism, we salute each other's cultures under the supervision of British teachers.

In particular, the emphasis of this Turkish teacher on the 'supervision of British teachers' reflects the fact that most of the Turkish-speaking teachers were only either teaching

Turkish to Turkish-speaking pupils or helping them with their problems. In other words, although the students are from various ethnic backgrounds, the ethnic composition of the teachers, especially mainstream ones is predominantly white English middle class. Coultas (1989:293) stressed that there is general discrimination against ethnic minority teachers in schools. Coultas (1989:293) also added that the black teachers are allowed to work in the British education system only if they stick to the lower grades of teaching and supply work.

Notably, in a study of classroom relationships between white teachers and Afro-Caribbean students, Wright (1987) observed antagonistic attitudes from teachers towards these students. Unfortunately, this issue is somehow absent in the critical approach of multi-cultural literature. When it comes to this issue, the advocates of multi-cultural education become ethnically blind about teachers' identities. They take for granted that teachers are white or English. Corson (1998:137) for instance, talks about how teachers should have high expectations for their students, become familiar with the neighbourhood community and comfortable in it and speak openly about issues of race and discrimination. Corson (1998:137) also suggests that teachers from students' own 'racial' backgrounds should act as mentors, and role models and these teachers should be present in mainstream classrooms in order to use non-standard language forms in relaxed and non-mocking ways.

Turkish-speaking teachers often complained that their presence was undervalued in the school. In one school, during the lunch break in the staff room, an experienced Turkish teacher talked about the mainly English teachers:

> Just look around you. They are cold like ice. I have been in this school for several years now. My only contact with them is restricted to 'good morning Mrs. A, bye Mrs. A'. That's it. Oh I forget of course, if there is no problem with some Turkish children. Only that man [referring to another ethnic minority Black teacher] sometimes comes and chats with me. I should be honest though, he is also the only person I approach sometimes for a little chat. In fact, after the break end, he was the only teacher who smiled and made a goodbye gesture to Mrs A and me from the far corner before leaving the room. Others somehow behaved as if we did not exist.

Some of the Turkish-speaking teachers do not believe that they were respected as a teacher by other staff. If one of them had a good relationship with Turkish-speaking pupils, it was automatically assumed it was because of his or her Turkish origin, not teaching capacity. This is exactly the point one teacher made:

> The other teachers make jokes about Turkish teachers like, 'Turkish children are very silent in your classes and listen to you. I think they are racist against other staff in the school.' Most of the time, we replied by smiling. How can I say to them, 'Look, it is a basic pedagogy, if you put the child out of the classroom the first chance you have, then of course you are going to lose control'. I know a child who is not permitted in classes for four weeks now. At the moment I don't think even they remember why they suspended the child in the first place. In the Turkish classes, they learn and enjoy and when they learn, of course they respect you.

Another problem these teachers faced, is their lack of participation in decision making processes. A teacher explained that:

> When you propose something new, they just say 'we are going to look at it'. Then naturally you will not hear anything from them. Couple of months later, if an English teacher goes to them with the same proposals, they just say, 'it is brilliant. This may improve our policies even further'. Everybody automatically forgets whose suggestion this was in the first place. And, they give the responsibility of the task to this English person.

The Turkish-speaking teachers also have problems with being used simply as a translator between the main-class teachers and the students. A Turkish teacher who taught mathematics in an English instruction secondary school in Turkey before coming to England with her husband, whose family live in London, was very critical of the situation:

> Every time something happen with the Turkish children, the staff come to me and ask for my help. Sometimes they even come in the middle of the lesson. Because you know I only teach Turkish there. How can my subject be as important as theirs? They just use me to make their points clear to the students or translate a letter to the parents.

Given the nature of this existence of Turkish-speaking teachers in the schools, it could be argued that existing policies have a potential to alienate Turkish-speaking children in relation to mainstream British teachers. Curriculum adjustments, and training courses for white teachers might be just the tip of the iceberg.

It also requires more staff recruitment from ethnic minority communities, not only for the service of their own community pupils, but for mainstream subjects too. Otherwise, white teachers' efforts to show the degree of their appreciation of different cultures might be perceived by these children as 'artificial'. As Gilborn (1995) argues, teaching professionals, most of the time, act in accordance with their presumptions and labels about a particular community. Gilborn notes that there is a:

> need always to question taken-for-granted assumptions about ethnic minority students and their communities, especially essentialist and reductionist perspectives that gloss over important differences (Gilborn, 1995:159).

In this sense, young people question the credibility of multi-cultural policies. For instance, a Kurdish girl who attended a school where the majority of the pupils were Turkish-speaking and the mainstream teachers were English, explained why she did not like Music lessons in the school:

> The music teacher wanted us to translate Turkish pop music we choose into English. But how does she know I like Turkish pop music or pop music? It was so boring. What was the point? I really don't understand. Most of my classmates are Turkish anyway. They don't need translation. I don't think the rest of the class was too much bothered to listen to Turkish music. When it was translated, the words became stupid anyway.

3.4.2 Language Difficulties- English Education:

In particular, the lack of enough English skills makes a significant contribution to the academic difficulties of ethnic minority students. The main obstacle for many Turkish-speaking students, especially Kurdish ones, is language. As a Kurdish girl explained:

> Now you said you study in the university, but tell me if they put you in a class in which everybody, except you, spoke French. I bet you can't even study in a primary school. This is exactly what happens to me. I felt the time in school was a waste.

A Kurdish boy who has been here for two years talked about the noise level in the classroom:

> My English is not good enough to understand everything anyway. When you add to this the teacher who start his lessons by shouting about lack of discipline from the beginning to the end, what basically you have at the end is a headache, nothing else.

This is a typical feeling among these students. They basically feel lost in the mainstream classes. During the fieldwork, it became apparent that some of the teachers and most of the students were dissatisfied with the current applications. A Section 11 teacher of Pakistani origin and a Turkish teacher complained about the allocation of the students in the mainstream classroom according to their age, not their level of English:

Pakistani Teacher:

> When we came to this country, my brother and I could only speak a little English. We attended English language classes for one year, then we entered mainstream education. It seemed you were losing a year, but in time you had a chance to catch up more easily. It is better to lose one year than lose all possible education prospects.

Turkish teacher:

> They just put these children in the main classes according to their ages from day one. After a couple of months, naturally the children lose their interest.

Even the existing programme was under strict budgetary scrutiny. Most of the Section 11 teachers complained about the lack of qualified staff and equipment. They stretch themselves from one classroom to another to help the students. For instance a Kurdish boy asks for books for each lesson:

> In Turkey, my mathematics was very good. In the primary school, I even managed to get an 'excellent' for mathematics. Here, as far as I can guess, it doesn't seem too difficult, if I manage to understand what exactly the problems are. Before I manage to understand something, the class passed to other things. It is difficult you know. Also in Turkey we have books to study, here there is not a specific book, only your notebook. I wish we have a proper book. Then at home, I can translate the exercises in Turkish by using a dictionary.

3.5 Beyond Culture - Economic Exclusion:

The Turkish-speaking students' problems are not limited to the cultural factors. As Fenton (1999) underlined, ethnicity issues cannot be reduced to economic/class discussions, but they cannot be isolated from them either. In this sense, these young people's exclusion could not be understood only in relation to culture without any reference to the socio-economic status of their families in general and the limited scope of education to provide future upward mobility for these young people in particular.

Rex (1982:55) points out that the British educational system produces and centres around themes of class status and mobility to a degree which is probably unparalleled anywhere else in the world, so the problems faced by the immigrants' children in entering the British social system should be dealt with by referring to this issue. In this respect, Rex (1988) proposes an education system which provides two specific services. One is to provide equal opportunity to all children including minorities to have 'an equal chance of unequal rewards' (Rex 1988:94), while ensuring that all children learn tolerance of cultural diversity (Rex 1988:97).

On the other hand, providing equal opportunity to ethnic minority children might help them to be more successful in the schools, yet whether educational success brings an upward mobility or not is a problem relating more or less to the available possibilities in the labour market. In this respect, Nichols (1981:21) emphasises that:

> an increase in intergenerational mobility into higher positions cannot be automatically attributed to the results of more egalitarian policies (such as they are) having been pursued by politicians. Account has to be taken, too, of the expansion and contraction of different occupational categories over time.

Even taking into account the existing structural economic barriers to the economic prospects of ethnic minority children, some critical multi-culturalists believe that multi-culturalism is the remedy for children's economic futures. Kalantzis and Cope (1999:262) introduce a new understanding of cultural diversity to replace the 'traditional assimilationist curriculum' and 'existing multi-cultural applications of superficial pluralism'. Kalantzis and Cope (1999:267) propose that this new understanding of cultural diversity portrays the children as "multi-skilled' all round workers who are flexible enough to be able to do complex and integral work' in the global economy. In this new work environment they argue:

> cross-cultural communication and the negotiated dialogue of different languages and discourses can be a basis for worker creativity, for the formation of locally sensitive and globally extensive networks which closely relate an organisation to its clients or suppliers, and creates structures of motivation in which people feel that their different backgrounds and experiences are genuinely valued (Kalantzis and Cope 1999:268).

However, my research failed to find evidence of opportunities for these young people becoming genuinely valued multi-skilled all round workers. Under the guise of respect for

their community values, the existing education policies provided these young people with limited experiences suitable only for jobs their parents may have had in their communities as will be discussed in the next chapter. Here however, it should be noted that educational policies in particular do not undermine, but underpin, this reality and might be best observed in the example of the Work Experience Scheme, which is a reflection of family exclusion on students' school lives through the case of work experience.

3.5.1 The Role Of Schools In Terms Of Improving Employment Opportunities:

It is important to show these young people that they can work outside of the community labour market, if they attain the necessary qualifications in schools. The Work Experience Scheme is an important tool to realise this aim in schools. Pupils in their last year of compulsory schooling are encouraged to undertake a period of work experience as part of their education. During a placement pupils carry out particular jobs in much the same way as regular employees. In 1992, over 90 per cent of pupils in their last year of compulsory schooling undertook placement (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 1995:14). Pupils observe work processes and employees going about their normal work, and undertake projects on the employers' premises.

Most Turkish-speaking young people are not given enough chance to learn about employment conditions in other sectors in the UK, either because they do not participate in the Work Experience Scheme (WES) or schemes in the community labour market which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Although there are some suspicions about WES, some of the studies show that participation in WES increases young people's familiarity with working conditions and their confidence in schools (DfEE and OFSTED 1997: 52, Petherbridge 1997, Watts 1983b). Watts (1983b:96) has argued that the measurable outcomes of work experience are positive.

The basic objectives of work experience are to increase pupils' knowledge and understanding of self and society and to help them to choose their future occupation by extending the range of occupations that the pupils are prepared to consider, and finally

to enable pupils to establish a relationship with a particular employer which may lead to the offer of a permanent job (Watts 1983a: 6-8).

The Turkish-speaking young people are unlikely to enjoy these positive impacts of the scheme in terms of extending their opportunities and gaining confidence in a future career. Barton et al. (1988:111) emphasise the importance of discouraging pupils from seeking placements with family and friends wherever possible so that new experiences can be gained. However, in the case of Turkish-speaking young people, quite the opposite is occurring.

As shown in Table 3.5, more than half of the Turkish-speaking pupils who undertook placement, did their work experience course in a small shop which is typical of the employment done in the Turkish-speaking 'community' (as will be shown in the next chapter). Only 15 per cent had a chance to work in a big store, whilst only three out of ten worked in an office environment. However, the differences between Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot pupils in terms of work experience is striking. Just over eight out of ten and six out of ten Kurdish and Turkish students respectively worked in a small shop during their work experience course, compared to only three out of ten Cypriot students. Moreover, nearly six out of ten Cypriot students did their work experience work in an office, while only one in ten Kurdish students did so.

Table 3-5: Where did you do your work experience? (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas (18)	Other Places in Turkey (8)	Cyprus (17)	Mixed (11)	Total (54)
Small Shops	83 (15)	63 (5)	29 (5)	36 (4)	54
Big Stores	6 (1)	13 (1)	12 (2)	36 (4)	15
Offices	11 (2)	25 (2)	59 (10)	27 (3)	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100

In the first instance, the Cypriot students might seem to have a better chance in terms of their placement, yet they are still far from the opportunities with which Work Experience might provide them. As Table 3.6 indicates, more than six out of ten students find their placement through their family connections. This figure is seven out of ten for Kurdish students. It seems that only Turkish pupils received the school's help on this matter, and the school managed to find work placements in an environment with which they were already very familiar.

In reality, if a student already has a part-time job, their employers signed the necessary replacement papers as a formality. This will be discussed in the next chapter. In other words, for a week the students' existing part-time job transforms into a work experience placement. As a Kurdish boy said about his own experience:

> I already worked in my uncle's barber shop. So he signed the work experience paper, then I brought them to the school and they approved it. That's it really. It was that easy.

Table 3-6: Who arranged the place for Work Experience? (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas (18)	Other Places in Turkey (8)	Cyprus (17)	Mixed (11)	Total (54)
I/Family arranged	72 (13)	38 (3)	59 (10)	64 (7)	61
The school arranged	28 (5)	63 (5)	41 (7)	36 (4)	39
Total	100	100	100	100	100

In other words, the schools do not give these pupils a chance to experience other employment opportunities, other than those already existing in the community labour market. It increases the children's isolation in terms of future economic prospects. This isolation is especially severe for Kurdish pupils, since they also need to overcome language barriers.

The work experience scheme did not overcome the feeling of exclusion among the Turkish-speaking pupils. Ironically, they have intentions to continue their education, but still feel they might end up with their parents' jobs. It is evident that young people's perceptions of the conditions within their local labour market bore a close resemblance to the actual conditions (Biggart and Furlong 1996:256). Within the depressed labour market conditions, they frequently remain sceptical about the value of the qualifications they are taking, but are scared of leaving the familiar environment of the school to enter an uncertain labour market (Biggart and Furlong 1996:264).

This is exactly what is happening to the Turkish-speaking young people. Table 3.7 reveals that 85 per cent of the young people want to continue their education. The number of Cypriot young people who have intentions to continue their education is even higher than this total. In fact, none of the Cypriot young people want to enter working life after compulsory schooling. Their uncertainty and lack of confidence is evident from a discussion with Cypriot and Turkish boys:

Cypriot Boy: If let's say I have a doctor father, a teacher mother and a lawyer brother, can you imagine me in a Kebab business? No way. They will certainly find me a proper job in an office. Have you ever seen somebody with these background in a Kebab shop? I didn't.

Turkish Boy: It is true you know. But there are other things outside of your control.

PE: What do you mean with other things?

Turkish Boy: I mean. If I become a doctor, I can only treat other Turkish people. If I have my own surgery, probably my patients will be Turkish people. I think the others do not trust somebody originally from this country. So at the end, after all your efforts, you can only earn a very limited amount of money. I know a doctor. Only Turkish people know him and go to him. And take the teacher, they can only teach Turkish children. Only we respect them as a teacher, not others in the school.

Table 3-7: The young people's plans after compulsory education (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
Continue education	89	77	92	70	85
Start Working	10	21		20	11
No idea	1	3	8	10	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100

3.6 Conclusion:

There has been a long-history of efforts within the academic community to explain the under achievement of ethnic minority students with reference to social and economic disadvantage. In time, however, conservative approaches have also begun to emphasise the cultural backwardness of such groups in order to understand their educational problems. In reaction to these approaches, a growing number of multi-culturalist scholars tend to claim that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is not because of cultural backwardness, but because of the lack of recognition of their cultural assets.

The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Turkish-speaking young people do not show a uniform pattern in terms of academic achievement in Haringey and Hackney, albeit that both of these boroughs adopted a considerable set of multi-culturalist policies.

The students were fairly successful in the exams in Haringey, but not in Hackney. In addition, a wide-spread scepticism amongst students and teachers about multi-culturalist incentives makes such policies even more controversial.

Most notably, when the existing multi-culturalist policies regarding religious incentives in schools were analysed, it was seen that a considerable proportion of the Turkish-speaking students were reluctant to have a place in the school specifically designed for prayer. In line with this, the students that do not fit the classical typologies of being Muslim, felt that they were not recognised as 'good Muslims'.

It is a fact that the problems of multi-cultural policies have also been acknowledged by the new version of multi-culturalism which is known as 'critical multi-culturalism'. In particular, they place specific emphasis on the importance of cultural interaction between students from different ethnic backgrounds. In this respect, two important problems are, however, overlooked by this new revision of multi-culturalism. One is that the undervalued positions of the ethnic minority teachers in multi-ethnic schools prevent these teachers from participating in the process of preparing the students to interact with each other on equal grounds. Another problem is the language. These pupils are not competent enough in English to interact with others. Some students reported that the lack of text books for each lesson made the language problems of ethnic-minority students even more severe. This absence might be felt more strongly because they know there is a different way of teaching in Turkey.

Nevertheless, the Turkish-speaking students' educational problems cannot be understood only in the context of cultural debates. One also needs to take into account the implications of their families' economic exclusion on the students' school-life in order to understand their problems. This became most evident in the case of the 'work experience scheme'. It was found that most of the young people were 'placed' in the small-shops of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in which they were already working on a part-time basis (The relation of students and their parents to the labour market will be discussed in detail in the following chapter). Accordingly, the feeling that education would not bring exclusion to an end in their future-life, appears to be a fundamental factor influencing the students' educational ambitions. Broadly speaking, the empirical evidence suggests that a proper discussion of the educational problems of the Turkish-speaking students specifically requires the implications of wider economic exclusion.

4. The Disadvantaged Position of the Turkish-Speaking 'Community' in Labour Market - A case of Exclusion:

In general, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the Turkish-speaking young people's relationships to the labour market and their disadvantaged economic prospects with reference to exclusion. As Bastenier and Dassetto (1988) point out, when some basic elements of identity construction are considered, the potential formation of a sub-proletariat is a factor that should not be disregarded:

> those who, in principle, should have moved into the labour force are really faced with the very likely prospect of unemployment. A new kind of marginality is added to their political estrangement and the fragmentation of their cultural references. How is it possible to speak of social integration of these people when an essential element, their integration into the economy, is missing? (Bastenier and Dassetto 1988: 164).

The developed capitalist economies have changed considerably in recent decades and as Wilpert (1988:2) notes, young people in general and ethnic minority young people in particular, belong to segments of the population most affected by these changes.

Sassen (1996a:580) identifies three economic processes in highly developed countries. First was the expansion and consolidation of the producer services and corporate headquarters sector into the economic core of major cities like London. Second was the reshaping of manufacturing industry to compete with cheap imports and those of leading sectors such as telecommunications or finance. The third process was the informalisation of a growing array of economic activities. Informalisation represented a mode of reorganising the production and distribution of goods and services in order to compete with cheap imports and high-profit firms in the local markets and escape the regulatory apparatus of the formal economy. Sassen also adds that all of these processes have shaped the job supply:

> The expansion of the high-income work force, in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms in everyday living, has led to a process of high-income gentrification that rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers (Sassen 1996a:584).

According to Sassen (1996a:584), there was a sharp polarisation in the labour market in terms of income. At one extreme, the high paid new jobs requiring a high skilled, college education were created and at the other extreme, there was a massive growth of low-wage service jobs requiring a low level of education.

Sassen (1996a:586-587) has emphasised two important features of segmentation in the organisation of labour markets. One is the decline in the proportion of unionised shops, the deterioration of wages, and the expansion of sweatshops and industrial home-work. Second is the shift in labour market functions such as recruitment, screening and training to the household or community. Migrant labour is engaged in particular kinds of jobs in relation to this transformation of the labour market. Sassen (1996a:588) argues that:

> Immigrants, in so far as they tend to form communities, may be in a favourable position to seize the opportunities represented by informalisation. But the opportunities are not necessarily created by immigrants. They are a structured outcome of current trends in advanced economies.
>
> A good share of the informal sector is not the result of immigrant survival strategies, but rather an outcome of structural patterns or transformations in the larger economy.

The labour market in these countries favours highly-skilled immigration but the pool of aspiring low-skilled immigrants is enormous and will expand exponentially in coming years (Castles & Miller 1993:178). While illegal employment is growing, legal minorities become the victims of the job losses in the manufacturing sector and growing numbers of immigrants become self-employed and owners of small businesses such as restaurants (Castles and Miller 1993:179).

Moreover, the jobs which are available for the migrants are usually peripheral, and less secure and, in most circumstances, are those jobs that the domestic workers refuse to do. This is especially the case for first generation migrants, who have usually come to developed countries with fewer qualifications, are ready to do any job available in the labour market and are unlikely to criticise what they do and their working conditions. Whilst in the developed countries, they spend minimum amounts and save the maximum they can afford for a future in their country of origin. Economically they are at the bottom of the receiving countries' labour market, but are still better off when compared to the

conditions in their home country. The reason for their migration therefore, was largely the desire to make a better life for themselves.

These first generation migrants come to developed countries with hopes for economic prosperity. For instance, in a study of Greek Cypriot migrants, Anthias (1983:79) finds that their primary aim in emigration is to provide better economic opportunities for their families and that they are ready to work in any kind of job under any conditions. In the USA, Wilson (1997:140-46) compared the attitudes of black Americans and newly arrived Mexican migrants towards dead-end jobs and low wages, and found that the Mexicans had considerably fewer reservations about these jobs.

In relation to the second generation young people, it is important to study what might be their place in the labour market and how it might differ from that of their parents. Most of the studies which analyse young people in the labour market focus on the transition from school to work. Until the mid 1980s most theories had focused on the impact of social class background in order to analyse the young people's transition from school to work. For instance, Roberts (1975) introduced the concept of 'opportunity structures' in relation to occupational choice. He argued that:

> Careers can be regarded as developing into patterns dictated by the opportunity structures to which individuals are exposed, first in education and subsequently in employment, whilst individuals' ambitions, in turn, can be treated as reflecting the influence of the structures through which they pass (Roberts 1975:142).

The studies concentrated on the low aspirations of working class young people because of their limited economic opportunities. Reynolds (1976:133) showed that the working class pupils' (the boys') expectations of their future were low. They expected to be apprentice carpenters, bricklayers, toolmakers, lorry drivers etc. Their aspirations were low - even when asked 'suppose you could do any job in the world and you had all the qualifications and experience required, what would you be?'. Most of the responses were the same as they still wanted to be bricklayers. Furthermore, also in relation to working class young people, Mungham (1976:102) pointed out that:

> the worry about work, the nagging fear of being without it, linked them firmly with their parents' generation and was the basis of a deep-rooted conservatism. They had learned, from their parents, from older working class relatives and from their own experience of the

> world not to expect very much. They saw the future not in terms of any possible prospects for advancement or change, but as a search for something secure.

Willis (1978) argued that against the formal middle class value oriented school system, working class young people developed a counter culture driven from wider working class shop-floor culture. Willis (1978) recognised this counter culture as young men's self-preparation for working class jobs.

Moreover, some theorists concentrated on the effects of the local environment on young people's experiences and expectations of their future possibilities. For instance, Timms (1978:40) argued that the children's experiences in the boundaries of the local area determine what follows next in the future. In relation to the local boundaries, Johnston and Herbert (1978:11) claimed that within the advanced industrial - urban societies, the most marked territorial separation almost invariably involves the members of ethnic minority groups.

More recently, Lynch (1987:202) found that ethnicity is significant for many aspects of labour market experience, stating that non-whites bear a disproportionate share of unemployment, all other things being equal (Lynch 1987:209).

Furlong (1992:108) suggests that occupational aspirations of young people reflect the deeply-embedded impressions about the world which have developed as a result of experiences in the family and in school. On the other hand Furlong (1992:121) also adds that although school-leavers have a reasonable idea about the sorts of opportunities available to them in the labour market, many young people hope to enter higher-level occupations and their experiences in the labour market are likely to lead eventually to a downward modification in their aspirations. Moreover, in an article on the same subject, Furlong and his colleagues (1996:562) emphasise that:

> as a part of the process of socialisation, children come to share in the assumptive worlds of their parents, friends and neighbours and adopt similar outlooks on the world around them. Central to these normative orientations is a notion of future socio-economic status.

On the other hand, Coles (1995) argues that during the transition from school to work, although the existing labour market constrains young people's future opportunities, they nevertheless might be able to choose from available career options. Coles (1995:22) argues that:

> Changes in education and training do not create extra or different jobs. But in responding to the opportunities that education, training and the labour market offer them, young people do choose between different career options.

However, Bray et al. (1997:32) maintain that boys in secondary schools want manual jobs without understanding the changing job market and the impact of the technological revolution. In other words, they don't seem too aware of the economic situation around them.

These studies emphasised that working class children learn the values and conditions of the labour market around them mostly through their parents and that, as a result, they may choose (willingly or unwillingly) a career from a restricted range of opportunities. On the other hand, several studies of second generation migrant children show that the first generation's non-selective involvement in the labour market would not be the case for the second generation young people, and that their aspirations for the future might be higher than their parents. Waldinger and Perlmann (1998) discuss the differences in economic expectations of first and second generation migrants in the USA. They point out that:

> The immigrants arrive willing to do the jobs that natives will not hold: however low the jobs may fall in the US hierarchy, they still offer wages and compensation superior to the opportunities back home. Having been exposed to different wage and consumption standards from the start, the children want more (Waldinger and Perlmann 1998:8).

Furthermore, Hoffmann-Nowotny (1985:127-29) observed high expectations among Italian young people in Switzerland. The author also shows that in Germany foreign children between 10 and 14 years of age have extremely high occupational aspirations. 45 per cent of the Turkish children want to become a doctor, engineer, or teacher. The figure among the German children was only 12 per cent. On the other hand, only a small proportion of the foreign children in Germany believed in equality of opportunities for themselves and the belief decreased with increasing length of residence in Germany (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1985:129).

Dex (1983:61,67) found from a study of 378 second generation West Indians and 463 white female school leavers in Birmingham and London in 1971, that the young black women were very slightly more ambitious than the whites, and more clearly they desired

a different set of jobs than those held by their mothers and West Indian women in general. Penn and Scattergood (1992:84) found similar results from a study of 376 Asian fifth formers in Sheffield in 1989. The majority of the respondents ideally preferred a professional job. Thornley and Siann (1991) observed that Asian girls' career aspirations were not so very different from those of their white peers. Waldinger and Perlmann (1998:8) emphasise the same dichotomy for the second generation children in general:

> Historical considerations aside, the advent of the hourglass economy confronts the immigrant children with a cruel choice: either acquire the college, and other advanced degrees needed to move into the professional/managerial elite, or else accept the same menial jobs to which the first generation was consigned. Given the aspirational shift entailed in 'second generation revolt', the latter possibility is not on the cards.

Nevertheless, generational upward mobility is not easy and it certainly does not depend upon merely the ability or aspirations of individuals. Piore (1979:172) argues that:

> Any restriction that policy places on the first generation, in the attempt to control its access to jobs, is likely to affect the access of the second generation to channels of upward mobility.

For some ethnic groups, this mobility takes not decades, but centuries. As Borjas (1994:572) finds, by comparing skill differentials of the children and grand-children of migrants of 32 national origin groups in the USA:

> The skill differentials introduced by immigration became important determinants of the skills and labour market determinants of the children and grandchildren of the immigrants.

In France, Lebon (1985:145-46) pointed to a certain reproduction of the foreign labour force from one generation to the next, especially in the textile industry. Second generation migrants in France generally hold low-skilled jobs and encountered longer delays in obtaining either a first job or a new job.

In other words, for ethnic minority children it seems difficult to fulfil their economic aspirations in the future. It is important to understand the mechanism which undermine these children's aspirations, since these might cause frustrations. In this sense, as Nichols (1976:14) argues:

> There can be many possible reasons why people 'accept' the situations in which they find themselves. To establish whether they 'accept', and in what way, requires specific investigation.

Pertinently, the young people's relation to the labour market could not only be understood within the context of their future job prospects, but their current engagement in the labour market through part-time jobs or so called 'out of school work' is also important. Pettitt (1998:1) emphasises that children's employment is affected by, and contributes to, the changing economic structure of the labour force. In fact, as Lavalette (1998:38) notes, work and labour are central values of modern British society and labouring was always thought to develop good moral values in working class children. Moreover, Lavalette (1994:226) argues that:

> Sociological research might usefully focus on the different social classes; the experiences of children employed by their parents, and differences in the labour participation of children from the minority ethnic communities.

Lavalette (1994:226) adds that such research on 'out of school work' benefits by adopting a perspective which fully locates child labour within the social structure of present class societies. However, there seems to be a disagreement within the existing literature on notions of what constitutes 'work' and direct comparisons between studies might often be difficult as different questions were asked. Sometimes respondents were asked if they were currently working, or have worked in the current school term, or have ever worked (Hobbs and McKechnie 1998:10). Morrow (1992) emphasises the essential contribution of school children to the domestic tasks and even in some extreme cases in caring for the elderly or disabled family members. In my research, as the emphasis is on the children's conditions in relation to the labour market, part-time work outside the household will be taken into account.

In this context, the chapter will analyse Turkish-speaking young people's relationships to the labour market and employment structure in terms of their future economic aspirations and their engagement in the labour market through their part-time jobs. Since knowing the conditions of the local labour market are important in order to analyse the young people's engagement in the employment relations, the first part of the chapter will concentrate on the labour market in general and the Turkish-speaking population's employment in particular. In the second part, the young people's aspirations in relation to

their parent's employment status will be analysed and finally the young people's part-time jobs will be studied.

4.1 Labour Market Structure and Employment Condition in relation to the Turkish-speaking Population in Britain:

The Turkish-speaking 'community' is concentrated in poor areas which offer limited employment opportunities. Consequently, these negative economic conditions have an effect upon the economic prospects of the community. As can be seen in Table 4.1, nine per cent of all the economically active population in the United Kingdom were unemployed in 1991, with 11 per cent of all active males and seven per cent of all active females being unemployed. In Haringey the unemployment rate of the economically active population was double this figure (18 per cent), whilst in Hackney the unemployment rate was 22 per cent.

Moreover, the males are more likely to be unemployed than the females. In Haringey the unemployment rate of males was 18 per cent and that of women was ten per cent. In Hackney it was 22 per cent for males and 12 per cent for females. Besides, the rate of economically inactive women was 32 per cent in Haringey and 36 per cent in Hackney, while the national figure is higher (50 per cent).

Apart from unemployment rates, employment figures for Hackney and Haringey are in tune with the national average. The percentage of male employees was 68 per cent in Hackney and 70 per cent in Haringey. The self-employed made up ten per cent of the active male population in Hackney and 12 per cent of that in Haringey. Eighty four per cent of active women in Hackney were employees, whilst this rate was 85 per cent in Haringey. Self employment among the women was not as popular as among the males (four per cent in Hackney and five per cent in Haringey).

Table 4-1: Economic Activity of the Turkish-speaking Population in Britain and in Hackney and Haringey (%)

	Great Britain			Turks*			Cypriots**			Haringey			Hackney		
Economically Active	Total	Male	Fem	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F
Unemployed	9	11	7	40	40	41	13	15	10	18	18	10	22	22	12
Employees	78	72	86	44	41	49	59	52	70	71	70	85	69	68	84
Self-employed	11	15	6	16	19	10	28	33	20	11	12	5	9	10	4
Economically Inactive	39	27	50	38	23	58	36	20	53	35	16	32	38	18	36

*1991 Census did not indicate Turks and Kurdish Turks separately.
**1991 Census did not indicate Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots separately.
Sources: OPCS 1993a: 916-27, 928-33, 940-41, OPCS 1993b: 20, OPCS 1993c: 392, 477.

Furthermore, according to the Deprivation Index, which was prepared by the Department of the Environment in 1994 (DfEE 1994), Hackney and Haringey are two of the most deprived areas in terms of 13 indicators which are unemployment; crowded housing; lacking amenities; unsuitable accommodation; education participation; children in low earning households; number of cars; standardised mortality rates; long term unemployment; income support; derelict land; house insurance and educational attainment. Hackney was the third most deprived local authority out of 366, and Haringey was tenth.

The deprivation is even more severe in some wards. According to Haringey Council Education Services and Statistics Department, no single ward in Haringey emerges as being amongst the 50 London Wards with the lowest levels of social deprivation. Eighteen of the 23 electoral Wards in Haringey have a higher level of deprivation than the median range for London. The level of deprivation in three wards is the same as the average deprivation level of all London wards and only two wards have a lower level of deprivation than the London average (Haringey Council Education Services and Statistics Department 1997).

Owen and Green (1992:27-8) point out that although ethnic minorities are improving their position in the labour market in the regions of economic expansion in Britain, their position is deteriorating in areas of economic contraction. A 'discouraged worker effect' amongst ethnic minorities is stronger in London than in some of the less favoured regions in which employment contraction results in high unemployment rates.

It is obvious that these unfavourable local conditions affect the members of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. However, all members are not affected by the disadvantages equally and there is a differentiation among them in terms of their places of origin. Although delineation of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Kurds from the 1991 Census data is not possible, the comparison between Turks and Cypriots in terms of employment conditions might provide some insights on the diversity between these groups.

According to the 1991 Population Census, there are 14276 economically active Turkish people in Britain, 10154 of whom were men against 4122 women. The number of economically active Cypriots is 48021, consisting of 31116 men and 16905 women (OPCS 1993a: 916-27, 928-33, 940-41). Table 4.1 indicates that the unemployment rates among Turks and Cypriots are higher than the national average. However, it is more severe for Turks than it is for Cypriots: four out of ten economically active Turks are unemployed, compared to one out of ten economically active Cypriots. This figure shows a similar pattern for males and females as well. The Cypriot male unemployment is even slightly lower than the unemployment figure for Haringey and Hackney, while Turkish male unemployment is well over those figures. On the other hand, it should be noted that Turkish and Cypriot female participation in the labour market shows a similar trend. Both Turkish and Cypriot women are more likely to be economically inactive, compared with all British women, and women in Hackney and Haringey.

The most striking characteristic of Turkish and Cypriot employment is the high number of self-employed, compared to the national figure. Only 11 per cent of the whole active labour force in Britain is self-employed, while 16 per cent of the Turkish active labour force and 28 per cent of the Cypriot active labour force are self-employed. Self-employment is especially popular for Turkish and Cypriot women. Although the Turkish and Cypriot women are less likely to be self-employed compared to their male counterparts, they are more likely to be self-employed compared to the general average in Britain (6 per cent of all active females). One out of ten Turkish women and two out of ten Cypriot women are self-employed. Yet, the difference between Turks and Cypriots still continue to exist.

Free school meal entitlement is a good indicator to show the economic level of families and the diversity between Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot families. Unfortunately these data are only available for the Haringey schools. Table 4.2 shows that in Haringey while

more than half of the pupils are not entitled to free school meals, only 11 per cent of the Kurdish, 17 per cent of the Turkish and 36 per cent of the Cypriot pupils do not require free meals. In other words, Cypriot students are three times less likely to require free school meals, compared to the Kurdish students in Haringey. In this respect, although the Turkish-speaking students are disadvantaged, compared to the total groups of the students, the Kurdish ones are the worst off among them.

Table 4-2: Ethnic Groups by Free School Meal Entitlement among the 1997 GCSE Candidates in Haringey (%)

Ethnic Groups	Yes	No	Total
European-Kurdish (74)	89.2	10.8	100
European-Turkish (88)	83	17	100
Turkish Cypriot (66)	63.6	36.4	100
All Groups (1700)	47.9	52.1	100

Source: Haringey Education Authority.

Haringey Education Authority also collected information about the families' social class backgrounds as defined in the 1991 national census. The data were used to measure the prosperity level of the wards in Haringey in which pupils live, rather than to measure the prosperity level of the parents in individual households. As can be seen in Table 4.3, the overall distribution of the pupils in the wards having various degrees of prosperity, is very even. On the other hand, Kurdish households in Haringey are less represented in the most prosperous wards, while more concentrated in the deprived ones. Only one per cent of the Kurdish households live in the wards with the highest percentage of heads of households in social class one or two. This ratio is seven per cent for Turkish families and three per cent for Cypriot ones whereas the general average for all groups is 12 per cent.

Table 4-3: Ethnic Groups by % of Heads of Households of the 1997 GCSE Candidates in wards grouped by % of Heads of Households in Social Class 1 or 2* in Haringey (%)

	Distribution of Households in each wards			
Wards Grouped by % of Heads of Households in Social Class 1 or 2	**Kurdish Household (74)**	**Turkish Household (88)**	**Turkish Cypriot Household (66)**	**All Households (1700)**
Highest % of Heads of Households in Classes 1 or 2	1.4	6.8	3	11.5
Next Highest % in Classes 1 or 2	13.5	8	16.7	13.2
Next to Lowest % in Classes 1 or 2	18.9	15.9	18.2	18.8
Lowest % in Classes 1 or 2	40.5	36.4	24.2	29.5
Unclassified	25.7	33	37.9	27.1
Total	100	100	100	100

*Social Class 1: Professional Occupations and Social Class 2: Managerial and Technical Occupations.
Source: Haringey Education Authority.

In general, the Turkish-speaking students come from disadvantaged families in terms of economic prosperity and from disadvantaged areas. In this respect, it seems that there is not a promising 'opportunity structure' for these young people. On the other hand, these restricted opportunities do not affect all the young people in the same way. The Kurdish young people have the worst conditions and the Cypriot ones have the best, while Turkish young people are somewhere in the middle.

Apart from the deprived economic conditions which these young people confront, there is another challenge to their future employment prospect: the existence of ethnic economic enclaves as territorially concentrated clusters of businesses. The Turkish-speaking 'community' concentrates on the clothing industry and small shop employment. In order to analyse the intensity of this phenomenon, the following section focuses on the nature of employment relations and the Turkish-speaking families in the labour market in more detail with references to the parents' employment of the Turkish-speaking young people in the sample.

4.1.1 Turkish-speaking Parents' Employment Conditions:

The sample more or less confirms the general picture of the Turkish and Cypriot population according to the 1991 Census. Five visible characteristics are observed among the Turkish-speaking 'community' in terms of employment. First, is the high rate of unemployment. Second, is the high proportion of male self-employment. Third, is the

small number of professional employees. Fourth, is the small number of economically active women. Finally, there is a clear differentiation among the people from different places of origins in terms of employment. These observations are confirmed by one of the Turkish teachers. He said that:

> Most of the men do not work at all. But Cypriots are relatively better off. Of course not all of them. Because Cypriots came here earlier than the others. These new comers were the worst off. When they have a job, they usually work in the restaurants, markets or factories. Some of them are owners, and the rest work there. The majority of women are housewives. The women working in the factories are usually single or married without children.

The Turkish-speaking 'community' members are mostly working in the clothing industry. The other important economic activity is small shop employment such as Kebab houses, small food shops and off licences. In these factories and shops, most of the time both employer and employees are from the Turkish-speaking 'community', even sometimes from the same region in Turkey or Cyprus. For instance, at the time of the research there were about 200 families in North London from the same village in Turkey.

It should be noted that the adult employment figures used here were reported by their children, though it could be assumed that the figures might be more accurate if they were gathered directly from the parents. On the other hand because illegal employment was quite common among the Turkish community members, when attempts were made to put these sorts of questions to parents, there was some reservation about answering, whereas the young people were more willing to answer such questions.

In this chapter, employees will be analysed in two different groups: non professional and professional. The category of non-professional employees mostly includes unskilled and semi-skilled manual employees such as finishers, ironers, machinists in clothing factories, waitresses in restaurants, shop assistants in food shops, car mechanics, nursery nurses, hairdressers, bus drivers and painters. A few non-manual employees (such as a receptionist and a priest in a Turkish mosque) were analysed in the category of non-professional employees. In addition, the mothers who work in the home for a textile factory or help in a family business are analysed under the category of non-professional employees. Professional employees are accountants, teachers, interpreters, doctors and engineers.

In the category of self-employed, there are clothing factory owners, owners of small shops such as kebab shops, food shops, hairdressers, dry cleaners etc. In the study, there are no self-employed fathers who hold a professional qualification, such as pharmacist. The main characteristics of the self-employed in the sample are the low formal qualification requirements, low barriers to entry and intense competition, which are quite common features of ethnic minority self-employment (Anthias 1983:84, Rafiq 1992:53, Ram 1993:573-75, Panayiotopoulos 1996:440).

Table 4-4: Fathers' Employment Status by Fathers' Origin (%)

	Fathers' Places Origin			
Fathers' Employment Status	Kurdish Populated Areas (91)	Other places in Turkey (41)	Cyprus (46)	Total (178)
Unemployed	44	22	11	30
Non-professional Employees	43	39	28	38
Professional Employees	0	12	22	8
Self-employed, owners of small businesses	13	27	39	23
Total	100	100	100	100

No father: 28

The unemployment rate among the fathers as reported by sons and daughters is high (Table 4.4). In general, three out of ten fathers are unemployed. Yet there are considerable differences between Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot fathers. Table 4.4 indicates that 44 per cent of the Kurdish fathers are unemployed, compared to 22 and 11 per cent of Turkish and Cypriot fathers respectively.

The differences between the fathers' employment status in terms of their places of origin follows a similar pattern in other categories as well. Although the number of fathers who have a professional job is very small (eight per cent), when compared with the number of non-professional fathers (38 per cent), it is nearly three times higher among the Cypriot fathers and none among the Kurdish fathers. The second largest group is self-employed fathers (23 per cent). Again, self-employment is very common for Turkish and Cypriot fathers, compared to Kurdish ones.

It is also noted that the status of those unemployed, self-employed and unprofessional employees is not stable. The mobility between each of the employment types is very common. Somebody could be employed in a clothing factory as a machinist, then they could open a Kebab shop, then after two or three years they could be unemployed. An

example is the case of Murat, who is a married Kurd who came here seven years ago from a village in Kayseri and has five children, two boys and three girls. Murat and his wife started to work as finisher in a textile factory where one of their co-villagers was employed, and later they worked in several other factories. Murat became an ironer and Ayse (his wife) learned to use sewing machines. After two years, one of their daughters started to work in the factory with them. Four years ago they managed to get their oldest son, who lived with his grandparents in their home village, to England. The son started to work with his mother, sister and father and he learned to use the machines as well. By 1997 they had saved some money and Murat left his job and opened a kebab shop in Haringey, while the rest of the family still worked in a factory. But he managed it for only one year, then he sold the shop and was unemployed for six months. Recently, he tried to open another kebab shop, but was unsuccessful.

When we look at the mothers' employment status, 65 per cent of mothers are not in employment at all (Table 4.5). This figure is seven per cent higher than the 1991 Census figure for Turkish women and 12 per cent higher than that for Cypriot women. Yet, the number of economically inactive Turkish and Cypriot mothers is in tune with the 1991 census. The mothers from outside of the Turkish-speaking 'community' and Kurdish mothers' low level of participation in the labour market causes an increase in the overall score, though the numbers of mothers from other groups are too small to be reliable.

Table 4-5: Mothers' Employment by Mothers' Origin (%)

	Mothers' Places of Origin				
Mothers' Employment	Kurdish Populated Areas (90)	Other places in Turkey (43)	Cyprus (58)	Other countries (5)	Total (196)
Housewives	73	62	53	83 (4)	65
Non-professional Employees	27	33	31	17 (1)	29
Professional Employees		2	9		3
Self-employed, owners of small businesses		2	7		3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

No Mother: 10

Only 27 per cent of the Kurdish mothers are active in the labour market. The low level of participation of some ethnic minority women, especially Bangladeshis and Pakistani women in the labour market in Britain is not a new phenomenon (Brah 1993, West and

Pilgrim 1995, Holdsworth and Dale 1997). According to the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (Modood 1997c:86), four out of five Bangladeshi women and seven out of ten Pakistani women are looking after the home or family. The difference in employment patterns among some ethnic minority women, as West and Pilgrim (1995:361) suggest, can be explained by:

> variations in domestic responsibilities, but- and this is crucial- their significance is mediated by migration. Difference is also structured by economic opportunities, which are influenced by education and are heavily dependent on local labour market conditions.

Among the Turkish-speaking women, economic opportunities in fact, play an important role in determining whether women are employed or not. First of all, most of them, especially those from Kurdish populated areas are uneducated and cannot communicate in English. Second, women are heavily dependent on jobs in the clothing industry, whereby intense competition necessitates low wages that are usually insufficient to pay for child care and other domestic responsibilities. Third, working at home for the factories is an option, if they have a sewing machine and a suitable place in the home in which to work and the necessary skills to use sewing machines. Most of the women, especially the recently arrived Kurds, do not have this skill and the only way to learn to use the sewing machines is in work training.

In the beginning, women start to work as finishers, then usually a relative or a co villager teaches them to use the machines. But again, most of the machinists are paid on piece rates and they do not have the spare time to teach somebody, so when they do, it is really a favour. The case of Filiz is typical. She is a Kurdish refugee, who worked as a finisher in a Greek clothing factory and came to the UK four years ago following her husband who worked as a painter and repairman. She has no children and she works five days a week between eight thirty and five, earning £40 a week. Her aim is to become a machinist, but she cannot find anybody to teach her.

> I don't like to work in this factory, but especially I don't like to work as a finisher. It is a very hard job. I am on my feet all day. At the end I only get £40. It is pocket money. The only reason I work here is because it is only five minutes away from my home. But one of my co-villagers promised to find me a job in the factory where she works and I hope she will teach me to use the sewing machine. Then I can earn some reasonable money.

Furthermore, like the fathers' employment, the differences in terms of origin are important regarding the mothers' employment as well. All Kurdish mothers are either not in employment or non-professional employees, while nine per cent of Cypriot mothers are professional employees.

As was mentioned above, people from the Kurdish populated areas arrived only recently in the United Kingdom and most of them came from rural areas, with few qualifications. The majority of them are refugees in this country which creates extra uncertainty in their lives. Fekete (1997) argues that refugees were the worst hit in the new restructuring of economies, particularly in the manufacturing sector in contemporary Europe. Koser and Lutz (1998) have called the migration of refugees and illegal immigrants 'new migration' and, according to them, new migrants in Europe today are more vulnerable than ever before.

Martin (1991:85-88) claims that the refugee women are especially vulnerable in terms of employment opportunities in the receiving country. They find it difficult to obtain language skills or work training because of the cost, domestic burdens and cultural barriers. Additionally, Martin (1991:87) argues that these particular problems often lead refugee women to become housebound and dependent on their husbands and children for social intercourse. Employment problems also affect refugee women's ability to adjust and integrate in their new country (Martin 1991:87).

Pertinently, there is another characteristic of the enclave economy to make the labour market conditions around the young people even more restrictive. The majority of the employment is provided by other members of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. This situation creates an employment opportunity structure dependent not only on available territorial jobs, but also on a restricted ethnic niche. Werbner (1999:558) refers to this characteristic of ethnic economies as 'networked spaces embedded in particular industries which focus around the production and distribution of particular types of objects'. As can be seen in Table 4.6, 78 per cent of non-professional employees work for a Turkish-speaking employer. Over eight out of ten Kurdish non-professional employees, who are the people working in the clothing factories and small shops, have a Turkish-speaking employer. Although the situation seems more relaxed in the context of professional employment, still 43 per cent of them have a Turkish-speaking employer.

Beside, three out of four Turkish professional fathers such as accountants and lawyers working for the factories and shops, are employed by a Turkish-speaking person.

On initial examination, the Cypriot professional fathers might seem less dependent on this ethnic niche, since four out of five of them work for non-Turkish-speaking employers. Yet most of them are hired by their employers for jobs related to the Turkish-speaking 'community' such as social services, education and translation. In the case of the ethnic enclave economy for Asian migrants in Manchester, Werbner (1999:560) observes that:

> Once the clothing enclave was established, it created a need for a support network of new kinds of services: for accountants, solicitors and transporters; for travel agents, insurance brokers and taxi drivers; for plumbers, electricians and decorators; for fashion designers and clerical workers.

It should be noted that the restricted labour market opportunities lead to vulnerability of the Turkish-speaking employees to the effects of Government policies. The best example is that of the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act which could further restrict employment opportunities (Wolton 1999). The Act contains many aspects regarding asylum and immigration, but two of them are more likely to have considerable consequences for the communities: removal of cash benefits and accommodation allocation on a 'no choice' basis which came into effect on April, 2000.

The Act removed cash benefits for all asylum-seekers and replaced them by vouchers provided directly from the Home Office and issued at the local post offices each week in five pounds, one pound and fifty pence denominations (Travis 2000). The vouchers are only able to be used at designated supermarkets in order to purchase essential living needs and the asylum seekers are not legally entitled to demand that they be given change.

The first immediate effect of the voucher system might be on the small shop keepers and restaurant owners, especially Kurdish ones. The majority of their customers are Turkish-speaking like themselves. This can be seen from their shop windows, their price tags or menus which are all in Turkish. Most of them do not display any English labels at all. In other words, a non-Turkish-speaking person could not separate a sweet shop from a bakery or could not order anything in a restaurant. When the government stops providing cash for their customers, it is very likely that most of these shops will go

bankrupt. When this happens, they might no longer employ their fellow country men and women and the already high rate of unemployment might rise. As Travis (2000) suggests:

> adult asylum seekers who will have to live on vouchers worth £36.54 a week and are banned from working could face being further impoverished.

The Act also gives no rights to the asylum seekers to choose where they would like to be accommodated. The Home Secretary may not consider any preferences for a specific locality. This means that the government could move the people away from their community, friends and family and the services of the majority of the professional employees involved in community related tasks might not be required any more and, therefore, they might lose their jobs.

Table 4-6: Fathers' Employment by Employers' Origin (%)

	Father's Places of Origin							
	Kurdish Populated Areas (33)		Other places in Turkey (19)		Cyprus (16)		Total (68)	
	Employers' Origin		Employers' Origin		Employers' Origin		Employers' Origin	
Fathers' Employment	Turkish Speaking	Others	Turkish Speaking	Others	Turkish Speaking	Others	Turkish Speaking	Others
Non-professional	82 (27)	18 (6)	73 (11)	27 (4)	73 (8)	27 (3)	78 (46)	22 (13)
Professional			75 (3)	25 (1)	20 (1)	80 (4)	43 (4)	57 (5)

The empirical evidence presented so far has endorsed the view that the Turkish-speaking 'community' shows various characteristics of an ethnic enclave labour market. On the other hand, the employment status of the members is not uniform and varies in terms of their places of origin. It seems that the Kurdish parents are the most disadvantaged group in terms of their employment status, followed by Turkish parents, whilst the Cypriots are doing well comparatively. The following section will analyse the effects of the enclave labour market conditions on the second generation Turkish-speaking young people.

4.2 Turkish-speaking Young people and Employment:

As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the effects of the employment conditions on the second generation young people can be understood by situating the young people in the labour market in two ways: the young people's possible future employment prospects and their current engagement in the labour market. By analysing these two situations, it is possible to capture to what extent these young people are aware of the exclusion in relation to employment opportunities and labour market conditions around them.

4.2.1 Turkish-speaking Young People's Future Expectations:

Future expectations are assessed in two different ways. The first question is simply about what they want to be in the future. The second question, on the other hand, is about what they really think they will be in the future. The first question encapsulates the notion of their aspirations, whilst the second one is more related to their assumptions or predictions about the future.

As can be observed in Table 4.7, the Turkish-speaking young people's aspirations are not low. More than half want to have a professional job in the future such as doctor, lawyer, architect or journalist. On the other hand, they do not believe they can achieve this ideal. In fact, 45 per cent of them think that they might have non professional jobs such as nursery nurse, air hostess, hairdresser, or police officer, instead of a professional position. One Kurdish girl said that:

> Sometimes I wonder if I can achieve my aim or not. It is difficult you know. But at the end I can't be nothing. I am certain about one thing- I can't get too much money. But at least I would like to earn more than my fathers' salary. It is about £60 a week.

Moreover, a very small percentage of young people (two per cent) want self employment, but the number of young people who predict their future prospects as self-employment is three times higher than this figure (Table 4.7). Because of the uncertain nature of the economic conditions of self-employment, the young people show a clear dislike for small shop keeping or owning a clothing factory. As one Turkish girl states:

> You know, opening a shop is not a real job, there are a lot of them around now. They are here today and gone tomorrow.

During a discussion group with six Cypriot and Turkish boys, their opinions were asked about small shop and clothing factory ownership. Except one, whose father sold his dry cleaning shop and retired, the others' fathers were small shop keepers and clothing factory owners. All the boys showed clear dislike for these jobs, preferring to be a bank manager, pilot, architect, lawyer and politician. Then, when they were asked what they will really do in the future, the boys replied that:

> Turkish Boy: If I failed to study, I am going to have my own business like a Kebab shop, dry cleaner or clothes shop.
>
> Cypriot Boy: If I can't go to the University, I will manage my father's factory.

There is no fundamental difference between the boys and the girls in terms of their aspirations, while slightly more girls than the boys predict their future as non-professional employee. Apart from this, the girls seem more certain about the future than the boys. Thirty six per cent of the boys have no idea about their future prospects, compared to 18 per cent of the girls. Besides, the girls accept that they are more likely to have a non-professional job, if they cannot realise their aspirations, than the boys do. Nearly six out of ten girls predict their future employment in the non-professional occupations, compared to three out of ten boys.

However, there are differences in terms of the occupations the girls and the boys choose in each category. The girls more often mentioned being a teacher, than the boys, while none of the boys aspired to being or predicted that they would be an air steward or nursery nurse. Moreover, although their number is small, none of the girls who aspired to be self-employed or predicted that they would be, chose small shop or factory ownership. Instead they chose hairdressers, beauty salons or private nurseries, which were not chosen by the boys at all.

Table 4-7: Future Expectations (%)

	All Young people					
	Aspirations			Predictions		
Number of Cases	Male (103)	Fem (103)	All (206)	Male (103)	Fem (103)	All (206)
Non professional employment	34	37	35	33	56	45
Professional employment	55	59	57	21	22	22
Self-employment	4	1	2	10	4	7
No idea	7	3	5	36	18	27
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Kurdish Populated Areas					
	Aspirations			Predictions		
Number of Cases	Male (52)	Fem (40)	All (92)	Male (52)	Fem (40)	All (92)
Non professional employment	46	53	49	52	78	63
Professional employment	44	45	45	14	13	13
Self-employment	6		3	2		1
No idea	4	3	3	33	10	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Other Places in Turkey					
	Aspirations			Predictions		
Number of Cases	Male (17)	Fem (17)	All (34)	Male (17)	Fem (17)	All (34)
Non professional employment	18 (5)	30 (3)	24	12 (2)	53 (9)	32
Professional employment	71 (10)	59 (12)	65	18 (3)	24 (4)	21
Self-employment	6 (1)	6 (1)	6	18 (3)		9
No idea	6 (1)	6 (1)	6	53 (9)	24 (4)	38
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Cyprus					
	Aspirations			Predictions		
Number of Cases	Male (17)	Fem (33)	All (50)	Male (17)	Fem (33)	All (50)
Non professional employment	24 (4)	27	26	24 (4)	36	32
Professional employment	65 (11)	73	70	35 (6)	39	38
Self-employment					9	6
No idea	12 (2)		4	41 (7)	15	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Mixed					
	Aspirations			Predictions		
Number of Cases	Male (17)	Fem (13)	All (30)	Male (17)	Fem (13)	All (30)
Non professional employment	24 (4)	23 (3)	23	6 (1)	46 (6)	23
Professional employment	65 (11)	69 (9)	67	35 (6)	8 (1)	23
Self-employment				35 (6)	8 (1)	23
No idea	12 (2)	8 (1)	10	24 (4)	39 (5)	30
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The differences between the Kurdish, Turkish and Cypriot families in terms of their positions in the labour market and their employment status are reflected in the differences between the young people's future employment expectations. Table 4.7 indicates that seven out of ten Cypriot young people want to have a professional job in the future. This number is similar to the 67 per cent and 65 per cent of those of Turkish and mixed origins respectively. The real difference is with Kurdish young people. Only 45 per cent of these young people want to be a professional employee in the future.

Furthermore, Table 4.7 shows that the Kurdish young people are more likely than others to downgrade their future ambitions to non-professional employment. Sixty three per cent of them predict their future employment as non-professional employees, compared to 32 per cent of Turkish and Cypriot and 23 per cent of mixed young people. The difference between Kurdish boys and the others who predict their future as having non-professional employment, is even sharper. More than half of the Kurdish boys think that they will end up with this kind of employment, compared to less than one out of ten mixed origin, just over one out of ten Turkish and about three out of ten Cypriot boys. Like the boys, eight out of ten Kurdish girls predict that their future will be as non-professional employees, though they seem to be less differentiated from other girls, except Cypriot ones. Only 36 per cent of the Cypriot girls see their future in non-professional employment.

The gap between the young people's aspirations and predictions shows the extent of the young people's awareness of the exclusion in the labour market and their disillusionment about their future employment prospects. It could be argued that if the future brings these young people what they predict, rather than what they aspire to, the most satisfied group of young people are those who predict their future as professional employee and the most disappointed ones will be those who predict their future as self-employed, while the young people who think they will end up with a non-professional job are in the middle.

As can be seen in Table 4.8, since all of the young people who see their future in professional employment, aspire to these jobs rather than the others, they might be the most satisfied group if they can achieve this prospect. On the other hand, less than one out of ten young people who predict their future as self-employed, want to be self-employed, whilst half of them desire to be a professional. Nearly four out of ten of them

prefer to be non-professional employees instead of shop keepers. Given that the number of Cypriot and Turkish young people who predict their future as self-employed, is nine and six times higher than that of Kurdish young people respectively (Table 4.7), the Cypriot and Turkish young people are more likely to find themselves in undesirable conditions of self-employment. The following discussion between Turkish and Cypriot boys is a typical example showing the young people's negative perceptions of self-employment:

Turkish Boy 1: Having a Kebab shop is the most awful thing which can happen to you.

Cypriot Boy 1: My dad has a factory. It is a very hard job. Because nobody respect you for owning the factory. You are not higher than your employees. You can not say I am the boss, I sit and they work. You have to work as well. You have to lift the heavy stuffs. You have to work for long hours. I don't want to do this job in the future, but if there is no alternative left, then I have to work.

Cypriot Boy 2: When you have a factory, sometimes there are jobs and sometimes there aren't. You can easily lose your business.

Turkish Boy 2: When you have these sort of jobs, you can't move up. You might stay where you are for years, if you don't do worse. But for instance, (I don't know) if you are an architect in an office, then you can have a promotion in a couple of years. You can change the office if you don't like.

Cypriot Boy 3: Also when you have your own business, you can have lots of problems with the customers. If they don't like the clothes, they ask their money back. They make lots of hassle. But if you work for somebody else, you start at 9 o'clock and finish at 6. It is over then. You can come your home and relax, leave the job at work. It is nothing to do with you anymore. This is the best advantage of having a good job and working in an office.

Table 4-8: Predictions by Aspirations (%)

	Predictions											
	Non-professional emp.			Professional emp.			Self-emp.			No idea		
Aspirations	Male (34)	Fem (58)	Total (92)	Male (22)	Fem (23)	Total (45)	Male (10)	Fem (4)	Total (14)	Male (37)	Fem (18)	Total (55)
non-professional emp.	53	50	51				30 (3)	50 (2)	36 (5)	38	39 (7)	38
Professional emp.	41	45	44	100	100	100	50 (5)	50 (2)	50 (7)	43	57 (10)	47
Self-emp.	6	2	3				10 (1)		7 (1)	3		2
No idea		3	2				10 (1)		7 (1)	16	6 (1)	13
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Moreover, half of the pupils that believe they will have non-professional jobs in the future, actually want these sorts of jobs. Yet, a reasonable proportion of them (42 per cent) wanted to be a professional. Only two per cent of the young people who believe they will end up with a non-professional job have no idea about what they want to be in the future. In other words, these young people are much more clear about their future employment prospects. Given that the number of the Kurdish young people who think their employment prospects are in non-professional employment is double the number of those Cypriots and Turkish young people (Table 4.7), it can be said that Kurdish young people are less likely to be disappointed by their future employment, if they can achieve their aim.

However, this does not mean that these young people might be ready to fill their parents' places in the future without any hesitation. While almost all of the non professional fathers are unskilled or semi skilled manual employees in the clothing factories or small shops, none of the young people, who aspire to be a non professional employee in the future want to work in manual occupations and in the clothing sector or small shops. One of the Kurdish girls says that:

> I want to have an office job in the tourism industry. But because my mother goes to a factory to work, when I finish school, probably I will go to a factory to work with my mum and dad.

In this sense, the Kurdish young people's aspiration seem to confirm to a certain extent, the general assumption of the studies about the low working class aspirations mentioned

at the beginning of the chapter. On the other hand, there is a difference between the Kurdish young people and the working class young people that Kurdish young people dislike their parents' conditions and want more secure working class jobs.

The analysis of the young people's perceptions of their future prospects in the context of their parent's excluded employment status again shows how influential the existing employment conditions are on their perceptions of their future. Table 4.9 indicates that the gap between aspirations and predictions is narrow for the young people who report that they have a professional father. In fact, most of them want to be a professional and believe they can achieve their aim.

On the other hand, none of the pupils whose fathers are self-employed want a similar future, but nearly 12 per cent believe they will end up with self-employment. This is the highest percentage, when it is compared with that for other groups. Ercan is one of them. He was born here, his father who owns a Kebab shop outside London came from Turkey, and his housewife mother was English. Ercan works in the shop seven days a week during the holidays and weekends during term time from noon until three a.m. the next morning. He does all sorts of jobs like dealing with the customers, washing dishes etc. He says:

> I have no ambitions, whatever comes I will accept and work. You can never know what's going to happen to you. But in any case I can do my father's job.

Table 4-9: Future Expectations by Fathers' Employment (%)

	Fathers' Employment							
	Unemployed (54)		Non professional (68)		Professional (15)		Self-employed (41)	
	Aspira.	Predict	Aspira	Predict	Aspira	Predict	Aspira	Predict
Non prof. emp.	44	57	40	49		13 (2)	29	39
Prof. emp.	52	20	52	16	93 (14)	67 (10)	61	20
Self-employment	4	2	3	7				12
No idea		20	6	28	7 (1)	20 (3)	10	29
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The numbers are small but it would seem that the children of the unemployed and non-professional fathers are less likely to aspire to professional employment, compared to the others, especially those of professional fathers. Besides, the number of young people who want to be a non-professional employee is the highest in these two groups

and none of the young people who have a professional father prefer to have non-professional employment.

It might be assumed that the girls' perception of future economic prospects are also influenced by their mothers' employment status as well as those of their fathers. Studies on other ethnic minorities find a positive relationship between the mothers' economic activity and the daughters' aspirations. As Bhachu (1991b:56) indicates:

> The fact that there is a high proportion of Sikh women in the labour market, that is, both mothers and daughters, have had considerable impact on their educational aspirations for their daughters. It is now necessary for girls to be educated to get reasonable jobs away from the unskilled factory work that most of the mothers and older less educated women are involved in.

In the case of the Turkish-speaking girls, the mothers' employment status seems to have a reasonable influence on their aspirations, though none of the girls aspire to be a housewife or end up as one. Table 4.10 shows that only 28 per cent of the girls who have a working mother, aspire to have non-professional employment, compared to 41 per cent of those who have economically inactive mothers. Moreover, only half of the housewives' daughters want to be a professional employee, while seven out of ten economically active mothers' daughters do so. It seems that not only their aspirations, but their predictions are also affected by their mother's employment status. Six out of ten housewives' daughters believe they will end up with a non-professional job, while only half of the economically active mothers' daughters believe so. Two out of ten girls, whose mothers are housewives, predict their future to be in professional employment, compared to three out of ten girls whose mothers are economically active. In addition, none of the girls whose mothers are employed wish to be self-employed, yet three per cent of them believe they will end up with this option.

Table 4-10: The Girls' Future Expectations by Mothers' Employment (%)

	Mothers' Employment			
	Housewives (58)		Economically Active Mothers (40)	
	Aspiration	Prediction	Aspiration	Prediction
Non prof. emp.	41	59	28	50
Prof. emp.	55	17	68	30
Self-employment	2	5		3
No idea	2	19	5	18
Total	100	100	100	100

As has been discussed so far, the young people have considerable awareness of exclusion in relation to employment opportunities and the difficulties around them through their parents' experiences. When they think about their future prospects, their parents' status in the labour market has influenced their future expectations. In fact, these young people are not only aware of the nature of the employment opportunities around them, but also dislike what they might be offered. In fact, their parents' occupations do not only affect the young people's future aspirations, but also their current involvement in working life.

4.2.2 Turkish-speaking Young People's Part-time Work:

Although child labour is usually thought of as a Third World phenomenon, employment of school children is a widespread occurrence in contemporary Britain as well (Pettitt 1998, Rikowski and Neary 1997, Lavalette 1998, Mizen et. al 1999). In this study, 32 per cent of the young people have a part time job and nearly 64 per cent of part time job holders work during the term time (Table 4.11). A teacher stated that:

> I think many families are sending their children to work during the weekend, and some of the children even don't come to the school, but work full time in the shops. When we have called the parents, they said they don't know their children were absent from school. But I think they do.

Table 4-11: Having a Part-time Job (%)

	Working Part-time			Working During the Term Time		
	Male (103)	Female (103)	Total (206)	Male (43)	Female (23)	Total (66)
Yes	42	22	32	67	57	64
No	58	78	68	33	44	36
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Boys are more likely to work than girls. Forty two per cent of boys have a part time job, whereas only 22 per cent of the girls work part time. But when a girl has a part time job, she works as long hours as the boys do. For instance, a Cypriot girl working in a hairdressers talks about the difficulties she faces:

> I don't have a chance to sit for a minute. She (the employer) pays me very little. Of course, it is bit difficult to study when you work.

In other words, when both the boys and the girls are in part-time employment, their conditions might not be different to each other. Yet, unlike the boys, the girls also have domestic responsibilities as well, regardless of having part-time jobs, though a working mother may put a bit more pressure on them to not have a part-time job.

As can be seen in Table 4.12, the daughters of working mothers are less likely to engage in outside work. In the case of a working mother, the daughter is not only needed to help with domestic tasks, but she is also needed to take the mother's place in other ways. They have to prepare their brothers and sisters for school and take them home when they finish, give them dinner and cook for the rest of the family, clean the house, wash the dishes and do the laundry etc. Unlike the work outside, they don't even get pocket money for these tasks, since the domestic tasks are not defined as work to be paid, but as a responsibility to be fulfilled. In fact, the mothers, regardless of their economic status, think that it is necessary for a daughter to learn these tasks for their own sake in the future. As a Kurdish mother who works in a textile factory put it:

> I will not always be with her. When she marry, she needs to clean her own home and cook for her own children. So it is better for her to start doing these things at this age. Now she sometimes complains about things, but in the future, she will thank me for teaching her how to cook and how to manage a home. Anyway, if she refused to do, who does she think will do this? I can't, I am working at the factory.

Table 4-12: The Girls' Part time work by Mothers' Employment (%)

Mothers' Employment Status	Yes	No	Total
Housewife (58)	24	76	100
Economically Active (40)	18	83	100
Total (98)	22	78	100

Unlike the girls, the boys do not have domestic responsibilities. If they do not have a part-time job, their lives are much easier than those of girls in the same position. But the life of the working boys is far from comfortable. The most important determinant of whether a child has a part-time job or not is the father's employment status. The significant role of parents in their children's work is also mentioned in other contexts by the charity, Save the Children (1988:72). The charity observe that many children worked for their parents, or for their parents' friends (Save the Children 1988:72).

The Turkish-speaking young people also work for their relatives or co-villagers and if they have a self-employed father, they work for him. If a child has a self-employed father, the contribution of the child's labour is quite essential to the father. Metcalf *et al.* (1997:65-7) emphasise the importance of family labour for Asian self employed families. The same phenomenon is pointed out in the case of Chinese take-away businesses by Song (1997), who suggests that the children are given a substantial amount of duties in the shops.

Table 4.13 reveals that more than half of the Turkish-speaking young people of the self-employed fathers work part time. These young people usually receive pocket money from their fathers in return for their work in the shop. Hakan, a Turkish boy who was born here, has a housewife mother and a coffee shop owner father. For as long as he can remember, his father has owned a coffee shop. He was the only son in the family with two sisters. Hakan worked in the coffee shop for pocket money after school and stayed there until eight o'clock in the evening and at the weekends, started in the morning with his father and left at two o'clock in the afternoon. Hakan wants to be an engineer, yet believes he cannot achieve his aim and will probably end up working in his dad's shop.

Table 4-13: Part time work by Fathers' Employment (%)

Fathers' Employment Status	Yes	No	Total
Unemployed (54)	24	76	100
Non-professional Employees (68)	25	75	100
Professional Employees (15)	33 (5)	67 (10)	100
Self-employers, owners of small businesses (41)	54	46	100
Total (178)	32	68	100

The children of unemployed or non professional fathers do not have part-time jobs, unless some of their relatives or very close co-villagers owned a shop and they need extra help. This seems to be a common experience among the young people with unemployed parents. As Mizen et. al (1999:430) argue:

> For children largely working in sectors of the economy notorious for informal recruitment procedures and a high turnover of labour, the absence of a parent or older sibling to 'ask around', 'put in a good word' or 'keep an eye out' for vacancy is likely to constitute a real barrier to work. This does appear to be the case for 16 to 18 year olds still in full-time education, where an unemployed parent corresponds with slightly lower rates of working. It may indeed be an invidious irony that those children most likely to derive the biggest material benefits from having a paid job are those most likely to be excluded.

Indeed when they work, they earn pocket money and this contributes to the family's income and some of them even give their earnings to their mothers. Leonard (1998:91) argues that the ability of children to provide for some of their own needs enables household resources to be directed to more immediate needs in low income families. This was the case for the Turkish-speaking young people having unemployed or non-professional fathers. A Kurdish boy, who works in one of his relative's barber shop after school and at weekends, said that:

> When we are in Turkey, my Dad worked in the bazaar in Bursa, he sold vegetables and my mum was knitting for other women in the neighbourhood in return of some cash. I was the eldest in the home and have one brother and one sister. In Turkey, I worked with my Dad. Here he couldn't work because of some health problems. In the barber shop, I clean the floor after the customers and bring them some tea or clean ashtrays. But also I am learning to cut the hair and other staff in time. He pays me pocket money. Sometimes I keep it, but usually I give it to my Mum. She uses it for extra expenses for my brother and sister.

The children of the professional employees have part-time jobs more often than the children of unemployed and non-professional employees. On the other hand, the nature of the jobs these children hold differ from one group to another. Middleton, Shropshire and Croden (1988:57) found in their survey on children aged between 11 and 16 years that although poorer children are less likely than more affluent children to have paid part-time jobs, employed poorer children tend to have either more jobs and/or work for longer hours than others.

Furthermore, the professional families and their children approach part-time jobs differently from other children. For instance, Lavalette (1994:219) mentions that out of school work remained an activity performed by working class children at the start of the century but today it is, to some extent, a cross class activity, since this type of work is now believed by the families to be a beneficial learning experience in tune with many elements of bourgeois ideology concerning the morally invigorating experience of work.

Similar comments are made by Hutson and Cheung (1992) in their study of Welsh sixth formers. Hutson and Cheung (1992:52) observe that part-time earning became part of life for those in the sixth form colleges, regardless of their families' class background. The Saturday jobs are regarded by the children and their parents in positive terms such as independence, commitment, effort, achievement, learning about the 'real' world and about the management of money (Hutson and Cheung 1992:59). These positive attributes of part-time work are also detectable among the Turkish-speaking part-time job holders from professional backgrounds:

> A Turkish Girl: I wanted to spend some time outside of the house and earn my own money. I didn't want to work in Turkish shops, so I went to all big shops at the shopping centre and asked the managers for a job. They asked me to fill application forms, then Etam offered me a job as a shop assistant during the weekends. I put the money in the bank and usually I spent it to buy some clothes or gifts to my friends.

> A Cypriot Boy: During the summer holidays, I occasionally go to my father's office. I help him there to arrange the files, post the letters, prepare some coffee or tea. It is fun. I enjoyed myself. Also if I worked hard, my father gave me some pocket money too.

The part-time job is certainly far from being a fun experience for those working in their father's small shops:

A Turkish Boy: I can say that working in a Kebab shop is like going to a jail. The shop is like a prison. Because you are in the same place from 11 o'clock in the morning until two o'clock in the evening, without any break. At least I am luckier than my dad. I only have to work during the weekends. Even when you give yourself a day off occasionally, you can do nothing because you already felt so tired. That's why I code the Kebab business in my mind as a prison. I mean, I am working all right, but it is a misery. My dad always told me that 'the last job in this life is Kebab business. If you want to save your future from this, *you have to read and become a man* [which means 'go to school and get a good occupational career'].

The introduction to working life happens to be very stressful for some of the Turkish-speaking young people, believing that their experiences are not encouraging and positive. They see the employment opportunities which the community offer them as highly restrictive for their future employment prospects, that is why none of the girls want to be a housewife like their mothers and none of the boys want to be a shop-keeper like their fathers.

Not surprisingly, the actual physical excluded boundary around the young people shows a consistent pattern with the narrow economic and social one. As shown in Table 4.14, in order to explore the physical boundary around them, the young people were asked if they have ever been in other places apart from London and in central London. The number of young people who have been to other places in the UK is low. Sixty two per cent of the Kurdish, 59 per cent of the Turkish, 42 per cent of the Cypriot and 40 per cent of the mixed origin young people have not been to any other place in the UK apart from London.

The physical boundary around the community does not even stretch to Central London. Central London might be only half an hour distance by underground, but as indicated in Table 4.14, 32 per cent of the young people have not been there even once in their life. Some of the young people think that central London is their local shopping centre or have been to Oxford Street only. Oxford Street is important to know because it is on the Piccadilly and Victoria underground lines and some of the families have their lawyers, who specialise in the Asylum cases or trade licences for their shops or restaurants, in that street.

Table 4-14: Travel within the UK by place of origin (%)

Have you ever seen any other places in the UK?	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
Yes	38	41	58	60	47
No	62	59	42	40	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Have you ever been to central London?	(92)	(34)	(50)	(30)	(206)
Yes	67	62	66	80	68
No	33	38	34	20	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100

4.3 Conclusion:

The current structural changes in the developed market economies bring about immigrant communities' exclusion in terms of employment opportunities in the labour market. Immigrants have been affected more than the non-immigrant population. Most of them are pushed to self-employment or other forms of informal community employment in the ethnic enclave labour markets. The future prospects of the second generations seem to be gloomier than what their parents' generation have at the moment.

Young people's position in the labour market is usually analysed in the context of transition from school to work. Some studies emphasised the low aspiration of the working class young people because of their working class background. Others focused on the restricted opportunities of the local labour markets, while some claim the importance of the individual choices from the existing alternatives. On the other hand, my research revealed that these young people certainly do not have low aspirations and they have no desire to fill their parents' places in the labour market. Yet, the studies also showed that upward mobility is not an easy target for generations of migrants, especially if the current labour market transformations are taken into account. In this context, the chapter analysed the degree of awareness of the young people about the exclusion in the existing labour market in terms of employment opportunities.

Furthermore, an analysis of the migrant children's employment prospects cannot be complete without studying their current engagement with the labour market through part-time so called 'out of school' jobs, since their labour is essential for some of the migrant families, especially self-employed and unemployed fathers and working mothers.

In line with all these discussions, it became clear that the Turkish-speaking young people's perceptions about their economic prospects are clearly related to their parents' economic situations and the exclusion in the labour market. In fact, the parents' economic positions are not uniform and vary in terms of their place of origin, though they are located in the same deprived labour market and are dependent on the ethnic network to find employment. The Kurdish families are in the most disadvantaged circumstances, compared to the Turkish and Cypriot families.

Unemployment and non-professional employment are more common among the Kurds and none of them have professional occupations. Turkish families might be better placed, compared to Kurds. The unemployment rate among the Turks is less than the Kurds and there are some Turkish professional fathers. Cypriot families appear to be the most advantaged group in the Turkish-speaking 'community' with the small number of unemployed and more in professional occupations. Yet even they are still pretty much dependent on the ethnic labour market in order to obtain employment. Self-employment is much more common among the Cypriot fathers, and shop or clothing factory ownership has its own risks and restrictions to be handled.

The economic position of the fathers in the Turkish-speaking families has a visible effect on both the aspirations and expectations of Turkish-speaking young people. The Kurdish young people seem to have more moderate future expectations and appear to be clearer about what they might become. On the other hand, Cypriot and Turkish young people are more confused about the future, since none of them aspire to be self-employed and they believe their alternatives are quite restricted. Nevertheless, Turkish-speaking young people are able to evaluate the situation and they do not want to end up with similar jobs to their parents, while at the same time they do see their alternatives as considerably limited and they think that the situation might push them into undesirable occupations.

However, despite all their disadvantages, their aspirations are clearly high, though they do not expect to reach their aims. The differences between their aspirations and predictions should not be interpreted to mean that they were unrealistic about their prospects. On the contrary, this difference showed that they had a great level of understanding about what was going on around them. In fact, none of the young people want to work in the clothing factories or small shops and none of the young people with self-employed fathers want to be self-employed.

Furthermore, a considerable number of pupils are already engaged in the labour process working under very hard conditions. This relatively early encounter with working life makes some of the young people even more alienated from their parents' excluded employment conditions. The working conditions are pretty hard for the young people, especially the boys who help their self-employed fathers after school hours. The conditions are even harder for the girls with a part-time job. The Turkish-speaking girls have to help their mothers with domestic tasks, regardless of the part-time job they might have.

In the end, Turkish-speaking young people feel that exclusion in the current labour market is pushing them to make a choice: whether to accept the jobs which their parents already do or attempt to improve their future life-chances. In this context, the following chapter will analyse the latest theories of ethnicity which suggest that transnationalism would change these young people's lives for the better.

5. Transnationalism and Its Limits:

5.1 Theory of Transnationalisation:

Contemporary theorists, especially Americans, seem to have abandoned the term 'migrants' in favour of 'transmigrants' and the term 'migrant communities' in favour of 'transmigrant communities' (Cohen 1997; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Gubta and Ferguson 1992; Goldring 1998; Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton 1992; Schiller and Fouron 1999; Vertovec 1999). They indicate that the conditions of ethnic minority communities can no longer be analysed within the narrow boundaries of the dominant societies. Cohen (1997:160) argues that:

> The massive amount and value of global transactions effected by the transnational corporations and their minions by no means accounts for the full volume of migration or capital movements. One has to move beneath these visible organisations to glean how a significant chunk of the "real" global market works. Traders place orders with cousins, siblings and kin "back home"; nieces and nephews from "the old country" stay with their uncles and aunts while acquiring their education or vocational training; loans are advanced and credit is extended to trusted intimates; and jobs and economically advantageous marriages are found for family members.

This theory advocates that the chances of ethnic minority communities for improving their conditions are increased once their dependency on the mainstream societies is reduced. Now, migrants are able to use their informal community links across national boundaries to engage in upward mobility. In this respect, this chapter will study the chances of Turkish-speaking young people to improve their conditions, since the Turkish-speaking 'community' might be the best candidate to be a transnational community.

The theorists suggest that technological innovations such as air transport, long-distance telephone and satellite systems, prepare the necessary conditions for a grass-roots transnationalism. Vertovec (1999:447) identifies transnationalism as:

> a condition in which, despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent),

> certain kinds of relationships have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common - however virtual - arena of activity.

Moreover, Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992:17) argue that:

> With the emergence of transnationalism the individual migrant is now embedded in a wider social field that spans two or more nations.

Schiller and Fouron (1999:356) introduce a concept of 'transnational social field', which means:

> an entry point that enabled us to trace the ways in which persons are linked together through social networks, but living within different political systems. The concept of social field has served as more than a metaphor of spatialization. It allowed us to observe a terrain of social relationships in which personal experiences and family strategies of surviving difficult economic circumstances and improving social position serve as the soil on which a broader language of national identity takes root and flourishes.

The main emphasis of this perspective is that the conditions of migrant communities in the receiving countries are mainly determined by their engagement in transnational activities. Itzigsohn et al. (1999:318) claim that there exists a 'transnational social field' constructed through the daily life and activity of immigrants, affecting all aspects of their life, from their economic opportunities, to their political behaviour, to their individual and group identities.

There are two important assumptions of this approach. Firstly, the 'transnational social field' is said to break the easy alliance between place and identity and destroys the link between space (national boundary of receiving country) and community (migrant communities). In other words, places are no longer the clear supports of our identity (Morley and Robins 1993:5). As Carter, Donald and Squires (1993:viii) point out:

> The forces of new technologies, globalization and 'time-space compression' have together created a sense of information flows, fragmentation and pace replacing what is now perceived to be a previous stability of homogeneity, community and place.

Gubta and Ferguson (1992) argue that the communities are no longer related to certain spaces, but interconnected spaces. They say that:

> Something like a transnational public sphere has certainly rendered any strictly bounded sense of community or locality obsolete. At the same time, it has enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount (Gubta and Ferguson 1992:9).

Similarly, Sørensen (1998:242) argues that:

> In a world characterised by enhanced spatial mobility and formation of transnational flows of people and meaning, the correspondence between physical worlds and social realities among people differently situated is neither simple nor understandable with bounded concepts.

This emphasis on the broken link between space and community implies that the migrant communities do not need to adapt to the dominant societies' national identities to identify themselves. In order to conceptualise the difference between space and community, Appadurai (1995) distinguishes the term 'neighbourhood' (national boundaries) as an independent social form from 'locality' (migrant communities). 'Locality' is primarily relational and contextual rather than spatial, while 'neighbourhood' refers to actual existing social forms in which locality, as a dimension or value, is variably realised (Appadurai 1995:204). When the local subjects (migrants) engage in the social activities of production, representation and reproduction, they contribute (generally unintentionally) to the creation of contexts which might exceed the existing material and conceptual boundaries of the neighbourhood (national boundaries) (Appadurai 1995:210).

The second assumption of transnational theories is closely connected to the first one. Since the migrant communities no longer need to identify themselves within the boundaries of receiving nation states, they do not need the receiving nations in order to improve their social and economic conditions. Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999:229) argue that:

> Whereas, previously, economic success and social status depended exclusively on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society, at present they depend (at least for some) on cultivating strong social networks across national borders.

According to Basch, Schiller and Blanc (1994:79), the new transnational way of life facilitates the survival of members of migrant communities:

> Almost ubiquitously at the social center of this transnational field, the family facilitates the survival of its members, serving as a buffer against the intrusiveness of individual state policies; it fosters the social reproduction of its members, their class formation and mobility; and as the repository of cultural practices and ideology shaped in the home society, it mediates identity formation in the new setting as it socializes its members into a transnational way of life.

Furthermore, the access of ethnic minority groups to their own media has particular importance. Ethnic minority language broadcasting can serve to keep their pride and integrity and ensure the continuation of their ancient idioms (Howell 1992:240).

With the introduction of satellite technologies, ethnic minority young people are not only affected by the media in the receiving countries but the media, especially television, coming from their places of origin. As Gillespie (1995:360) outlines in her ethnographic study of a Hindu family in Southall,

> for the young people in this family, and in Southall more generally, there is no easy equation between geography, culture, and media. The new TV delivery systems allow Hindus in London to keep in touch with Indian popular culture. TV plays a significant role in re-creating and re-presenting "tradition" among first and second generation Hindus in Southall.

In this context, some of the theorists even promote transnationalism as a new way of not only surviving, but gaining economic and social status for the transmigrants. According to Portes (1999), transnationalism is a neutralised alternative to the restricted relation of immigrants with other groups in the mainstream society and their relatively disadvantaged position. Portes (1999:470-72) discusses the possible effects of transnationalism on the second generation, in relation to their assimilation into the mainstream community. He argues that:

> For the second generation, in particular, it [transnationalism] offers a valuable counterweight to a relentless process of acculturation that leads children, even at an early age, to abandon their parental languages and embrace unquestioningly the norms and styles of the host culture. In America, this process of acculturation carries the price of learning and interjecting one's inferior place in the social hierarchy. That sense, which along with poverty, creates the conditions for downward assimilation, is neutralised by the

economic and symbolic alternatives that transnationalism makes possible (Portes 1999:472).

Furthermore, Goldring (1998:189) argues that transmigrants can also make claims of social status and social capital with specific reference to their places of origin in the context of the transnational social fields. They change their clothing styles, drive imported vehicles when they visit their home country, improve their housing and spend more money than somebody of similar status in their home country. Within the understanding of their community, therefore, they improve their social status.

Similar points are made in the context of Turkish migrants in Germany. Caglar (1995:311) points out that regardless of the economic and social achievements in Germany, Turkish people suffer a lack of recognition from German people. Most of the German Turks recognise Turkey as the most convenient place for matching their economic mobility with their social and economic capital (Caglar 1995:312). Although the majority of them are workers in Germany, most of them earn more than even average middle class employees in Turkey, and their self-image, in the context of Turkish society, is not that of a worker. With these perceptions, not even Turkish migrants from rural parts of Turkey intend to return to their villages. If they ever return to Turkey, they prefer to settle in cities (Caglar 1995:313).

Basch, Schiller and Blanc (1994:242) argue that transnationalism is a process, rather than a phenomenon. They emphasise that as long as the conditions in the receiving countries and home remain unchanged, the transnational activities continue as a trans-generational process.

On the other hand, this perspective is not free from criticism. Some critics totally reject the existence of a transnational dimension to migrant communities in ways similar to a transnational character of advanced finance capitalism and the transnational character of the Americanisation of media messages. For instance, Kelly and Schauffler (1996:34) claim that:

Interpersonal networks are distinguished as much by their ability to generate a sense of cohesion as by the extent to which they can parlay group membership and mutual assistance into worthwhile jobs and knowledge. What distinguishes the impoverished from the wealthy is not their capacity to deploy social capital but their poorer access to

> resources of high quality. Those resources often are embedded in physical locations not available to the impoverished.

From the same perspective, Sassen (1996b:23) comments that in today's large modern cities in Western Europe and the USA:

> We see a homogenizing in the urban forms of advanced economic sectors in cities with such disparate histories and cultures as New York, London and Tokyo. This pressure towards homogeneity overrides history and culture. But beyond the central urban core of high-rise luxury offices there are discontinuities within each of these cities: a hierarchy of urban forms, from the transnational urban space of finance to the old working-class districts and new immigrant communities (Sassen 1996b:23).

In relation to media technologies, these critics emphasise the effect of Americanisation on the content of media messages. In contrast to transnational norms in the media, Burnett (1996:4) reveals that some 55 per cent of all film screenings and 55 per cent of all home video rentals world-wide are not transnational, but uniform, American material. As Downing (1992:272) observes in the case of Spanish-language media in New York:

> An initial impression of advertising on these channels, for example, indicates their similarity to Anglo advertising, with certain exceptions. Cosmetic advertisements are even more exaggerated.

Morley and Robins (1995:223) also underline the American effect on the media in general stating that:

> It is not simply that America exports a lot of television programmes - beyond that, America has written the 'grammar' of international television - the formats of television, developed in America, have literally 'set the frame' for the production of television in most other countries.

Ang (1985:3) argues that 'American cultural imperialism' has successfully integrated into national 'cultural identity' itself. According to some critics, even transnational media, which supposedly serves the 'continuation of the ancient idioms' of transnational migrants, could not escape American influences. As Karim (1998:12) comments:

> Adoption of the market model of mainstream broadcasting appears to belie the cultural studies view of minority media resisting dominant structures and discourses. Ethnic DBS

> (Digital Broadcasting Satellite Systems) networks carry out similar types of market research, programming schedules and advertising. Apart from certain differences in the modes of narrative, the only difference seems to be in the languages and cultures of the content.

Other critics of transnational theories argue that even if migrants have transnational links, this does not give each member of this community equal access to the advantages of being transnational. For group members have access to this 'transnational field' in accordance with their social and economic status. As Guarnizo and Smith (1998:12) point out:

> If we were to believe that transmigrants are socially, politically, and culturally unbound, the question then is how can we define who is and who is not a transmigrant? In other words, what are the boundaries of transnationality?

Furthermore, in their study of Colombian migrants' transnational activities, Guarnizo and Diaz (1999:417) found that Colombian transnational activities were not as boundless as the transnational theorists advocate:

> transnational processes are indeed a) socially bound (that is, they are embedded in social relations and expectations that bind across national boundaries); b) territorialized (that is, they occur in specific locations that provide certain opportunities and set limits to their reach); and c) they do not overcome class, racial and regional differences, categories which remain significant analytical tools for the analysis of transnational migration in general.

Van Hear (1998:253) has several reservations about the characterisation of transnational communities. One is related to these communities' cosmopolitan character. He argues that:

> by no means all, or even most, transnational populations are thrusting cosmopolitans. On the contrary, many are rather parochial transnationals - people with transnational networks and links, but with a parochial outlook or world-view (Van Hear 1998:255).

Another reservation is related to the nature of the solidarity among the members of transnational communities. He stresses that:

while transnational communities can be the source of useful sustaining networks and solidarity, there may also be profound divisions within them. Global village there may be, but villages are often rife with suspicion, bickering and backbiting. Such divisions in transnational communities may reproduce cleavages at home - and may indeed be one of the reasons for people to leave. (Van Hear 1998:256).

He also adds that:

Divisions may also arise between the established populations of migrant origin and newcomers - including between different cohorts of the same ethnic or national group (Van Hear 1998:256).

In relation to the divisions among the members of transnational communities, Khandelwal (1996:125) comments on the Indian community in New York that:

While "Little India" can be located in the global diaspora of Indians, it is entirely possible that two Indian immigrant families living on the same block in New York City may not socialize because they come from two different regional cultures of India and speak different languages, particularly if they are not comfortable in the English language which is prevalent only among the middle and upper classes of urban educated Indians.

Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999) also emphasised the differences between rural origin migrants and urban origin migrants, and between poorer, less skilled migrants and highly skilled professionals. They argue that the Mexican transnational community is made up of Mexican migrants mainly from Mexican villages, while Mexico City migrants do not constitute a transnational migrant community, and this is especially the case of the highly-skilled professionals. Although unskilled city migrants are more likely to be members of that kind of community, these migrants use their kin contacts from their original villages, rather than friendships or neighbourhood contacts in Mexico City.

In their study of Colombians in New York and Los Angeles, Guarnizo, Sanchez and Roach (1999) share similar views about transnationalism with Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999)'s study of Mexican migrants. They point out that:

the transnationalizing incentives, regardless of their empowering potential, have up to now found little echo among the vast majority of migrants. Migrants' relations with the country (Colombia) are still maintained as mostly private relations between kin and acquaintances.

> Only a small elite and a few organisations have capitalised on these opportunities (Guarnizo, Sanchez and Roach 1999:390).

Given this criticism of transnational theories, Mahler (1998:82) argues that before reaching concrete conclusions, it is important to investigate what the transnational activities are; how representative they are in the entire transnational field; and how representative of the entire migrant population the participants in these activities are. He also suggests that the studies in this area should also investigate the role of gender, class, age and mobility in more detail (Mahler 1998:82-86).

Broadly speaking, then, in recent years, there has been increasing academic attention to what is called the transnationalisation of migrant communities in general and Turkish-speaking communities in particular. In this process, the advances in transportation systems, credit transactions amongst the ethnic minorities of different countries, and the 'globalisation of ethnic-minority media' become amongst the most often referred to changes in regard to the transnationalisation of ethnic minority groups. In wider terms, it has been stressed that such developments substantially reduce distances between ethnic minority communities and their relatives at home and in other countries. It has also been indicated that transnationalisation alleviates dependency of ethnic minorities on the social and economic conditions in receiving countries, which were working as a mechanism for the reproduction of their disadvantaged status. In this sense, the transnationalisation process is claimed to be a challenge to the assimilation of especially younger generations, and an effective solution to their economic exclusion in receiving countries.

In respect to such claims, the research for this thesis investigated the connection between young people's attitudes towards various issues and their access to Turkish/Kurdish newspapers and television. It was found that there are certain indications that there might be some affiliations between these two. However, the findings also suggest that this relationship is not straightforward in terms of assimilation and solutions to economic problems.

In the first empirical part of the chapter, the transnational character of the Turkish-speaking 'community' will be studied to understand the degree of transnationalisation within the community. And in the second part, the attitudes of Turkish-speaking young people towards various issues will be analysed within the context of transnationalisation.

The proximity of Turkey to other European countries has made travel easy and cheap before techonological development paved way to cheap air travel, and so the travel dimension in the transnational migrants' lives is not so new for Turkish communities. That is why the media connection is (especially) analysed.

5.2 Mapping Out the Transnationalisation Level in Turkish-speaking Young People's Daily Lives:

This part will discuss the level of transnationalisation in the Turkish-speaking young people's daily lives. The Turkish-speaking 'community' in London is a prime example of a transnational community in the sense of the 'transnational' theoretical claims. When one enters a Turkish shop in Haringey, or when one learns about London's weather conditions from a Turkish television station, it is clear that the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London is part of a 'transnational' network. Indeed, Robins (1999b) claims a Turkish transnational community exists throughout Europe. The Turkish transnational community is differentiated from others in several respects. Unlike the Maghrebians in France or South Asians in Britain, they do not share a colonial past with any receiving countries, and they are the only group which has spread throughout the European community (Robins 1999b).

Similarly, in a study of Kurdish asylum seekers in Finland and Britain, Wahlbeck (1998:5) emphasised the aspects of deterritoralisation and transnationalism in the Kurdish communities in terms of the refugees' preferences for determining their identity in relation to their countries of origin, not their receiving countries. She also observed that most of the Kurdish refugees make trips all over Europe in order to keep in touch with friends and relatives (Wahlbeck 1998:7).

Moreover, Favell and Martiniello (1999:16) emphasised that the exclusionary tendencies of formal political practice in Brussels encouraged the immigrants to depend on their own ethnic or religious alliances and, in the case of Turkish immigrants, these alliances are beyond Brussels or Belgium, and spread around Europe.

If the community in London is a part of the Turkish transnational community, then the question is to what extent the Turkish-speaking young people participate in the transnational activities. The following section will discuss the intensity of transnational activities in Turkish-speaking 'community' life, particularly in relation to the young boys

and girls. According to the theorists discussed above, the transnational communities are different from others in two important respects: regular contact with their relatives beyond the boundaries of receiving nations, and receiving news from their home countries on a daily basis through new technologies such as satellite systems. These two phenomena are therefore chosen for analysis.

5.2.1 Regular Contact with Relatives and Co-villagers both in London and in other countries:

The relationship between relatives and co-villagers among the Turkish-speaking 'community' is intense. When Kurdish and Cypriot families have relatives in England, they are mostly in the same area. Their relationships with family members and co-villagers is very important to them. Everyday they have face-to-face contact with their immediate relatives, and telephone contact with other relatives and they see co-villagers at wedding ceremonies. The relatives and co-villagers provide financial help as well as cultural and social support. When somebody needs money, they first ask for help from an immediate family member, before asking from anyone else.

Table 5-1: Relatives and Co-villagers in England by Place of Origin (%)

Relatives in England	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
Yes	82	41	92	77	77
No	19	59	8	23	23
Total	100	100	100	100	100

The boundaries of the extended family network are not only within London, but within other countries as well, especially other European Union countries, though unlike the Kurdish and Cypriot families, the Turkish families do not have other family members in other countries. The Kurdish family network in Europe is especially close, exchanging information about the living conditions in different European states. A Kurdish father compared his circumstances with those of his brothers in Germany and France after attending a wedding ceremony in Germany:

I told my brothers that everybody belongs to his own country. I am very happy with mine. The situation in France is worse. Germany is better. But I can never swap my condition with anybody else's. Here, the government helps you, and you can work in a decent job, my life could not be better. In Germany, they have only state income support, nothing else. They said that the streets in Germany are clear, but clean streets cannot feed you. In the

> marriage ceremony, I gave the biggest gift. I understand their condition is terrible. I asked why they gave so little money. They said that they changed the tradition there, nobody gives so much money to the newly-weds anymore. But I know the real reason. They simply don't have any money.

When one of the relatives has a financial problem, money is collected by other members of the family in different countries. Also, they send gifts to each other, and participate in special ceremonies. For example, during the field work, there was an old woman with three sons in London, a daughter and a son in Germany and another son in France, who had just arrived from Turkey and applied for asylum. When she had health problems for the first time, all her children sent money for her to go to a private doctor, because she has no social security in Turkey. A couple of months later, they decided to take her to doctors in Europe. Firstly, she went to Germany and spent three months there, then France and finally she came here. Actually, the doctors could not find out what was wrong with her, but she seemed happier because she was seeing all her children and grand children after a long absence.

Table 5-2: Relatives in other countries by Place of Origin (%)

Relatives	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
No	16	41	62	43	35
Europe	84	56	16	43	57
Other Countries		3	22	13	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Extended family networks bring control and dependency as well as solidarity to the members. Gossip also spreads across the different countries in a very short period of time. A Kurdish girl:

> Sometimes my mum comes home and talks about a girl she saw in the park with a boy. Then she telephones the girl's mum. It makes me feel sick. How can I have a boyfriend? What might happen, when somebody sees me with that boy? My dad will kill me.

This is not only true for young women, but for men as well. For instance, Staring (1998) documents strategies developed by the Turkish migrants in the Netherlands in response to the migrant relatives without documents, who are mostly male and so called 'tourists'. Migrants' relatives or friends usually look after their guests and help them financially or give assistance in finding a paid job, yet these relatives also circulate information about

their illegal status (Staring 1998). This reduces their chance of marrying a legal migrant woman from their own ethnic community in order to obtain legal status because of the distrust of the woman's family (Staring 1998:234).

In London too, although men are more free to commit adultery or go to pubs and night clubs, there are various rules which they should obey as well. For instance, they should never take the adulterous relationship seriously and should be ready to leave the relationship if the wife finds out; they can go to night clubs, but should not do it very often; and finally they should never gamble. If they exceed these social boundaries, they receive severe warnings to stop from their wives' family or their own family. By transgressing these boundaries, they also jeopardise the reputations of the other men in their family such as their brothers or their sons. For instance, a Kurdish woman had two sons, one of whom had a gambling problem, and for whom she could not find a girl to marry, having tried in Germany and Turkey. Then when the youngest son became eligible to marry, it was difficult to find him a girl too because of his brother's gambling problem.

It seems that the transnational character of the social networks of the Turkish-speaking 'community' is followed by its members' transnational physical mobility. As can be seen from Table 5.3, 79 per cent of the Turkish young people have visited Turkey and 94 per cent of the Cypriot young people have been to Cyprus in the previous year of the fieldwork, and for the majority of the Turkish and Cypriot young people these visits are regular. On the other hand, some of the young people do not like to visit their parents' places of origin, when they are in Turkey or Cyprus, regarding these visits as boring and usually preferring to go to a holiday resort. One of the Turkish girls talked about her experiences:

> When my dad tells us we are going to Turkey, it means we are going to the village, where my mum and dad were born. They like to go to there, but not us. There, we basically do nothing, no swimming, no shopping. We visit the relatives, even far relatives. Then after one month we come back here again, a waste of time. In school, the teacher said 'Oooh! you were in Turkey, you must have a marvellous time'. Yes of course, I watch the cows.

Connection to places of origin is extremely rare amongst the Kurdish young people. Most of them are asylum seekers and could not go to Turkey, but they visit their relatives in Europe and other countries. Fifty three per cent of them have been to a European

country. Unlike the Turkish young people's experience in Turkey, most of the Kurdish young people like to visit their relatives in Europe. Turkish young people in London have also been to other European countries. Although Cypriot young people have their relatives in Europe, the majority of them are in Australia and Canada. Hence, their contact with these relatives is not as powerful as the Kurdish and Turkish young people's contacts with their relatives.

Table 5-3: Physical Mobility in transnational context by place of origin (%)

Have you ever been to Turkey for a holiday ?	Kurdish Populated Areas (92)	Other Places in Turkey (34)	Cyprus (50)	Mixed (30)	Total (206)
Yes	37	79	40	63	49
No	63	21	60	37	52
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Have you ever been to Cyprus for a holiday?	(92)	(34)	(50)	(30)	(206)
Yes	2	6	94	40	31
No	98	94	6	60	69
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Have you ever been to any other countries apart from the UK?	(92)	(34)	(50)	(30)	(206)
In Europe	53	53	36	33	46
In other countries	1	6	14	13	7
No	46	42	50	53	47
Total	100	100	100	100	100

As a result, it is evident that the Turkish-speaking young people have strong contacts with their relatives beyond London and in this sense, they are indeed transnational. But there is no doubt that the effect of these contacts is not as influential as that of Turkish television and newspapers, since their availability has become possible with new technologies and, in this sense, their existence creates a more logical ground for analysis from a transnational theoretical standpoint.

5.2.2 Turkish Television and Newspaper Consumption:

Although there are several local Turkish-speaking radio stations in London, Turkish television programmes and newspapers are also important parts of ordinary Turkish-speaking family life. Ninety nine per cent of the young people in the sample have a satellite dish in their home to access mainly Turkish channels. A few households,

especially Cypriot ones, watch the other international channels such as SKY TV or MTV. The television set is switched on first thing in the morning and switched off last thing in the evening. It is the background to women's daily tasks and family gatherings. Moreover, several Turkish newspapers, including local ones, are widely read within the community.

Private television channels and international broadcasting are very recent phenomena in Turkey. Turkish state television broadcasting started in 1968 by a donated German transmitter in Ankara and, at the beginning of the 1980s, it covered over 80 per cent of the population. Colour broadcasting was introduced in 1984. The second channel was opened in 1986, a third one in 1989 and a fourth in 1990. Additionally, GAP TV (South-eastern Anatolian Project TV) begun broadcasting to the mainly Kurdish populated Southeast in 1989. Again, at the beginning of the 1990s, TRT International was introduced to broadcast to Central Asia and Europe. However, over the years the TRT broadcasting character has changed very little. It is highly centralised and susceptible to government policies. Moreover as Aksoy and Robins (1997:83) argue:

> The 'real' Turkey, with all the complexities and diversity of its civil society and cultural identities has been denied, or, more correctly, disavowed, in the name of the 'official' cultural ideal.

On the other hand, according to Aksoy and Robins (1997:86), 'real' culture did not disappear from public life, but rather continued to survive in parallel to the TRT's 'official' culture through popular journalism, the film industry and Arabesk music. This 'real' culture manages to find a place in broadcasting with the introduction of private channels in the 1990s. Aksoy and Robins (1997:88) argue that:

> What commercial television did was to draw the popular culture that had been leading a parallel life into the mainstream. And, thereby, they contributed significantly to cultural revitalization. This pluralization of the media scene was associated, too, with an opening up of political culture and debate.

In contrast to Aksoy and Robins (1997), Kejanlioglu (1998:42) argues that the state broadcasting in Turkey has never been a subject of long-term, or even short term planning in contrast to its counterparts in Europe. The infrastructures came from Britain and Germany, while most of the programmes were either imported, usually from America, or bad copies of foreign programmes. Moreover, although she acknowledges

the state channel's dour and faceless speakers, and uniform style imposed by the top state officials, Kejanlioglu (1998:44) insists that this style is simply replaced by the commercial broadcasting mentality of friendly and humorous speakers, sensational reporters, and imitations of 'American Turkish' accents. Kejanlioglu (1998:44) thus criticises what the private channels have really achieved since their first broadcasting:

> 'Talk shows', erotic 'night gyms', the fights over broadcasting rights to football matches, media stars' transfers with astronomic fees, flamboyant competitions aimed solely at giving money away by asking questions like 'what are the colours of the Turkish flag?' or 'what is the Turkish capital?', 900 telephone lines for these competitions, bloody reconstructed 'reality', the stars' private lives reported as news, Turkish films assumed to be watched even after they have been shown ten times, the neighbourhood soap operas which repeatedly cook up the same theme, 'where are the good-old days?'.

This is exactly the picture of Turkish broadcasting which enters thousands of Turkish-speaking households in London and western Europe everyday. It has nothing to do with the complexity and diversity of the civil society advocated by Aksoy and Robins (1997). Even in the main news, there is in fact no news. The first news story is usually about the high ratings of the channel compared to its rivals, followed by the latest news from the set of popular soap operas shown on a particular channel, and finally the political news is restricted to the clothes or daily habits of political figures. Almost every news bulletin is interrupted by an advertisement break and finally, when this so called news finishes, there is another session of advertisements showing which company supplies the speakers' clothes, make up, shoes and studio furniture.

Apart from commercialisation, there is almost no control over the content of the programmes. Although an independent commission (RTUK- Radio Television High Commission) supposedly works as a censorship board, it is mainly under state control and the members of the commission in some way manage to find 'dangerous' political messages against unity and the national security in the programmes and heavily censor them. In other words, nudity and violence are acceptable as long as they are not dangerous, and not against the 'country's interests'. As a Kurdish father complained about Turkish channels:

> When we first came to London, we didn't have a satellite, so for a couple of months we watched English channels, then we bought a satellite dish. But I am not happy with the

> content of the programmes. There is no restrictions on anything you know. You can not watch them with your family without holding the remote control on your hand. In a normal film, suddenly that's a bed room scene. It is not suitable to watch with the children. We believe the English television is shameless, but I swear to God, ours is more shameless than theirs.

There might be one exception to this picture: Kurdish Television (Med TV), broadcasting from London at the time this research was being conducted. It is not a commercial station, in fact, it is a politically oriented pro-PKK channel, mainly carrying news relating to the Kurdish problem from a PKK perspective, with political talk shows and occasionally Kurdish folk music. The news is usually about the conflict in South East Anatolia and shows speeches of the PKK Party officials. In that sense, it works like a counterpart to the Turkish National Television, TRT, again with faceless speakers and uniform style imposed from the PKK top officials. However, in March 1999 the Independent Television Commission ordered Med TV off the air due to its breach of impartiality and incitement rules (Black 1999). (It then became public that the chairman of the commission was also one of the directors of British Aerospace which begun licensed production in Turkey of assault rifles and grenade launches (Pallister 1999)). It should be noted that during the week following the capture of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in February 1999, Med TV managed to mobilise many Kurds to protest in many European cities. On the other hand, there is no doubt that these were very extraordinary times for the community and increased the audience for the channel.

However, it is the highly commercialised and empty content of Turkish private television channels which appeals to the Turkish-speaking young people in London, not the politically oriented TRT or Med TV. As shown in Table 5.4, 45 per cent of the Turkish-speaking young people watch Turkish television stations, while 19 per cent and 26 per cent of them watch English and Turkish mixed and solely English television respectively. A Turkish teacher claims that:

> These children watch Turkish television, read Turkish newspapers and the only occasion when they speak English is when their teacher asks them something. Even in the classroom, they continue to speak Turkish.

As might be supposed from our earlier discussions, 66 per cent of the Kurdish young people watch Turkish television, while 58 per cent of the Cypriot ones prefer the English

channels. The distribution of the Turkish young people in each category is relatively even. 38 per cent of them prefer Turkish channels, compared to 20 per cent and 32 per cent of those watching English and both English and Turkish television respectively. It should be noted that TRT-INT is the least likely to be watched by young people, who overwhelmingly prefer to tune into one of the many private commercial channels. In other words, their main criteria is entertainment. In fact, most of the English channels they prefer are the music channel MTV or Sport channels.

Table 5-4: The Young people's Favourite Television Channels by Place of Origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other Places in Turkey			Cyprus			Mixed			Total		
TV Channels Numbers	Fem (40)	Male (52)	Tot (92)	Fem (17)	Male (17)	Tot (34)	Fem (33)	Male (17)	Tot (50)	Fem (13)	Male (17)	Tot (30)	Fem (103)	Male (103)	Tot (206)
Turkish	63	69	66	24 (4)	53 (9)	38	9	24 (4)	14	46 (6)	35 (6)	40	37	53	45
English*	10	6	8	24 (4)	18 (3)	21	61	53 (9)	58	46 (6)	29 (5)	37	33	19	26
Mixed	23	10	15	47 (8)	18 (3)	32	24	12 (2)	20	8 (1)	24 (4)	17	25	14	19
Kurdish (Med TV)	3	12	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	3
Don't watch	3	4	3	6 (1)	12 (2)	9	6	12 (2)	8	0	12 (2)	7	4	8	6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*these include some International channels, apart from Turkish ones, such as SKY TV or MTV.

Except for Turkish young people, there is no gender difference in terms of channel preferences. As indicated in Table 5.4, more than half of the Turkish boys prefer to watch Turkish channels, while nearly half of the Turkish girls watch both English and Turkish programmes. On the other hand, apart from the language differences, the content of the programmes they watched are very similar on both English and Turkish channels: they are usually soap operas or music programmes. As Geraghty (1997:41) points out,

> personal relationships are the backbone of soaps. They provide the dramatic moments - marriage, birth, divorce, death - and the more day - to - day exchanges of quarrels, alliances and dilemmas which make up the fabric of the narrative.

In his sense, apart from language, there is very little difference between Neighbours on BBC and a Turkish soap opera. There are no obvious differences between the Kurdish girls and boys in terms of television channel preference. Table 5.4 reveals that both of them watch overwhelmingly Turkish channels. Moreover, only a small number of them prefer to watch Med-TV. The number of Kurdish girls who watch Med-TV is even fewer than that of the Kurdish boys.

There might be several factors that encourage Kurdish young people to watch Med-TV less often compared to the other channels. Although some of the programmes are in Turkish, the dominant language of the broadcasting is Kurdish. The television channel also broadcasts in Kurdish dialects and Arabic. Most of the Kurdish young people have difficulties with the Kurdish language. Most of them can only barely understand and cannot speak it fluently. Moreover, like other Turkish-speaking young people in the sample they prefer entertainment programmes, rather than programmes that have political content. Mainly for this reason, they do not watch TRT-Int either. Both of the channels work like political broadcasting. Besides, even the entertainment programmes on both channels seem dull for the young generation compared to the flamboyant style of private channels.

The difference between a grandmother and her granddaughters' attitude to Med-TV illustrates why entertainment programmes do not appeal to young people. The old lady liked to watch Kurdish folk music on Med-TV, because unlike others she can enjoy the words as well as music. However, when one of the girls is present, they change the channel. The girls complain that her taste is too old fashioned and they prefer to watch one of the popular soap operas or talk shows.

Like Kurdish girls, the Kurdish boys like to watch Turkish television, but there are some differences between them in terms of programme preferences. The boys usually watch the sport programmes, while the girls prefer the soap operas and talk shows. However, it should be noted that during the prime times, all the family usually watch the TV together and for that reason, the prime time soap operas are often watched by girls and boys alike unless there is a second television in the household.

Apart from television, written media are also an important part of the young people's lives, though the Turkish-speaking young people watch television more than they read newspapers. Table 5.5 shows that 42 per cent of the young people read Turkish newspapers, compared to 20 per cent of those who read English ones. It should be noted that the most common English newspapers are so-called tabloid ones like *the Sun* and *the Mirror*, not broadsheet newspapers like *the Times* or *the Guardian*.

In London, Turkish shops sell almost all the leading Turkish newspapers such as *Hurriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*. There are also several local Turkish newspapers produced by the Turkish Cypriot, Turkish and Kurdish communities. Some of the local newspapers have free distribution. In practice, though, the written media, like television, seems not to provide much of a voice to the community. The content of local newspapers is nothing more than advertisements for Turkish shops and society pages, whilst the Turkish national newspapers are very biased.

In a study of five major Turkish newspapers, Inal (1995) observed a 'structural' bias in the press, arguing that powerful sources make the news. Ordinary people populate news only when they break the law. But even so, in crime stories, the journalist seems to rely on the police sources to define guilt and innocence (Inal 1995:135).

In fact, the most read sections in the Turkish newspaper are the magazines and the sports coverage, rather than the political news or the columns. There is not much difference in the young people's preferences in terms of their gender. On the other hand, the differences of places of origin make far more difference among the young people. More than half of the Kurdish young people and half of the Turkish young people read the Turkish newspapers, compared to 14 per cent of the Cypriots. More than half of the Cypriot young people read the English newspapers. In this sense, at least, Cypriot young people have a link to the society in which they live, while Turkish and Kurdish young people still have minimum contact outside of their communities.

Table 5-5: The Young people's Favourite Newspapers and the Place of Origin (%)

	Kurdish Populated Areas			Other Places in Turkey			Cyprus			Mixed			Total		
Newspaper	Fem (40)	Male (52)	Tot (92)	Fem (17)	Male (17)	Tot (34)	Fem (33)	Male (17)	Tot (50)	Fem (13)	Male (17)	Tot (30)	Fem (103)	Male (103)	Tot (206)
Turkish/ Kurdish	58	56	57	59 (10)	41 (7)	50	15	12 (2)	14	39 (5)	35 (6)	37	42	43	42
English	8	8	8	18 (3)	6 (1)	12	42	53 (9)	46	31 (4)	24 (4)	27	23	18	20
Mixed	13	6	9	6 (1)	29 (5)	18	18		12	15 (2)	18 (3)	17	14	11	12
Don't Read	23	31	27	18 (3)	24 (4)	21	24	35 (6)	28	15 (2)	24 (4)	20	21	29	25
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

On the face of it, there are many television channels and newspapers for the Turkish-speaking young people to choose from. They can read and hear television and newspapers from their country of origin at the same time as their counterparts in Turkey. However, their choices are not as wide as they appear to be. The content of the programmes which they prefer to watch is nothing more than entertainment with American style commercialisation. It is also a fact that the Cypriot young people receive this American style entertainment through other satellite channels which are mainly English.

The evidence so far shows that the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London, indeed, has a transnational character. Yet, this, by no means, shows that being transnational has paramount effects on the Turkish-speaking young people's lives.

5.3 Association between access to transnationational media and the young people's attitudes on various issues:

As indicated before, the most challenging dimension of transnationalism on the immigrants' daily lives is easy access to their visual and written media, otherwise the

regular contact has always been a part of the immigrant communities. This is especially true for Turkish-speaking communities in European Union countries. These countries' proximity to Turkey and the fact that the most of the relatives live within the boundaries of the European Union, have always made travel easy.

Besides, regular contact with relatives and co-villagers is more functional and essential in relation to the adult migrants, since according to the Transnationalists, their informal links provide them with economic as well as social solidarity. The economic dimension of this contact is not directly relevant to the Turkish-speaking young people's daily lives, since it is not them but their parents who participate in these activities directly.

The influences of the media are especially well documented in relation to young people's lives in general. Kellner (1995:162) suggests:

> Identity is mediated by mass-produced images in the contemporary media society, while image and cultural style is becoming ever more central to the construction of individual identities. Media culture provides a powerful source of new identities, replacing nationalism, religion, the family, and education as sources of identity.

Moreover, in relation to the influence of popular music on young people, Ross (1994:3) claims:

> The level of attention and meaning invested in music by youth is still unmatched by almost any other organized activity in society, including religion. As a daily companion, social bible, commercial guide and spiritual source, youth music is still the place of faith, hope and refuge.

In a study of a London district, Southall, Baumann (1997:210) observes that:

> The internal divisions by region could be multiplied, of course, by those of religion and intra-religious traditions, caste, migratory history, class, and numerous other factors. Yet the idea of Bhangra as an 'Asian music for Asians' consciously replaces these internal divisions by a shared external distinctiveness.

The effect of media on young people is also observed for Turkish young people in Turkey. According to Sirman (1990:35), in the village in Soke in the Aegean Region, the mass media, especially television, is affecting the eating and dressing habits of young girls who imitate the style of their favourite TV singers.

Given all these developments TV and Newspaper consumption has been chosen in order to discuss the relationship between transnational activities and Turkish-speaking young people's attitudes. As indicated in the first part of this chapter, it was the claim of transnationalisation students that the acceleration of interactions between migrants and home countries, especially since the mid 80s, has certain implications for identities, social lives and economic status in particular and thereby on the relations between migrants and the dominant society in general.

In line with transnational claims, the relationship between the media and the young people's attitudes will be measured in nine categories: Britishness, inter-ethnic marriages, religious practices, having a room for praying in the schools, arranged marriages, extended families, family sizes, partner's job and, finally, economic exclusion.

It will be argued that the implications of transnationalisation should not be exaggerated. As discussed in the first chapter, whether Turkish-speaking migrants regard themselves as Alevi, Sunni or Muslim is the product of long historical processes as expected of any ethnic or religious affiliations. Besides, as indicated in the second chapter, the structural transformation of family from traditional to modern forms also has a long historical background, and cannot simply be discussed within the limits of transnationalisation. In particular, parents being first generation migrants intrinsically includes the fact that their family structures have been well affected by development in Turkey, apart from the issue of transnationalisation.

As can be seen in Table 5.6, there is indeed an association between access to Turkish/ Kurdish media and the young people's attitudes towards Britishness as an identity. Nearly half of the young people with no transnational media access chose Britishness as an identity, compared to about two out of ten of those with transnational media access. In relation to inter-ethnic marriages, although both categories of young people are less likely to prefer to marry somebody outside the Turkish-speaking 'community', the number is smaller for those who have no access to the Turkish/ Kurdish media.

In this context, the transnationalism theorists might be right, when suggesting that transnationalism could influence the immigrants' lives. However, with respect to the practical implications of transnationalism, my research proves some limitations. In relation to the fasting practices of the young people for instance, there are no marked differences between those who have access to the Turkish media and those who do not.

Moreover, the pattern of indifference is repeated in the case of the young people's opinion on having a separate room for prayer in the schools. The young people's feelings about their families' intervention in their partner preferences also show similarities between those who have access to Turkish media and those who do not. Both categories of young people do not approve of the idea. Their negative attitudes on the issue of extended households also seems to have a limited connection with their access to transnational media technologies. And finally, the preference of Turkish-speaking young people for having fewer children in the future also has no relationship with access to the transnational media.

However, the most important claim of the model might be the potential of the transnational social field to neutralise the negative effects of the dominant society and to protect the second generation young people from downward assimilation. As discussed in the previous chapter, Turkish-speaking young people did not predict their future job prospects as lying in professional employment, despite their high aspirations in this direction, instead believing that they might end up with similar employment to their parents in the future. Apart from those with professional fathers, the young people were pessimistic about their future opportunities. In this sense, it is reasonable to accept that if transnationalism is as advantageous as its advocates indicate, the young people who have regular access to Turkish home media, might be more confident about their job prospects, since they do not need to struggle any longer within the boundaries of the receiving country and might feel less exclusion due to existing disadvantaged economic conditions.

Unfortunately, the opposite seems to be the case. As can be observed in Table 5.6, although both categories of young people, regardless of their access to transnational media, usually predict their future outside professional employment, the percentages with professional expectations among those with no transnational access is more than double those with transnational access. This pattern is also consistent in the case of visual media and written media access. Only one in six young people who watch Turkish or Kurdish TV predict professional occupations for their future employment prospects, compared to nearly one in four of those who do not watch Turkish or Kurdish TV. These proportions are much the same in the case of newspaper consumption.

In the light of these discussions, it becomes evident that having access to transnational media appears to have some association with less acceptance of British identity as one of indications of being adapted to the dominant society[5]. Even so, it seems that the relationship of transnational media with certain attitudes is much less close in other areas of the young people's lives.

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[5] Of course there are difficulties in making these claims, because of possible differences within the Turkish-speaking 'community' which this thesis seeks to emphasise. Despite the very small numbers involved, an appendix has been added so that the reader may use data at the level of each sub-group.

Table 5-6: Access to Transnational Media and the Young People's Attitudes (%)

	Turkish/Kurdish TV		Turkish/Kurdish Newspapers		Transnational Turkish Media	
	Access (140)	No Access (66)	Access (112)	No Access (94)	Access (152)	No Access (54)
Britishness						
Choosing Britishness as an identity	14	42	18	35	18	49
Choosing other identities	86	59	82	65	82	56
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Inter-ethnic Marriages						
Approved	28	40	21	45	25	45
Not Approved	70	60	79	55	75	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fasting						
Yes	45	51	53	45	52	43
No	55	49	47	56	48	58
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Having a separate room for prayer in the school						
Approved	37	44	52	33	43	38
Not Approved/Not Know	63	56	48	67	57	63
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Families' Intervention to the marriage						
Accepted	23	21	25	19	24	19
Refused	77	79	75	81	76	81
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage						
Accepted	13	10	12	12	12	11
Refused	87	90	89	88	88	89
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ideal Number of Children						
2 and less	59	61	58	62	58	64
3 or more	41	39	43	39	42	36
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employment Exclusion						
Professional Job Expectation	16	27	15	27	15	33
non-professional Job Expectation	84	73	85	73	85	66
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

5.4 Conclusion:

In recent years, there has been increasing academic attention to what is called the transnationalisation of migrant communities in general and Turkish-speaking communities in particular. In this process, the advances in transportation systems, credit transactions amongst the ethnic minorities of different countries, and globalisation of ethnic-minority media have become the most often cited changes in regard to the transnationalisation of ethnic minority groups. In wider terms, it was stressed that such developments substantially reduce distances between ethnic minority communities and their relatives at home and in other countries. It is also indicated that transnationalisation alleviates the dependency of ethnic minorities on the social and economic conditions in receiving countries, which were working as a mechanism for the reproduction of their disadvantaged status. In this sense, the transnationalisation process is claimed to be a challenge to assimilation, especially the assimilation of younger generations, and an effective solution to their economic exclusion in receiving countries.

In respect to such claims, this research investigated young people's attitudes on various issues in terms of their access to Turkish/Kurdish newspapers and television. It was found that there are certain indications that young people's attitudes are related with the transnationalisation of media. Most notably, the evidence might seem to suggest that watching Turkish/Kurdish television or reading Turkish/Kurdish newspapers is associated with young people's attitudes towards Britishness and inter-ethnic marriages. Those who have access to any of these or to both media facilities, had less tendency to describe themselves as British and to approve of inter-ethnic marriages. Accordingly, it is possible to say that these findings are consistent with assumptions regarding the implications of the transnationalisation process. Even so, however, my findings suggest that the implications of transnationalisation are not straightforward.

First of all, despite more acceptability of Britishness amongst those who do not access transnational media, the identity issue cannot simply be discussed within the context of growing transnational activities in recent years as opposed to the assumption of 'a hitherto frozen country image in the past' (Robins 1999a:4). As stipulated in the chapters on identity and education, young people's attitudes, especially in terms of religion, do not fit the stereotypical Muslim understandings: they were not strict followers of Islamic practices or strong proponents of religious incentives at schools. Such a divergence

cannot properly be understood without referring to the long-term historical background of religious and sectarian identity construction in Turkey. In this sense, young people's attitudes towards fasting or quiet places at schools do not vary according to their relationship with the globalisation of media.

Nor can the specific attitudes to family structure be discussed within the short history of growing transnationalisation. As discussed in the family chapter, young people in general showed considerable opposition to arranged marriages, extended families and having more than two children. Given that their parents are mostly first generation migrants in the UK, their differences could not be reduced to the 'assimilationist effects' of the mainstream society, but can only be understood with a specific reference to the changing family structure in Turkey. Accordingly, the young people who access transnational media like those who do not, are considerably reluctant about arranged marriages, extended families and having more than two children.

It is also worth mentioning that young people's predictions of their future economic prospects are not consonant with the rather optimistic expectations of scholars regarding the economic potential of transnationalisation. As discussed in the labour market chapter, most young people believe that they would not be able to acquire professional jobs in the future and that they will end up with disadvantaged jobs like their parents. Besides, as discussed in the education chapter, neither current education policies in general nor multi-culturalist incentives in particular, help to resolve young people's feelings that education would not help to achieve their occupational aspirations. Similarly, the analysis of students' responses does not suggest that those who have access to transnational media have more optimistic future-expectations. Ironically, it is those who are engaged only with the British media who appear to be more optimistic about their future careers.

Broadly speaking, it is possible to argue that the lack of willingness amongst the young people who access transnational media to consider 'British' as their identity or to approve inter-ethic marriages, might suggest that transnationalisation affects young people. Even so, regarding attitudes towards religious issues and family structure, this study failed to find any difference between those who access transnational media and those who do not. While pinning their hopes on transnationalisation to save ethnic minorities from assimilation, transnationalisation models fail to capture the fact that, in

the case of Turkish-speaking communities, no proper analysis of the differences and similarities between home country and receiving country can be advanced without referring to widespread changes in Turkey. Likewise the hopes pinned on transnationalisation to bring the economic disadvantages of ethnic minorities to an end, are not confirmed by the less optimistic occupational predictions of young people who access transnational media when compared to those who do not.

Conclusion:

In this part, I am not going to summarise the findings of my research in detail, as they can be found in the concluding parts to each chapter. Here I am drawing out several key issues and discussing some of their implications. A limited number of previous studies have either overly concentrated on Turkish Cypriot and Turkish young people, or overlooked the internal dynamics of the 'community'. The studies have identified a 'Turkish' culture in contrast to a British one, defining the young people's situation as caught between two different cultures. By doing this, they have understood Turkish speaking young people's lives and aspirations within the contexts of the assimilation and integration debates. Furthermore, these studies usually analysed young people in an educational context and mentioned other issues such as family and employment only when relevant to the young people's school performance. Consequently, these studies revealed very little in terms of sectoral and religious differentiation and changes within the community arising from these internal dynamics.

This thesis aimed to contribute to filling this gap. Yet as one of the first studies in the area, this one had its own weaknesses. Most notably, because of the lack of systematic information on Turkish-speaking communities, it was particularly concerned with providing basic information. Therefore, at times, the indicative features of the thesis have overweighed analytic discussions, although it has also attempted to link the empirical findings to theoretical debates on ethnicity. This study has not attempted to resolve the problems of young Turkish speaking people but to shed light on them. More than anything else, it has attempted to depict some of the key dimensions of the young people's lives, and what barriers they have had to overcome in order to survive, and how they have coped under the most difficult circumstances. In other words, this thesis has sought to identify how these young people live most of the time, and to set down what their aspirations, expectations and attitudes are towards certain issues, rather than show why they have these aspirations and attitudes. In this sense, this work might be considered a preliminary to later research. Another challenge for further research would be to extend the kind of analysis which has been presented here to include Turkish-speaking minorities in other countries, both in Europe, and in the classical immigration countries of the world such as Australia, America or New Zealand.

Apart from analysing these young people's lives and aspirations, my findings in this research have several implications in relation to the existing literature. First of all, the thesis has shown that it is difficult to identify a single Turkish and/or Muslim community. In this sense, it is possible to assume that diversity based on ethnic and religious differences exists within other ethnic minority communities, especially the so-called Muslim community in Britain.

There are a number of differences based on ethnic and religious identity among Turkish speaking 'community' members. Until now, studies of ethnic and religious communities in general, and Muslim and Turkish communities in particular, have assumed a distinction between mainstream social values, held to be secular, western and/or Christian, and ethnic minority values, held to be religious, traditional and/or Muslim. They also argue that a Muslim family structure associated with extended family size, a higher level of solidarity and patriarchalism would not converge with the modern, nuclear and individualistic style of Western families. In relation to this understanding of ethnic minority communities, multi-culturalists have tended in recent years to claim that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is because of the lack of recognition of their cultural assets in line with prevailing assimilation policies. This multi-culturalist understanding, like the theories on identity and family, has imposed its own ethnic and religious categories on some ethnic groups and then prescribed some cultural policies in line with these assumed cultural assets.

No doubt, members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' are aware of their differences in comparison to members of the dominant society. Yet they are also more aware of the differences within the Turkish-speaking 'community'. The fragmented nature of the Turkish-speaking 'community' creates factions based on religious and ethnic identity. Consequently, the Turkish-speaking young people's ethnic and religious identities should not be analysed merely as a result of the conflict between the values of the mainstream society and the values of the Turkish-speaking 'community'. The sources of their ethnic and religious identity are the conflicts that have existed in the community for centuries. The Turkish-speaking young people in this study were Muslim Turks, Alevi Kurds or Cypriot Muslim Turks and had not begun to consider themselves members of a larger Muslim community or identify with other Muslim minorities living in Britain. In any situation, they retain their religious and ethnic identity as Muslim Turk, Alevi Kurd or Cypriot Muslim Turk.

In this sense, the relationship between religion and ethnicity is complex. They do not always go hand in hand. It is controversial to call all members of the Turkish-speaking 'community' in London solely Muslim and Turkish. Making assumptions about religious identity is not a good starting point for analysis. When we assume a group's identity as Muslim, we can make three basic errors. Firstly, we can miss the differentiation at the level of self-identification of individuals. In other words, because somebody calls another a Muslim, it does not necessarily mean that they are a Muslim. Secondly, the practical implications of this identity can be missed. There are many differences in terms of religious practice. In other words, there are those who practice their religion and others who do not and this is an extra dimension of their identity. Finally, by assuming a group of people is Muslim, regardless of their differences, religious associations might be mistakenly taken to be the 'real' representatives of the community.

A similar diversity has become evident in the analysis of ethnic minority families as well. Like the studies on ethnic and religious identities, research on ethnic minority families has also tended to emphasise the differences between secular western nuclear families and traditional ethnic minority families, while ignoring the existing diversity among the ethnic minority families. With reference to Muslim ethnic minority families in general, and the Turkish-speaking migrant families in particular, it is claimed by some writers that, even though ethnic minority young people are affected by the Western-style families of the dominant societies, such influences do not have any inevitable implications for their future life when they become 'full-time' Muslims.

It is not only the identity and family studies, but the studies focused on the educational problems of ethnic minority children that also have a tendency to ignore the diversity within a particular group by imposing their own categories such as Muslim, or Turkish in the name of multi-culturalism. In the case of multi-culturalist education, in order to help explain the educational problems of ethnic minority children, a growing number of multi-culturalist scholars in recent years have claimed that the educational failure of ethnic-minority students is exacerbated by the lack of recognition of their cultural assets. However, when their suggestions regarding religious incentives in schools were analysed, it was seen that a significant proportion of the Turkish speaking children were reluctant to have a place in a school specifically designed for prayer. In line with this, those young people who did not fit classical typologies of being Muslim, felt they were not recognised as 'good Muslims'.

In relation to this current stereotypical understanding of Muslim identity and culture, this research has other implications relating to differences between the second generation and their parents. Among those who place a substantial emphasis on the distinctiveness of Muslim family structure, ethnic minority young people have usually been portrayed as being caught between their parents' traditional cultural values and modern values usually represented by the school system. This cultural clash supposedly creates a conflict between these young people and their parents. Consequently, there is real concern over the assimilationist effects of mainstream societies on young people. However, the present research showed that although differences between these young people and their parents existed, these differences could not only be encapsulated by the assimilation debate. There were a number of other factors such as the influence of changing family structures in Turkey and Cyprus, and the current labour market conditions in Britain creating these differences. Most importantly, these differences were negotiated by the young people and their parents. Despite the young people's ability to speak English (which gives them power over their non-English speaking parents, and creates the possibility of their becoming influenced by the family structure of the dominant society), there was a considerable attachment to traditional values. Most notably, attitudes towards pre-marital sexual relationships and inter-ethnic marriages were generally conservative.

At the same time, however, young people had in many respects a markedly distinct attitude from traditional understanding. The majority of young people did not want to have more than two children in their future families. They were strongly opposed to arranged marriages and they even claimed they would marry someone if necessary at the expense of earning their parents' disapproval. They were also rather reluctant to live in extended families. It was also encouraging to observe that girls in particular had positive attitudes towards women remaining employed after they had married. More importantly, however, it appears to be rather difficult to portray these young people's attitudes as simply the rhetorical repetition of the mainstream society's family values before they 'become a full time Muslim'. Although such ambitions might be regarded as the implications of the dominant society's influences, young people's attitudes were not basically different from those of their own parents. Given that most families are first-generation in the UK, such differences from the conventional Muslim family image

cannot be understood simply as the assimilationist effects of the mainstream society. It is crucial to take into account the changing family structure in Turkey and Cyprus.

The same fixed notion of traditional culture has also been evident in transnationalisation studies. While celebrating transnationalisation as a solution to the problems of assimilation, transnationalists ignore the fact that those exposed to transnational media do not simply see a home country which is 'frozen in the past' (Robins 1999a:4), but a country which is, as discussed earlier, continuously changing in many aspects. In this sense, transnationalisation is not simply something which introduces fixed values but a transition process in Turkey.

There was also another difference between young people and their parents in terms of the young people's economic aspirations and their parents' current economic situations. My research revealed that these young people certainly do not have low aspirations and have no intention of filling their parents' places in the labour market. Nevertheless, the thesis also shows that upward mobility is not an easy target for generations of migrants, especially if current labour market transformations are taken into account. It also became clear that the Turkish-speaking young people's perceptions of their economic prospects were clearly related to their parent's economic situation and their exclusion in the labour market. In fact, the parents' economic positions were not uniform and varied in terms of their places of origin, although they were located in the same deprived labour market and were dependent on the ethnic network to find employment. The Turkish-speaking young people were able to evaluate the situation and did not want to end up with similar jobs as their parents, although at the same time they thought their alternatives were considerably limited and that the situation might push them into undesired occupations. As a result, it was argued that existing differences between the young people and their parents could not simply be explained in the context of the assimilation debate, rather they should be considered in the light of the wider implications of the social changes in their places of origin and the current economic situation in Britain.

Apart from emphasising the ethnic and religious diversity and the need for a more comprehensive understanding of generational differences, another implication of this study related to young people's gender identity and gender differences in their attitudes towards various issues. Throughout the research, every single subject was also

analysed in terms of gender differences. For instance, their involvement with religion was not simply a matter of where they were from or the sects to which they felt they belonged. It also depended on whether they were male or female and whether their mother and father practised religion or not. In addition, although the working conditions were somewhat hard for the young people, both boys and girls, and the boys who helped their self-employed fathers after school hours worked very long hours, the demands were very extensive for girls with part-time jobs, since they also had to help their mothers with domestic tasks, regardless of the part-time jobs they might have had.

Furthermore, in the family chapter, it was argued that gender identity is not a simple result of conflict between two cultures: western and traditional. In fact, gender identities are negotiated between young men and women within the community. They not only had ideas about their roles and obligations in relation to their own gender, but they expected certain roles and obligations from the opposite gender as well. In other words, the girls not only defined what an ideal woman should be, but also defined how an ideal man should behave. This was the case for the boys as well. Moreover, these roles and expectations included both public and private spheres. In other words, the women's roles were not only defined in relation to the home, but outside it too. Likewise, the men's roles included both family and public obligations.

Another important implication of this thesis might be the subject of hybrid identities and inter-ethnic relations. In relation to being British, Turkish speaking young people felt that even if somebody was born in this country, she or he could not become British in the cultural sense. On the other hand, when they visited their country of origin, they felt different to the rest of the population and this difference originated in the country of birth, namely Britain. In this sense, it is difficult to talk about the existence of hybrid identities such as British Turk or British Muslim in the case of Turkish speaking young people. They still felt themselves Muslim Turk, Alevi Turkish Kurd and Muslim Turkish Cypriot.

In relation to cultural hybridity, their preferences for using a mixed form of Turkish and English languages as discussed in the family chapter, might be deemed to support the existence of cultural hybridity. However, apart from using the mixed language for the purpose of escaping from their parents' authority, this supposedly cultural hybridity factor was not detected in their friendship patterns or their attitudes towards inter-ethnic-marriages. Turkish speaking young people had reservations about some ethnic groups

in terms of friendship and inter-ethnic marriages and, in fact, the actual social boundaries around the Turkish speaking children might even not cross the inner boundaries of the sub-communities. Furthermore, young people's identities and their attitudes towards inter-ethnic and inner-ethnic relations had been influenced by historical and social developments in Turkey and Cyprus. For instance, unlike others, Cypriot young people were more aware of their differences from Greek Cypriots, while Turkish and Kurdish young people emphasised the importance of being Muslim or Alevi.

A final implication of this thesis is that it is necessary to analyse the effects of the wider economic exclusion of ethnic minority communities for a comprehensive understanding of the young people's lives and aspirations. The existing approaches often pay little attention to this issue. For instance, the evidence presented in this study suggests that Turkish-speaking students' educational problems cannot be entirely encapsulated into cultural debates. One also needs to take into account the implications of the economic exclusion of families on students' school-life in order to understand their problems. This became most evident when the case of the work experience scheme was analysed. It was found that most of the students were ostensibly 'placed' in the small-shops of the Turkish-speaking 'community' for which they were already working on a part-time basis. Accordingly, they had the feeling that education would not bring exclusion to an end in their future-life. Schemes such as work experience which inadvertently reinforce students' cultural identification with their own community appear to exacerbate exclusion.

Moreover, the analysis of the position of Turkish-speaking communities in the labour market showed that the current structural changes in developed market economies bring about severe disadvantages to immigrant communities in terms of employment opportunities. Most of them are pushed towards self-employment or other forms of informal community employment in the ethnic enclave labour markets. The unemployment and non-professional employment are more common among the Kurds and none of them have professional occupations. Turkish families might be situated in a better condition, compared to Kurds. The unemployment among the Turks is less than the Kurds and there are some Turkish professional fathers. Cypriot families might be the most advantaged group in the Turkish speaking community with the small number of unemployment and more professional occupations. Yet even they are still pretty much dependent on the ethnic labour market. It is also true for professional employees.

Beside, self-employment is much more common among the Cypriot fathers, and shop or clothing factory ownership has its own risk and restrictions to be handled.

Despite all their disadvantages, the Turkish-speaking young people's aspirations are clearly high, though they do not expect to achieve their aims. The differences between their aspirations and predictions should not be interpreted to mean that they were unrealistic about their prospects. On the contrary, this difference showed that they had a great level of understanding of what was going on around them. In fact, none of the young people wanted to work in clothing factories or small shops and none of those with self-employed fathers wanted to be self-employed. In the end, Turkish speaking young people feel that the exclusion in the current employment market is pushing them to make a choice: Whether to accept the jobs which their parents already do or attempt to make their futures better.

Broadly speaking, the young people's lives, identities and aspirations were structured by a multiplicity of ideological, cultural and structural factors, such as the impact of the global and the national economy on the local labour markets; social and cultural developments in Turkey and Cyprus; moral and cultural assumptions about women's and men's position in relation to the family, caring responsibilities and paid work; young people's own social and political perspectives on such issues, that is, how they might feel as well as think about them; and the role of education in the social construction of limited job expectations. In other words, economic, cultural, and social factors are all implicated. They are all integral to the framework of the analysis I have utilised throughout this thesis. And their combined effect, as I here tried to show, is that it is not sufficient to label them all 'Turks' as to assume that they share some larger and undifferentiated 'Muslim' identity.

APPENDIX 1:

QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION 1

1-Sex: **F** **M**

2-How old are you? 3-How many years have you been in England?

4-Is your mother alive? **Yes** **No**

5-Is your father alive? **Yes** **No**

6-Could you tell me who in your family is living in your house?

Mother	Father	Sisters- The number of and ages:	Brothers-The number of and ages:	
Grandmother	Grandfather	Mother's Brother	Father's Brother	Mother's sister
Father's sister	Cousins- the number of	Uncle's wife	Others (please, specify)	

7-Do you have any other relatives in England? **Yes** **No**

If you have, could you tell me who they are?

Sisters- The number of and ages:			Brothers-number. of and ages:	
Grandmother	Grandfather	Mother's Brother	Father's Brother	Mother's sister
Father's sister	Cousins- the number of	Uncle's wife	Others (please, specify)	

8- a) Where is your father from, please indicate the region?

the name of the city and/or village

b) Where is your mother from, please indicate the region?

the name of the city and/or village

9- Did you always live there, if no where did you live?

a) the name of the city and/or village

b) Who came to England, first?

Father **Mother** **Father&Mother**

Some brothers and/or sisters and the parents **Whole Family**

Other (Specify)

c) How long ago your parents had arrived to England before you came here?

10- Which educational level did you complete in Turkey or Cyprus?

Primary **Left Primary** **Secondary** **Left Secondary**

Higher **Left Higher** **Other (Specify)**

11-Have you ever interrupted your education? **Yes** **No**

12-If you had, why?

I now want to ask a few questions about your parents' work:

13-Does your father have a job in England? **Yes** **No**

14-What is his job? (Please give as much detail as you can)

a) where? (eg. factory, office, shop .....)

b) What kind of work does he do there? (eg. ironer, owner, machinist, unemployed.....)

c)How many years does he do this job?

d) How many days per a week does he work?

e) How many hours per a day does he work?

f) If your father works for an employer, where is his employer from? prompt.

eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot.....

g) What was your father previous job? please specify such as ironer, machinist, shop owner, unemployed etc.

h) How many years did he do this job?

I) How many days per a week did he work?

n) How many hours per a day did he work?

m) If your father worked for an employer, where was his employer from? prompt. eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot.....

15-Does your mother have a paid job in England? **Yes** **No**

16-What is her job? (Please give as much detail as you can)

a) where? (eg. factory, office, shop , home.....)

b) What kind of work does she do there? (ironer, owner, machinist,.....)

c)How many years does she do this job?

d) How many days per a week does she work?

e) How many hours per a day does she work?

f) If your mother works for an employer, where is her employer from? prompt.

eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot.....

g) What was your mother previous job? please specify such as ironer, machinist, shop owner, housewife etc.

h) How many years did she do this job?

i) How many days per a week did she work?

n) How many hours per a day did she work?

m) If your mother worked for an employer, where was her employer from?

prompt. eg. Turkish, Turkish Cypriot.....

17-Many school students have paid jobs these days, do you work part-time?

Yes **No**

18- Do you do any work for money?

Yes **No**

a) When do you usually do this?

Weekends Summer Holidays After School Fridays

Other (specify)

b) What are you doing? (working in a factory, a shop, a travel agency etc)

c) How many hours in a day on average in term time?

19- Is the person you work for a relative or a family friend?, if it is so, who is he or she? (uncle, aunt, father, mother etc)

20-If you work, Can you keep your money yourself? **Yes** **No**

If it is **NO**, do you give it to **your father** **your mother**

a) Do you participate in any Work Experience Scheme (WES) in the school?

Yes **No**

b) If you did, where did you work? in the factory, in a barber shop, in an off licence etc.

c) Who found this job for you? school, your family, yourself etc.

d) If you don't participate in a Work Experience Scheme (WES), do you plan to do so this year?

Yes **No**

e) If so, what sort of job would you like to do? factory work, off licence, shops etc.

f) are there any other working people in your family, apart from you, your mother and father? such as brothers, sisters etc. If so, who they are, what are their jobs.

SECTION 2:

21- How many years after arriving in England, did you start at school?

Less than one year **1-2 years** **3-4 years** **more than five years**

22-Please could you compare your performance in school in England with Turkey? Are you:

Much More Successful **A Little Bit More Successful** **About the Same**

A Little bit less Successful **A Great Deal Less Successful**

23-Which subject or subjects in the school do you like most?

24-Why? Prompt: teachers/ easy/ content/ language

25- Which subject or subjects don't you like at all?

26- Why?

27- In the school, do you prefer to have better contact with female teachers or male teachers? **Women** **Men** **I don't mind**

28- Why? we are from the same sex, women or men can understand you better, they are both teacher etc.

29-What kind of qualifications do you hope to get?

a) how many GCSEs do you have or think to have?

b) how many of them do you think would be grade C and above?

c) are you retaking any GCSEs? **Yes** **No**

30- Yr. 10/11 What will you do at the end of yr.11?

Yr. 12/13 What will you do at the end of this year?

SECTION 3:

31- What do you want to be in the future?

32- What do you think you will really do?

33-What is the possibility of having the job that you want?

No possibility **Very small possibility** **So so**

strong possibility **Very strong possibility**

34- How likely is it for you to get a regular full time job?

No possibility **Very small possibility** **So so**

strong possibility **Very strong possibility**

35-Do you hope to go to Turkey or Cyprus and work there? **Yes** **No**

36-In the future, the house you want to live:

In which city	In which area

37- How much money do you want to earn **PER Week or month** in the future?

38- If you have a lot of money, what would you like to do?

39- When you earn your own money, do you want to :

live with your family? **or** **have your own house?**

40-Do you want to marry in the future? **Yes** **No**

41- At what age would you like to marry?

42- How many children would you like to have?

43- What would your ideal partner's job be?

44- Do you think that you will have a common budget with your partner in the future?

Yes **No**

45-If you have a daughter in the future, what sort of a job, do you want her to have?

46-If you have a son in the future, what sort of a job do you like him to have?

SECTION 4:

47- Do you celebrate holy holidays (bayrams)? **Yes** **No** **Sometimes**

48- Do you celebrate new year? **Yes** **No** **Sometimes**

49- Does your father go to the mosque? **Yes** **No**

50- If he does, does he go:

Every day	Fridays	Holy days
Ramadan	Fridays and Holy days	Fridays and Ramadan
Holy days and Ramadan	Holy days, Fridays and Ramadan	

51- Does your father fast? **Yes** **No** **Sometimes**

52- Does your mother pray? **Yes** **No**

53- If she does, does she pray:

Every day	Fridays	Holy days
Ramadan	Fridays and Holy days	Fridays and Ramadan
Holy days and Ramadan	Holy days, Fridays and Ramadan	

54- Does she fast? **Yes** **No** **Sometimes**

55- Do you go to the mosque here? **Yes** **No**

56- If you do, do you go:

Every day	Fridays	Holy days
Ramadan	Fridays and Holy days	Fridays and Ramadan
Holy days and Ramadan	Holy days, Fridays and Ramadan	

57- Do you pray here? **Yes** **No**

58- If you do, do you pray:

Every day	Fridays	Holy days
Ramadan	Fridays and Holy days	Fridays and Ramadan
Holy days and Ramadan	Holy days, Fridays and Ramadan	

59- Do you fast here? **Yes** **No**

60- Should there be a quiet place in school for Muslims to go?

Yes **No** **Not know**

61- Would you like that? **Yes** **No** **I don't mind**

62- Which language do you speak with your parents?

63-Which language do you speak with your brothers and sisters, if you have any?

64- Which place in Turkey or Cyprus does your best Turkish-speaking friend come from? Sivas, Lefkose etc.

65- If you have ever had a foreign friend, where is s/he from?

I haven't got any	English	Scottish	Pakistani
Irish	Welsh	Indian	
Chinese, Vietnamese	Caribbean	African	
Greek	Greek Cypriot	Other (specify)	

66- Could you look at the card again, are there any countries where you never want to have a friend at all?

I haven't got any	English	Scottish	Pakistani
Irish	Welsh	Indian	
Chinese, Vietnamese	Caribbean	African	
Greek	Greek Cypriot	Other (specify)	

67- What group do you want your wife/husband to come from?

I haven't got any	English	Scottish	Pakistani
Irish	Welsh	Indian	
Chinese, Vietnamese	Caribbean	African	
Greek	Greek Cypriot	Other (specify)	

SECTION 5:

68- What are the names of your favourite television programmes? (Turkish and English please)

69- Which newspapers if any do you read?

70- Who is your favourite film star?

71- Do you have a boyfriend or girlfriend? **Yes** **No**

72- Where is she/he from?

73- What is your favourite song?

74- Who is your favourite singer?

75- What is a 'good man' in terms of your criteria?

76- What is a 'good woman' in terms of your criteria?

77- Do you ever go to the First Zone (Central London)? **Yes** **No**

78- How often?

Every day **At least once in a week** **At least once in a month**
every three months **every six months** **every year**

79- Do you go to the holidays to Turkey or Cyprus? **Yes** **No**

80- When did you go to there last time?

81- Which parts of Turkey or Cyprus have you seen in these holidays?

82-Have you ever been to any other country than England? **Yes**
No

a) If yes, which countries are they?

b) For what reason have you been to these countries? seeing your relatives, family holiday, going with friends etc.

c) Do you have any relatives living in other countries apart from England, Turkey and Cyprus such as Germany, France etc.? If you have please could you specify who lives where?

83- Have you ever been anywhere in GB apart from London? **Yes** **No**

84- Where?

b) For what reason have you been there? family holidays, visiting relatives, going with friends etc.

85-Which category below do you feel best fits your identity?

Turk	Kurd	Turkish Kurd	British
British Turk	British Kurd	Middle Eastern	Other (specify
Cypriot	Turkish Cypriot	Kurdish Cypriot	

86- Which category below do you feel best fits your identity?

Muslim	Christian	Alevi
Atheist	Other (specify)	

87- Which category do you wish your husband/wife to belong to?

Muslim	Christian	Alevi
Atheist	Other (specify)	

88- Which category fits your best friend?

Muslim	Christian	Alevi
Atheist	Other (specify)	

89- Which category below do you feel best fits your identity?

Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Indian	other group
white	black Caribbean	black African	black other	

90- Which category do you wish your husband/wife to belong to?

Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Indian	other group
white	black Caribbean	black African	black other	

91- Which category fits your best friend?

Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese	Indian	other group
white	black Caribbean	black African	black other	

92- Which category below do you feel is closest to your identity?

Traditional or Modern or something else (specify)

Why? your clothes, music, your family etc.

93- Which category do you wish your husband/wife to belong to?

Why? clothes, music, family etc.

94- Which category fits your best friend?

Why? clothes, music, family etc.

95- Do you smoke cigarettes? **Yes** **No**

96- Can you smoke in front of your family? **Yes** **No**

Only with my mother

97-Do any of the people you know (and I don't want to know who they are) use drugs?

Yes **No**

98- Where? **School** **Your street**

Outside **Other (specify)**

99- Do you think there should be more freedom for drug usage? **Yes** **No**

100- Why do you think so?

101- Do you give some parties in your home? **Yes** **No**

102- How many times in a year do you go to societies (such as TYA- Turkish Youth Association)?

Every day **At least once in a week** **At least once in a month**
every three months **every six months** **every year**

103- Which one do you go?

104- Do you have a satellite dish in your home? **Yes** **No**

SECTION 6: General Views

105- If your family do not accept your marriage with somebody, what will you do?

I do not marry **I marry against my family wish** **Other (specify)**

106- If you marry in the future, do you want to live with your family or your partners' family in the same house? **Yes** **No** **Not know**

107- Do you think it is a good idea for couples to live in the same house before marriage? **Yes** **No** **Not know**

108- Do you think you can do that? **Yes** **No** **Not know**

109- Can you accept it if your child does that? **Yes** **No** **Not know**

110-Do you think it is OK for people to have children without marriage?

Yes **No** **Not know**

111-Can you do that? **Yes** **No** **Not know**

112- If your child does that, how would you respond?

a- I support him/her, I try to help him/her.
b- I refuse to see him/her again.
c-I force them to marry
d-I beat them, then accept them
e-other (specify)

113- If you have a son who is going to have a child without marriage, is it different for you to have a daughter in the same condition? **Yes** **No**

Why?

114-Would you like to vote in the future? **Yes** **No**

115- Which party would you like to vote for?

116- In the future, which language do you think you will speak with your children?

Turkish **Kurdish** **English** **Other (specify)**

117- In the future, do you think you will go to Turkey or Cyprus for holidays? **Yes** **No**

118- Here are some descriptions of homeless people. Read them all. Which ones do you agree with?

a- They are alcoholic and drug addicts.
b- They have no place in the society and they are dangerous.
c- They are parasites living with the tax payments' money.
d- They have no families or relatives to protect them.
e- They are forced by the society to live like this.
f- The government does not help them, so they have to live under these conditions.
g- They are ready to change their conditions, if they have good opportunities.
i- Other (specify)

119- Here are some descriptions of unemployed people. Read them all. Which ones do you agree with?

a- they don't have a good education.
b- they choose the wrong occupation for themselves.
c- they do not try hard enough to find a job.
d- they do not have the powerful relatives or friends who can help them.
e- compared to other people, they are less intelligent and have less ability.
f- they are lazy.
g- the Government does not provide enough opportunities for them.
h- the employers do not treat all applicants equally, they make discriminations in terms of age, sex or race.
i- Other (specify).

120- What do you think three biggest problems will be in the world in the future?

War	Unemployment	Unequal development between the nations	Population increase
Poverty	Pollution	Global warming	Other (specify)
Starvation	Education	Disease	Health

121- Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with the sentences below?

a- There is no discipline over children in English families. **Agree** **Disagree**

b- Children have more freedom in English families. **Agree** **Disagree**

c- the respect between family members in English families is low. **Agree** **Disagree**

d- the English families are more supportive of their children's education.

Agree **Disagree**

e- the English fathers are softer than the mothers. **Agree** **Disagree**

f- in the English families, the men do some domestic jobs. **Agree** **Disagree**

g- the harmony among the family members in English families is less.

Agree **Disagree**

122- Sometimes women deserve beating, **Agree** **Disagree**

123- Why?

124- Sometimes children deserve beating, **Agree** **Disagree**

125-Why?

APPENDIX 2:

APPENDIX TABLE 1: Access to Transnational Media and the Young People's Attitudes by Gender (%)

	Turkish/Kurdish TV				Turkish/Kurdish Newspapers				Transnational Turkish Media			
	Access		No Access		Access		No Access		Access		No Access	
	Fem (65)	Male (75)	Fem (38)	Male (28)	Fem (57)	Male (55)	Fem (46)	Male (48)	Fem (74)	Male (78)	Fem (29)	Male (25)
Britishness												
Choosing Britishness as an identity	15	13	39	45	19	18	38	32	21	16	41	47
Choosing other identities	85	87	61	55	81	82	62	68	79	84	59	53
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Inter-ethnic Marriages												
Approved	8	39	38	36	16	34	33	41	14	39	41	35
Not Approved	92	61	63	64	84	66	67	59	86	61	59	65
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fasting												
Yes	67	31	52	50	77	30	43	46	75	32	35	53
No	33	69	48	50	23	71	57	54	25	68	65	47
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Having a separate room for prayer in the school												
Approved	26	25	31	21	30	25	28	22	30	25	28	21
Not Approved/Not Know	74	75	69	79	70	75	72	78	70	75	72	79
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Families' Intervention to the marriage												
Accepted	39	13	23	17	37	14	23	15	37	13	20	18
Refused	62	87	77	83	63	86	77	85	63	87	80	82
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage												
Accepted	5	18	6	17	9	14	3	20	7	16	4	21
Refused	95	82	94	83	91	86	97	80	93	84	96	79
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ideal Number of Children												
2 and less	67	54	59	64	65	50	60	64	65	52	59	71
3 or more	33	46	41	36	35	50	40	36	35	48	41	29
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employment Exclusion												
Professional Job Expectation	18	15	25	31	19	11	25	29	18	13	28	38
non-professional Job Expectation	82	85	75	69	81	89	75	71	83	87	72	62
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

APPENDIX TABLE 2: Access to Transnational Media and Kurdish Young People's Attitudes (%)

	Turkish/Kurdish TV		Turkish/Kurdish Newspapers		Transnational Turkish Media	
	Access (82)	No Access (10)	Access (60)	No Access (32)	Access (84)	No Access (8)
Britishness						
Choosing Britishness as an identity	12	20 (2)	10	20	12	29 (2)
Choosing other identities	88	80 (8)	90	80	89	71 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Inter-ethnic Marriages						
Approved	27	30 (3)	23	30	26	29 (2)
Not Approved	74	70 (7)	77	70	74	71 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fasting						
Yes	37	40 (4)	42	33	41	21 (2)
No	63	60 (6)	58	68	59	79 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Having a separate room for prayer in the school						
Approved	21	20 (2)	15	25	18	29 (2)
Not Approved/Not Know	79	80 (8)	85	75	82	71 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Families' Intervention to the marriage						
Accepted	22	30 (3)	25	23	23	29 (2)
Refused	78	70 (7)	75	78	77	71 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage						
Accepted	12	10 (1)	12	8	10	7 (1)
Refused	88	90 (9)	89	93	90	93 (7)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ideal Number of Children						
2 and less	57	60 (6)	60	58	58	64 (5)
3 or more	43	40 (4)	40	43	42	36 (3)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employment Exclusion						
Professional Job Expectation	10	20 (2)	12	15	10	29 (2)
non-professional Job Expectation	90	80 (8)	89	85	90	71 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

APPENDIX TABLE 3: Access to Transnational Media and Turkish Young People's Attitudes (%)

	Turkish/Kurdish TV		Turkish/Kurdish Newspapers		Transnational Turkish Media	
	Access (24)	No Access (10)	Access (23)	No Access (11)	Access (27)	No Access (7)
Britishness						
Choosing Britishness as an identity	8	80 (8)	41	59 (6)	33	77 (5)
Choosing other identities	92	20 (2)	59	41 (5)	67	23 (2)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Inter-ethnic Marriages						
Approved	23	50 (5)	41	35 (4)	38	39 (3)
Not Approved	77	50 (5)	59	65 (7)	62	62 (4)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fasting						
Yes	77	80 (8)	77	77 (8)	81	69 (5)
No	23	20 (2)	24	24 (3)	19	31 (2)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Having a separate room for prayer in the school						
Approved	46	40 (4)	53	35 (4)	52	31 (2)
Not Approved/Not Know	54	60 (6)	47	65 (7)	48	69 (5)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Families' Intervention to the marriage						
Accepted	23	20 (2)	29	12 (2)	24	15 (1)
Refused	77	80 (8)	71	88 (9)	76	85 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage						
Accepted	8	10 (1)	6	12 (2)	10	8 (1)
Refused	92	90 (9)	94	88 (9)	91	92 (6)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ideal Number of Children						
2 and less	62	60 (6)	59	65 (7)	62	62 (4)
3 or more	39	40 (4)	41	35 (4)	38	39 (3)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employment Exclusion						
Professional Job Expectation	15	20 (2)	12	29 (3)	10	39 (3)
non-professional Job Expectation	85	80 (8)	88	71 (8)	91	62 (4)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

APPENDIX TABLE 4: Access to Transnational Media and Cypriot Young People's Attitudes (%)

	Turkish/Kurdish TV		Turkish/Kurdish Newspapers		Transnational Turkish Media	
	Access (17)	No Access (33)	Access (13)	No Access (37)	Access (23)	No Access (27)
Britishness						
Choosing Britishness as an identity	29 (5)	33	14 (2)	35	25	34
Choosing other identities	71 (12)	67	86 (11)	65	75	66
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Inter-ethnic Marriages						
Approved	43 (7)	40		47	25	45
Not Approved	57 (10)	61	100 (13)	54	75	55
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fasting						
Yes	57 (10)	40	57 (7)	40	58	37
No	43 (7)	61	43 (6)	61	42	63
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Having a separate room for prayer in the school						
Approved	14 (2)	30	43 (6)	26	25	29
Not Approved/Not Know	86 (15)	70	57 (7)	74	75	71
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Families' Intervention to the marriage						
Accepted	29 (5)	21	29 (4)	21	33	18
Refused	71 (12)	79	71 (9)	79	67	82
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage						
Accepted	14 (2)	12	29 (4)	9	17	11
Refused	86 (15)	88	71 (9)	91	83	90
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ideal Number of Children						
2 and less	57 (10)	65	29 (4)	70	50	68
3 or more	43 (7)	35	71 (9)	30	50	32
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employment Exclusion						
Professional Job Expectation	71 (12)	33	43 (6)	37	58	32
non-professional Job Expectation	29 (5)	67	57 (7)	63	42	68
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

APPENDIX TABLE 5: Access to Transnational Media and Mixed Origin Young People's Attitudes (%)

	Turkish/Kurdish TV		Turkish/Kurdish Newspapers		Transnational Turkish Media	
	Access (17)	No Access (13)	Access (16)	No Access (14)	Access (18)	No Access (12)
Britishness						
Choosing Britishness as an identity	25 (4)	45 (6)	27 (4)	47 (6)	27 (5)	53 (7)
Choosing other identities	75 (13)	55 (7)	73 (12)	53 (8)	73 (13)	47 (5)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Inter-ethnic Marriages						
Approved	25 (4)	33 (4)	27 (4)	32 (4)	27 (5)	33 (4)
Not Approved	75 (13)	67 (9)	73 (12)	68 (10)	73 (13)	67 (8)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Fasting						
Yes	45 (8)	61 (8)	64 (10)	53 (8)	60 (11)	53 (7)
No	55 (9)	39 (5)	36 (6)	47 (6)	40 (7)	47 (5)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Having a separate room for prayer in the school						
Approved	33 (6)	17 (2)	36 (6)	16 (2)	40 (7)	7 (1)
Not Approved/Not Know	67 (11)	83 (11)	64 (10)	84 (12)	60 (11)	93 (11)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Families' Intervention to the marriage						
Accepted	25 (4)	11 (1)	18 (3)	16 (2)	20 (4)	13 (2)
Refused	75 (13)	89 (12)	82 (13)	84 (12)	80 (14)	87 (10)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Sharing the same household with their families after the marriage						
Accepted	25 (4)	17 (2)	9 (1)	26 (3)	20 (4)	13 (2)
Refused	75 (13)	83 (11)	91 (15)	74 (11)	80 (14)	87 (10)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Ideal Number of Children						
2 and less	67 (11)	55 (7)	64 (10)	53 (8)	60 (11)	53 (7)
3 or more	33 (6)	45 (6)	36 (6)	47 (6)	40 (7)	47 (5)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
Employment Exclusion						
Professional Job Expectation	17 (3)	28 (4)	18 (3)	26 (3)	13 (2)	33 (4)
non-professional Job Expectation	83 (14)	72 (9)	82 (13)	74 (11)	87 (16)	67 (8)
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

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